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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis investigates how preschool children acquire the 
meanings of unfamiliar words. In an attempt to clarify the notion of word 
meaning a three-fold distinction between sense, reference and denotation 
is introduced. It is suggested that knowing the full meaning of a word 
entails knowing both its sense and its denotation. 
Two main experimental approaches are implemented - the cross-sectional 
and the mini-longitudinal. In the first set of experiments (Chapters 2 and 
3) children's ability to infer denotation (Chapter 2, n=88) and to identify 
the referent (Chapter 3, n=60) of a novel term are examined. In both sets 
of studies children have minimal exposure to the new terms and comprehension 
is assessed immediately. The results of Chapter 2 suggest that children 
have greater difficulties discovering the meanings of unknown verbs than 
they do unknown nouns and that there are considerable difficulties for the 
young child to coordinate information given about denotation in a 3-series 
sentence task. On the whole children find the task difficult and there is 
a suggestion that performance fails to reflect competence. The experi-
mental evidence from Chapter 3 is, in contrast, unambiguous. Firstly, 
children find it harder to identify the referent of an unknown verb (p < 
.00001). However, children's responses are not random in this condition 
they choose the stimulus containing the objects initially associated with 
the unknown action (p < .001). This is not the case"with failures to 
identify the referent of an unknown noun. Secondly, children have greater 
difficulties identifying the referent of an unknown noun if it replaces a 
known lexical ite~ than if it replaces an unknown lexical item (p = .0033). 
It is argued that establishing reference is pre-empted by the existence of. 
an appropriate name in the child's vocabulary. 
Since acquiring the meaning of a new word is rarely a one-trial affair, 
the second section of this thesis attempts.to trace the acquisition of 
threenove1word~, an animal term (Chapter 5,n=16), a novel mode of 
locomotion (Chapter 6, n=12) and a nqvel shape or colour term (Chapter 7, 
n=14), in the lexicons of three and four-year old children qve~ a periqd 
of several months. The method is based on that of Carey (1978 a & b). 
Tasks assessing production and comprehension as well as sense and denot-
ation are introduced. In the case of the novel animal term, introduced 
by linguistic and perceptual contrast, children learn the term quickly and 
treat it in a similar manner to other known animal terms. Children have 
greater difficulty learning the new term for a novel mode of locomotion, 
supporting the earlier evidence suggesting that verbs are harder to learn 
than nouns. 
Chapter 7 attempts to assess the importance of solely linguistic 
contrast on the formation of the child's denotation of a novel term (shape 
vs. colour term). It is concluded that providing that the novel term is 
not pre-empted, lexical contrast is an effective manner of restricting de-
notation. Children's individual hypotheses concerning the meaning of the 
novel term are discussed in detail. 
The repercussions of these studies for future work in developmental 
semantics is discussed and a need to formulate objectnecriteria for full 
'meaning, such as sense reference and denotation, isrecognised 
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Typographical Conventions 
The following typographical conventions are used to assist the 
reader: 
Single quotations are used to indicate that a word's meaning is being 
considered (cf. Section 1.4); 
Underlining is used to refer to the word qua lexical item and for 
emphasis; 
Upper case letters are used to indicate denotations (cf. Section 1.4); 
Double quotation marks are used for quotations from other authors, 
statements from the subjects and for dialogue between the experimenter 
(E) and the subject (S); 
Square brackets are used to indicate semantic components (cf. Section 
1.5.2) and for inserts within the quotations of other authors. 
1.1 Aims 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis considers the process of semantic development in the pre-
school child. In particular the emphasis is on how youn~ children acquire 
the meanings of unfamiliar words and how the representation of these words 
changes over time. 
By the age of six the child has a productive vocabulary of between 
8,000 and 14,000 words (Carey, 1978a). This means that the child is 
acquiring between five to eight words a day for a period of four and a half 
years. We have a puzzle. The puzzle becomes more complex when we realize 
that words are not generally acquired in one trial, but at this stage in 
semantic development the child will be mapping the meanings of many new 
words at one time (Campbell, in press). How does the child proceed with 
this task which to the casual observer appears effortless - a task which 
would involve considerable concentration from an adult learning a new 
language or simply attempting to increase his-vocabulary? The adult is 
arguably better equipped than the child for he has access to knowledge of 
particular grammars, word formation rules and linguistically relevant 
distinctions of his own native language. 
As others have shown, and as I hope to show more fully, part ?f the 
solution to this problem is that, for the child, acquiring the meaning of 
a new word can be a lengthy process. The child may well progress through 
various "wrong theories" of a word's meaning but, as we shall see, he is 
flexible and has various linguistic and non-linguistic strategies to help 
him on his way. It is with these strategies that I am primarily concerned. 
1 
What sources of non-linguistic and linguistic information ca~ the child 
use to work out the rules governing the application of a new word? Can 
this process be traced from the child's initial encounter with a term for 
a set period of tifue with different terms representing different word 
classes in the English lexicon ? 
2" 
1.2 The need for eclecticism in research on meaning 
Three distinct approaches to the problem of meaning can be discerned -
the logical, the linguistic and the pragmatic. Each perspective deals with 
a different and distinct aspect of meaning and, not surprisingly, each 
orientation is viewed by its proponents as dealing with the central issue(s) 
concerning "meaning". So for example, logical semantics is concerned with 
"the description of possible languages or gramm,ars 
as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are 
associated with aspects of the world" 
and not with "the description of the psychological and sociological 
facts whereby a particular one of these abstract 
systems is used by a person or population" 
Lewis, 1972:170 
I believe, however, that the tendency to presuppose the primacy of 
one particular view of meaning above the others is not a satisfactory way 
to approach the problem of semantic development. 
In that this thesis is concerned with the development of the meanings 
of individual lexical items we are explicitly involved with the conditions 
which govern the, child's appropri'ate use of a term. For example in the 
case of the word ball we are interested in the conditions under which the 
sentence "That is a ball" would be true. As such we are drawing a parallel 
between truth-conditional semantics and the acquisition of word meanings. 
Truth-conditional semantics assumes that meaning is inherent in the symbol 
that expresses it. The traditional manner of dealing with the truth con-
ditions of any sentence(s) in which a word (X) occurs is to list the entail-
ments of S. It is self-evident that while the primary goal for certain 
logicians is determining the truth conditions of each sentence in a 
language, natural or formal, this is not the primary goal of the child. 
The linguistic approach to meaning, in contrast to the log~cal, 
focuses on the fundamental characteristics of the word. Roughly, these 
.. investigators view words as composed of elementary semantic components (cf. 
Section 1.5.2). The ultimate goal of this type of analysis is to derive 
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a set of components which cannot be decomposed any further - semantic 
primitives. Semantic components have been used (a) to prove that sentences 
are analytic, self-contradictory or anomalous and (b) to account for the 
meaning relations' among words in the vocabulary, ego synonymy. If such an 
approach were the sole perspective taken we would be restricting our analysis 
to the relationships between words to the exclusion of the word-world 
relationships. Furthermore such an orientation makes the implicit 
assumption that there is simply a quantitative difference between the 
semantic representations of children and adults - an assumption which 
requires justification. 
So while logicians are concerned with the truth relationships between 
a word and a particular world, linguists are concerned with the fundamental 
structure of the word. Neither of these approaches considers why the child 
uses language. The failure to acknowledge that the main goal for the child, 
at least at this stage in development, is communicative competence is I 
believe misleading. l~at is communicated is a function of the context in 
which the utterance occurs as well as the individual items (words making up 
the utterance). As Campbell and Wales (1970) state: 
"Much of what we say and write is constrained in 
important ways, by the particular circumstances' 
in which we are speaking or writing" 
1970:248 
So while verifiability theories of meaning hold rigorously for formal 
languages they fail to recognize an important distinction present in natural 
languages, that of utterance meaning and speaker's meaning (Grice, 1968). 
Focussing on the speaker's meaning rather than the utterance meaning 
places us in the domain of intentional semantics - pragmatic approaches to 
meaning (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Grice, 1968). Intentional semantics 
assumes that meaning is given by the speaker's intentions on any' given 
occasion, frequently referred to as a theory of language use. Psychology 
provides us with ~pirical evidence that both children (Donaldson and 
McGarrigle, 1974; Light, 1979) and adults (Bransford and McCarrell, 1974) 
are influenced by their expectations of the speakers intentions and their 
knowledge of the state of world. affairs - be they present or absent. From 
a philosophical orientation Grice (1968) has isolated a number of general 
maxims which specify the conv.entions which participants in a conversation 
should normally obey, conventions which we might term appropriacy conditions. 
Though it is clear that in conversations words do not appear in 
isolation and that the intended meaning of a particular word may vary 
between contexts due to various pragmatic factors, it seems equally evident 
that the meanings of individual words do constrain speakers' meanings and 
that one can discuss the meaning of a word outwith the context of utterance. 
It is a condition of being able to use a word appropriately that we know 
its meaning. 
The differences which exist between these three approaches to meaning 
should not be one of absolutes in psychology but one of emphasis. In in-
vestigating a child's communicative system the word and the context will 
interact and possibly carry different weights in different situations (cf. 
Campbell and Bowe, 1978; Hoogenraad, Grieve, Baldwin and Campbell, 1978). 
In fact the relationship between the two may well differ between children 
and adults. Emphasis on one to the toal 'exclusion of the other is likely 
to be a stultifying exercise for psychologists. 
Miller (1978) has suggested that 'the significance of an utterance is 
inferred on the basis of five main components: 
1. its meaning 
2. its linguistic context 
3. its social and physical circumstances 'including knowledge of the 
speaker 
4. a knowlegde of conventions governing discourse 
5. general knowledge. 
All of these factors will also affect the child's interpretation of 
a novel word and his potential for increasing his vocabulary given an 
initial encounter with a'previouslY unknown word. So while I am advocating 
an overall eclectic view of the child as a word learner, this thesis is 
primarily concerned with one aspect of that process, how the child comes 
to know the meaning of particular previously unknown lexical items. The 
problem for the child is two-fold - to map words onto the appropriate set 
of objects, actions or events and to form some representation of the 
semantic relationships which exist between different lexical items. These 
ideas are discussed more fully in Section 1.4. 
1.3 Ostensive wefinition and naming 
If one were to approach a parent or an educated layman and enquire 
as to how a child learnt the meanings of words one is likely to be told 
that objects are pointed at (or indicated in some way) and named. Despite 
the present tendency to discount the process of ostensive definition and 
naming or to claim that it is ineffective, substantially identical 
approaches may be found in the philosophical and early psychological, 
literature. Ostensive definition is a process of providing the meaning of 
a word be it by pointing to or using some other means to focus the child's 
attention'on a particular denotatum or referent (cf.1.4). The term 
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naming, as it is used in this section, is what would jl be called reference 
or in some cases reference and denotation (cf. 1.4). 
For example Augustine (1952) reflecting upon his own semantic deve1op-
ment provides the following explanation: 
"When they named anything, as theyspoke turned towards 
it, I saw and remembered that they called what they 
would point out by the name they uttered ••• and thus 
by constantly hearing words, as they occured in various 
sentences, I collected gradually for what they stood" 
(1952 :8) 
The noted linguist Bloomfield (1933) advocated a similar position: 
"If someone did not know the meaning of the word apple, 
we could instruct him by handing him an apple or pointing 
at an apple, and continuing as long as he made mistakes, 
to handle apples and to point at them until he used the 
words in the conventional way. This is essentially tne 
process by which children learn the use of speech forms'~ 
(1933: 140) 
More recently Carroll (1971) focuses on the naming aspect: 
"There comes a stage when the acquisition of voaculary 
is extremely rapid; this seems to occur when in his 
cognitive development the child has reached the point 
of perceiving that things, events and properties have 
names" 
(1971:32) 
There are a number of difficulties with such approaches. In the first 
instance ostensivendefinition, of itself, is never sufficient, since first 
of all the person interpreting the definition must know in advance the 
* Author's em~hasi~ 
significance of the pointing gesture and, secondly, be able to identify 
... 
the object or attribute correctly. Wittgenstein (1953) emphasises the 
latter point in his discussions in Philosophical Investigations (1.3.5 
numbered paragraphs) when he argues that it would be impossible to grasp 
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the force of an ostensive definition if one did not know the logical category 
of the word being defined - whether it was a colour word or a shape word 
for example. How is the child to know which category or 'level of speci-
ficity' (see Discussion in Chapter 3) the speaker is intending ? 
So problems certainly exist in identifying the ostendent when we are 
dealing with perceptually specified objects. Additional problemsarise when 
we try to account for the acquisition of abstract or relational terms. Can 
'in' be pointed at and named? Do we point at a set of objects which are 
in relationship with each other such that an adult would say X is in Y, 
and say "in"? We must surely take into account some of the other components 
enumerated by Miller (1978) in the previous section. On the other hand, 
how do we account for the fact that "square round" has meaning but no 
referent? It seems to me that we must go considerably beyond the process 
of ostensive definition in our search for an explanation of semantic develop-
mente 
The notion of 'naming' also merits some discussion. Lyons (1977) has 
distinguished between two forms of naming, the vocative and the referential. 
It is with the latter that we are primarily concerned. The idea that the 
relationship between words and things is primarily one of naming originates 
with the Greek philosophers. However, words do not name or stand for 
individual objects~ unless they are proper names, but for sets of objects, 
and the word learner be he adult or child must therefore be able to 
abstract certain general criteria for use of that particular word. As 
Harrison (1977, pIl8) states, the criteria for saying of someone that he 
knows the meaning of a general name can be specified in terms of the 
following two conditions. 
1. he must be able to identify with certainty an array of objects to 
.. 
ColliDgwood (19;8, p.227-22S) has made the same point clearly 
and concisely and discusses the repercussions of such an analysis. 
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which the name definitely applies together with an array of objects to which 
the name definitely does not apply plus a group of ambiguous objects. 
2. this assignment corresponds to that of another competent speaker of 
the language. 
It is worth keeping Harrison's criteria in mind when we wish to assess 
the child's semantic competence. 
However, Harrison's criteria deal only with the relationship 'between 
word and object; and as he remarks himself labelling alone "is a narrow and 
circumscribed ritual". 
Is meaning solely concerned with the relationship between word and 
object? Surely not, but this is what a theory of acquisition based on 
naming would imply. Semantics is also concerned with the relationships 
between words, ego synonymy, hypernymy, antonymy and converseness. In fact 
accounting for such relations has been the pri,mary goal of many semanticists 
(cf. Katz, 1972). These issues are not to be dismissed when considering 
semrultic acquisition. 
"Learning the meaning of an expression 
to operate correctly with an expression 
other expression which is equivalent to 
is learning 
and with any 
it" 
(Ry1e, 1957:257) 
I began this section by ,dis(}ussing the assumption that meanings 
of words are acquired through the process of ostensive definition and 
naming:- ostensive definition can be either explicit, that is point to an 
object and giving its name, ego "That is a cup" ,or impliCit, that is the 
fact that an objected is called X is embedded in the linguistic or non-
linguistic context; ego "Pass me the cup". As we have seen, this point of 
view is not without support. It is certainly worth considering what 
influences these procedures might have on semantic acquisition though they 
may not be able to account for the development of the full meaning of terms. 
In fact Schlesinger (1977) has recently suggested 
·fit.at the .A.11IC'IstJ.n1aa vi8 is bauoalq ooneot as 
far &8f1r,t !OW are oono.rn.etl. !'hea. woms are 
l.arnt b7 belDc l1m1 ted. to s,..1£10 ref.rel1ta •.. 
Lat.r 011. aa the oAil' atta1Ds inoreauDB 00DllDall' 
of the l~ tM oAild. .. learn woms th.ro'tlgh 
q'lli t. a 41ff.rent preo.sa ••• " 
(1977.1) 
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Sohl.aJ.Dcer·a poa1t1011 4o.s not OOBo.m ua here. 'bat it is worth 
remer)::JD. that .ven w:J. th Aia .od.1f1oat1oD.a to reatriot the 1l1t.ud. ref.rel1t 'lt7 
_aas of ... not1ou aa t.xtares, there are 41ff1Ol1l. t1.a, I10t tM l.aat lIa. to 
io w:J. th Aia not101'l of ref.ret pa1r1DB au' tM oAild.' s •• tabl1 ... nt of ".10'Nl 
perc.ptual coDf.f.ca:t'e.tioBa" (J\10). 
Oateu1oB is aa iDil.reBtq _'lt1p .. a _tho' of previci.:J.Dc a l1st •• r with 
iDf01'll8.t101'l abo1l.t aa o'ltj.ot........ lor euapl., the stat_.t "'Eaat 1. a cup" 
oaa 'It. intezpreted. in at l.&st fft:&:' tiff.ret W8¥8a the l1st.n.r' oeD a .... 
that that part1cralar object .. be call.' a.!!l' or that Ul'th:J.DB a1DLi1ar to 
that particular o'ltj.ot .. be called. a _.' or that that particular obj.ot 
1a a -p (D.ot a b1'Wllh aa 7GU IIl1pt lIav •• DOS->' or alt.mat1veq that uo"-
tAiDB 11k. thi8:o'ltj.ot is a 'cup' (to ....... who k:aowa the .. a .. of taB worel. 
'bat not ita 4eJ1Otat101l, of.' aecuoa 1.4). fta.fore, the real prebl •• with 
oeteu10. is tat the cl.f1a1 t1ol1 oaa b. 1at.zpret., in a _b.r of tiff.reDt 
Yqa, what iDfomat1on is extraeted. .t'reIIl ... a clet1a1 tioa upeI1cla OIl aow it 
is 1D.t.zpret.i. 
fta main J:'ea8Oll8 for ti8G\lsslDc ost.s1 ve cl.f1a1 t10n a:na DUliDB were 
b.oause· of 11M preval .. CM of 1IMse 1.as wi thin 11M lq popal.at1on eal to 
.11l.01d.at. a _ber of preb1_s oono.r.n.1Dc the aof[ll1u t10B of wom aea:n1JJC. 
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1.4 Sense, reference and denotation 
The previous discussion emphasizes the need for some elaboration of 
the notion of 'meaning'. Until this point I have been using the te~ 
intuitively. There are a number of ways that one might tackle this 
problem. It is possible, as Ogden and Richards (1923) have done, to 
present a list of definitions of meaning, 22 in their case. Leech (1974) 
takes a similar approach though he reduces the list from 22 to 7, giving 
primary importance to "logical meani~g". 
, . 
I shall adopt a more restricted notion of meaning, since I am 
concerned primarily with word meaning. I hope to show that the three-way 
distinction of sense, reference and denotation, applied to words is 
sufficiently rich to do justice to the child's task, while at the same time 
narrow and precise enough to permit the framing of empirically testable 
hypotheses. These three aspects of meaning will now be discussed. For we 
can only assess what is being acquired if we know what is to be acquired, 
that is, what counts as knowing thQ meaning of a word. 
Ry1e (1957) outlines the historical development of the theory of 
meaning and discusses a number of, initially, neglected issues which event-
ua11y led to a rejection of a solely referential theory of meaning. He 
emphasizes the point that it is not always the case that a word means 
nothing if it does not refer to somebody or something. It was precis1y this 
problem which led Frege (1892) to draw a distinccion between 'sense' and 
'reference'. 
"It is natural, now, to think of there being connected 
with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides 
the reference of the sign, also what I should like to call 
the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation 
is contained" 
(1892:57,) 
Frege's chief example has become common place in modern day writings 
on this topic. Although the evening star and the morning star both refer 
to the same object, the terms have different senses. From Frege's writing 
it is possible to extract three main points which clarify one's under-
standing of meaning. 
1. To a given referent (object) there does not belong only a single sign, 
that is an object can be referred to in a number of ways. 
2. In grasping a sense of a word one is not certainly assured of a 
referent. The underlying assumption here is that there are no pre-
suppositions about the existence of objects an~ properties outside the 
language system itself. So the fact that unicorns do not exist does not 
prevent us from discussing unicorns and does not force us to postulate the 
existence of abstract and fictional entities that do not exist in the 
ordinary way that tables and chairs do. More commonplace is the following 
example, I know what a virus is, say. It is a subcellular micro-organism. 
Yet staring down an electron microscope at a virus in full view, I have no 
idea that it is a virus. Aga~n the sense of the word is known but not its 
denotation. 
3. If words are used in the ordinary way what one intends to speak about 
is their referents (and denotata, see subsequent discussion). 
Psychologists until recently have failed to observe this distinction 
and even now it is a source of some confusion. What I hope to show is that 
this is a profitable way'of examining certain aspects of the acquisition 
of word meanings. The use of the terms sense and reference is by no means 
systematic in the writings of various authors and frequently different 
terms are used to draw a similar distinction, ego meaning and reference, 
intension and extension, connotation and denotation. 
I choose to make a three-fold distinction between sense, reference 
1 1 
and denotation following Lyons (1977). It may not be evident how original 
this suggestion of Lyons is. In fact even Lyona (1968) discusses only the 
difference between 'sense' and 'referer,ce' and although he distinguishes 
'denotation' from 'reference' (p426) he does not distinguish it from 'sense' 
(p428). It is interesting that this distinction is not generally drawn 
(but see Allwood, Andersson and Dahl, 1977) and is certainly not drawn in 
the psychological literature. It seems, to the present author at least, 
an indispensable distincticm. I "draw the distinction "as fo1.1dws:-" 
Reference: des cribes the re lationship betwl:!en an 06 ject and. a 
particular expression on a particular occasion of utterance. It is in 
fact an arbitrary relationship. An object can be referred to in any number 
of ways and it is "the person who refers who invests the exprl:!ssion with 
. ,\ ( ) reference by the act of referr1ng Lyons, 1977:177 • It follows from this 
analysis that reference is not a property of words per se but of word-
containing expressions in concrete utterances. 
Denotation: is however not constrained in this manner. Denotation, 
here, describes the relationship that exists between a linguistic term and 
a set of objects, a relationship which Lyons argues is external to the 
language system. An object which is referred to or denoted must exist. 
Therefore the term tree denotes a particular set of objects (ie. trees) 
and the individual trees are its denotata. A second example taken from 
Lyons might help to clarify this point. The denotation of the term red 
is a particular property and its denotata are all red objects (1977:207). 
It is possible to rephrase the following quotation by Frege to make this 
point: 
"Singular definite article always indicates an object 
whereas the indefinite arefcle ac'Companies a concept 'Word"tP.43) 
Reinterpreted in the light of the preceding distinction we might like 
to say that a singular definite article indicates a referential expression 
whereas an indefinite article implies a denotatum. 
It is' worth considering some of the repercussions of this distinction 
briefly. For example, "if words have denotation, their denotation will 
det~rmine their reference when they are employed in a referring expression" 
(Lyons, 1977:208). If a child knows, in some sense of the word, the 
denotata of dog he will know what sort of thing to look for,when told "There 
is a dog". An explanation of how a child gets from an initial referential 
act which is how he is likely to first encounter a term to full meaning is 
as yet unclear. That the distinction between denotation and reference may 
have an empirical motivation is shown by the following (possible) example. 
A child may know how to make successful reference using the word daddy 
(in utterances where he refers to his father) without knowing anything 
about the denotation of the term (except that it includes his father). 
Quine (1960, Chapter 3) advocates just this point of view with respect to 
early word use. 
Sense: Lyons' use of the term sense is more restricted than that of 
other philosophers and linguists. I have mentioned that both denotation 
and reference involve entities outwith the language system, sense on the 
other has to do with relations entirely within the language system ie. 
between words. Hence Frege's comment 
"That in grasping the sense of a word one is not certainly 
assured of a reference" 
The sense relationship is said to hold between the words or expressions of 
a language independently of the relationship, if any, which holds between 
those words or expressions and their referents or denotata (Lyons, 1977:206). 
_~-.For- example, Unicorn has meaning, not because of its denotation, but 
because of its relationship with other elements in a particular semantic 
field, ie. animals. It is precisely in this way that the semantic relation-
ship between words (sense) may be pertinent in the restriction of denotation, 
for the manner in which a child limits the denotation of a new term is a 
critical issue. Although Lyons regards neither sense nor denotation to 
be logically and ps,chologica1ly basic (p2l0-21l), it seems clear that 
although sense may not determine denotation it surely limits it. Knowing 
the meaning of X and the sense relationship between X and Y limits the 
denotation of Y. If we know that 1) X and! denote vessels and 2) X is 
incompatible with Y - whatever X is, is not Y and vice versa and 3) X denotes 
cups then 4) Y denotes drinking vessels which are not cups. Hence, knowing 
the semantic domain of a term helps set up the boundary conditions for 
application of that term. Knowing the denotation of a term does not 
necessarily help us to discover its sense unless we have some ~ priori 
knowledge of the object denoted, that for example a cup is a drinkillg 
vessel. We might know the denotation of cup without knowing the semantic 
domain to which it belongs. Equally we might know the sense of 'champagne 
glass' without knowing its precise denotation. 
The three-fold distinction between sense, reference and denotation 
has been introduced to elaborate the meaning of 'meaning' and therefore to 
dissect some of the strands involved in the acquisition of word meanings. 
It can be argued that this thr~e-way distinction provides us with a) a 
working definition of what is entailed by knowing the meaning of a word 
and b) an instrument with which we may hope to examine some of the issues 
and approaches in semantic development. 
As far as a) is concerned I have argued that reference is in fact an 
arbitrary relationship which is situation bound and therefore being able 
t'o decipher the referent of a referring expression on one particular 
occasion can be due to anything from a clever guess to knowledge of the 
.' . expresslons meanlng. 
Establishing successful reference is not a sufficient condition for 
knowing its denotation. If a child does not realize what is being referred 
to by a particular term he, is in nop~d don to work out the denotation of 
that particular term. I do not think that one would wish to argue either 
that knowledge of denotation is a sufficient condition for knowing the 
meaning ~f a lexical item. A child may know what the word cup denotes, but 
not necesaarily that it is a drinking vessel. Knowledge of denotation may 
however be a necessary condition even if a word denotes an empty set. ego 
unicorn. Moreover, if a child knowsthesense of a term, as I argued 
previously, he need not know the denotation,therefore sense is really not 
a sufficient condition either. What I would like to suggest is that to 
say ,that a child or adult had the full meaning of a term we would require 
evidence for knowledge of both sense and denotation. The individual would 
(using Harrison's criterion for denotation) know which items were definitely 
denotata,which were definitely not denotata,and a subgroup of questionables, 
but he would also know the relation of the term to other Hnguisticelements 
ie. the sense of the term. This interpretation provides us with rough 
guidelines for an operational definition of what is entailed in knowing 
" the meaning of a word. This is, of course, a more rigid but I believe more 
appropriate formulation than simply stabbing at some vague entity which one 
calls "full adult meaning". Assuming the presence of both sense and 
denotation in a child's "working vocabulary" for a particular term he would 
be. credited with full meaning, though this would not necessarily be full 
adult meaning. This would allow the possibility of a similar analysis for 
both children's and adult's lexical entries. 
I suggested that the approach to meaning advocated here would also 
permit clarification of some of the issues concerning. and approaches to 
semas.ti,o.cievelepnmnt. For example, McNeill (1970). and Nelson (1973b) draw 
a distinction between what they term horizontal and vertical semantic 
development. Rorizontal development occurs when the child has worked out 
some of the features of a particular word (Clark, 1973b, 1975) but not 
sufficient features for appropriate use (and the term maybe, for example, 
overextended in use). So in horizontal development not all the features 
associated with a word are part of the initial representation when the word 
itself enters the child's vocabulary. In contrast vertical development 
occu~swhen a word enters the child's vocabulary accompanied by most or all 
of its semantic features. However, when vertical development occurs the 
child does not realize the relationship between words sharing semantic 
features - a semantic framework must be developed. So for vertical develop-
ment the child's representation of the individual term is nearly complete -
it is the relationship between words which is 1acking- sense of the term. 
Now these two perspectives of semantic development are not mutually 
exclusive, although they are frequently treated as if they are. Rowever 
there is a tendency to regard them as two distinct semantic processes. I 
should like to suggest that they are two parts of the same process _ 
acquiring the full meaning of the word. If we look at word meaning from 
the perspective of sense,r.eference and denotation this suggestion appears 
not only tenable but imminently sensible. In the terms I am using here 
vertical development would be seen as the establishment of denotation but 
not sense, whereas horizontal development would be viewed as a case where 
denotation was not' Clearly delimited but sense relations might well be 
present. The child's representation of the new term would tell us what new 
information was required before he could be credited with full meaning, ego 
in the case of vertical development the sense relationship and in the case 
of horizontal development the boundary conditions for denotation. The two 
types of development are part of the same process. This approach would also 
allow a degree of latitude in assessing semantic development for it is 
possible from this perspective for different words to be learnt in different 
ways by the same child, depending on his previous experience with a parti-· 
cular lexical item. 
'if 6' ,r' < 
1.5 Representation of meaning 
Describing meaning as consisting of three interelated aspects - sense, 
reference and denotation provides us with a framework for approaching the 
meanings of words but leaves us with two principal questions: 
1. How is the sense of a term to be represented? 
2. How does the child arrive at the denotation of a particular term ? 
These questions are very similar to ~Yhat Kempson (1977) describes as the 
two most important demands on a theory of meaning: that is should account 
for semantic relations between lexical items and different linguistic 
expressions ego synonymity and paraphrase; and that it should account for 
the relations between linguistic expressions and the world, ego denotation 
and truth value. 
There is no simple answer to these questions. What I shall do is 
describe the approaches which have had the greatest impact on developmental 
semantics. The first. three modes of representation discussed are primarily 
concerned with question 1 but have implications for question 2. It is the 
answer to question 2 which has occupied developmental semanticists to the 
greatest extent, that is the criteria for application of a particular term 
(Bowerman, 1974, 1976; Clark, 1973, 1974, 1975; Nelson, 1974; see also 
section 1. 6.2). 
1.5.1 ·Hierarchical structures 
One approach to the problem of representation is to regard the lexicon 
as hierarchically structured. The crux of this approach rests on the 
relationship between superset and subset or category member relations. The 
hierarchical ordering of lexical items is best represented schematically, 
see Figure 1.1 
The broken lines in the figure indicate further branches on the tree. 
As can be seen from this figure each item is related by means of class 
inclusion to the one above it on the tree. The relationships represented 
on the tree are transitive, so that while 'dog' is a superordinate of 
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'setter', 'dog' is a subordinate of 'ma:tmnal'. Hyponymy is the term coined 
by semanticists to describe the relationship of class inclusion (cf. Lyons, 
1968:453) • 
"A hyponym is a subname: since the referents of the 
word "table" are included among the referents of the 
word "furniture", "table" is a hyponym of "furniture"" 
(Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976.:241) 
To deal with lexical items in this fashion is to deal with the sense 
relationships holding between the items, that is between word and word, 
and to envisage the word as a unitary structure. Knowing that 'dog' is a 
hyponym of 'animal' implies knowing something about their sense in a global 
fashion. I would like to expand briefly on my use of the term global. It 
is reasonable to argue that there is more to knowing the sense of 'dog' 
than that ieis a hyponym of 'animal', for example what are the basic 
semantic components of the term dog ? Surely being animal is only one 
of them. '~oman' is not only a hyponym of 'human' but is also incompatible 
with being 'man'. Lexical items do not just stand in one relationship to 
each other, although it can be argued that there is just one relationship 
per pair. 
Lyons (1977 :295-301) raises a number of .difficulties for such a heir-
archica1 approach. By faT the mo.st important here its the fact chat although 
some semantic fieldi,. particularly nominal Qnes, can be represented in this 
way, others lack a clear hierarchical arrangement. 
~I'l'here is no paradigmatic superordinate of which 'rQund', 
'square', 'oblong' etc are hyponyms: what we find instead 
is what. might be called a quasi-paradigmatic ·relation 
between these more specific adjectives and the more 
general abstract noun 'shape' II 
(Lyons, 1977:299) 
Although there is some experimental support for the hierarchically 
structured lexicon in the adult (eg. Collins and Quil1an, 1969) the major 
influence that this work has had on developmental semantics is not on the 
overall organisation of .the child's lexical fields (some authors arguing 
that there is no such organization until school age), but rather as a means 
of predicting the order of acquisition of particular words within the 
hierarchy. It is suggested for example that children first learn terms 
which are most useful for them talking about their world (cf. Brown, 1958). 
This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
There are therefore two major problems with a solely hierarchical 
representation to meaning - lack of applicability across semarltic fields 
d
J 
• 
and lack of specificity of the internal components of thewor s mean1ng. 
Finally it is unclear how an individual would get to a restricted denotation 
of a term from solely hierarchical sense relationships. Undoubtedly, there 
is some degree of hierarchical organization in the lexicon and this may be 
a useful concept for predicting the order of acquisition for certain types 
of'words. The arguments made so far would suggest there is more to the 
representation of meaning. 
1.5.2 Semantic components 
In contrast to the preceding approacn componential analysis does not 
treat a word as a unitary structure but rather as a complex number of 
components or features. This is a much more detailed way of characterizing 
the relation between words and originates from the work of anthropologists 
such as Goodenough (1965) and liguists ego Katz and Fodor (1963), Postal 
(1966) and Bierwisch (1970) • Semantic components are seen as basic units 
of meaning which combine in different ways to make up individual lexical 
items. These components are thought not to be decomposable any further. 
Ultimately there should be fewer components than words and we should 
be able to combine these components to form the meaning of any word in the 
lexicon. According to linguists these features are not to be defined in 
terms of physical properties or relations outside the language system, but 
are ~bstract entities. For example in Katz's sense sameness of meaning 
cannot be idendfiedw:ith $amenessof usage nor with sameness of reference 
but With the same co~itive content; that is with sameness of components. 
An 'example of c'Omponential analysis follows: 
"In this vein, spinster might be analysed as a semantic 
complex made up of the features (equivalently called 
components or markers) [female], [never married], 
[adul t ], [human] " 
(Kempson, 1977:18) 
We should be aware, though, that in describing semantic structure in 
terms of semantic components, we have merely transferred the need to 
explain meaning from the individual lexical items to the basic components. 
As Lewis (1972) points out: 
"Semantic markers are symbols: items in the vocabulary 
of an artificial language we may call Semantic Markerese. 
Semantic interpretation by means of them amounts merely 
to a translation algorithm from thE~ object language to 
the auxiliary language" 
(Lewis, 1972:169) 
What this approach cannot adequately provide an answer for is the relation 
between a lexical item and its denotata. It does, however, seem to be a 
satisfactory way of representing meaning relations8mong words within the 
vocabulary, ego synonymy, antonymy, converseness and hyponymy. 
There are a number of other limitations which are worth enumerating 
because of their repercussions for applying this mode of representation to 
child language. In the first instance not'all semantic fields can be 
broken down into discrete semantic'cO'l'IlJ:!>onents and certainly not 'all semantic 
fields are characterizable'by means of binary features like Cmale)/[female} 
What are the semantic comparentsof tulip 1 ••• [Hower] 1 If so, how do 
we distinguish tulip from any other sort of flower 1 This problem, which 
occurs for certain semantic fields - particularly taxonomies, has led 
linguiSts like Leech (1974) to suggest: that such terms should be left as 
unanalysed wholes. That is,when we are dealing with multiple taxonomies 
rather than binary contrasts, ego instead of 
B~y x = [Male xJ & ffon-adult xJ & /J!.uman €t 
we have the following,' ie. Gold (x) ;:; (<X)Metal. Leech's suggestion of an 
index (~ ~ ••• ) allows incompatibility relations to be derived. 
It can be argued (cf. Kempson, 1977; Lewis, 1972) that componential 
analysis fails to provide satisfactory answers to oth~r important semantic 
questions such as a) what are the necessary features for correct represent-
ation? b) Can all terms ,be analysed in the form of necessary and 
sufficient components? c) When is a property a criterial component of 
the word~ meaning and when simply a part of encyclopaedic knowledge? To 
i1lustrate)how do we decide which of these features .are necessary and which 
are contingent: 
Dog x - [animal ~ & 6arks €I & E legs ;g & 0as fleas, &Gy dog 
, Cara xJ? 
Wittgenstein's (1953) discussion of the term game is a case in point. He 
argues that there are no defining properties for 'game~ rather all games 
bear a family resemblance to each other. Each game has properties in 
common with some other game but there is no list of common properties. 
The componential approach has been directly applied to the field of 
semantic acquisition by Eve Clark (1973a, 1975) who proposed a Semantic 
Feature Hypothesis: 
"The s,emantic feature hypothesis states that when the 
child first begins to use identifiable words, he does 
not know their full (adult) meaning; he only has partial 
entries for them in his lexicon, such that these partial 
entries correspond in some way to some of the features 
or components of meaning that would be present in the 
entries for the same words in the adu1~s lexicon. Thus, 
'the child will begin by identifying the meaning .of a word 
with only one or two 'features' rather than the whole 
combination of meaning components or features (qua Postal) 
that are used criterially by the adult" 
(Clark, 1973:72) 
The empirical evidence concerning this hypothesis will be discussed 
in Section 1.6.2. An Andersen (1975:81) points out, this 'implies that 
children must learn both the specific subset of semantic primes which are 
relevant in his language and the combination rules which are derived from 
the actual lexical items. 
Clark's Semantic Feature Hypothesis will suffer from many of the 
limitations of the component~a1 approach but there is a subtle change from 
the linguists' representation to Clark's theory which should be made 
explicit. While the componential view deals with the relationships 
between words Clark's theory is dominated by the relationship between word 
and object. 
"In the Semantic Feature Hypothesis features should be 
taken as a shorthand way of representing a speaker's 
knowledge about conventions for the use of a word 
rather than as something inherent in the word itself 
- that is a method of formalizing the conditions that 
an object, event etc must meet before it can be 
referred to appropriately by the word in question" 
(Clark, 1975 :83) 
Effectively, what Clark has done is to use a system that was designed for 
representing sense as a basis for the representation of denotation. She 
must still explain how features originate not simply how they are used. 
Similarly, decisions for defining necessary versus contingent criteria 
must be made as must some explanation of words which can only be defined 
in terms of family resemblances. 
1.5.3 Pro totypicia1r.epresentations 
As I have just indicated, one of the difficulties for a componential 
view of meaning is that we are required to assign determinate components 
to words though their meanings are not always determinate. In contrast, 
prototype semantics attempts to represent' the meaning of a linguistic form 
through the presentation of a prototype or paradigm case. Particular 
instances may therefore be analysed in terms of their approximation to the 
prototype of the relevant category. It is only within the last decade that 
linguists (eg.Labov, 1973) and psychologists (eg. Rosch and Mervis, 1975; 
Rosch, 1976, 1977) have raised questions about definiteness of word meanings, 
though the prob~em had been raised in philosophy by Wittgenstein (1953) and 
in psychology, with respect to categorization processes, by Vygotsky (1962). 
The fact is that the boundary of word meanings are fuzzy (cf. Labov, 
1973; Lehrer, 1970; Lemwberg, 1975). The question is whether this fact 
applies to the sense of the term, the denotation of the term or both aspects 
of meaning? For example, Harrison (1977) allows for the establishment 
of vague boundaries in his criteria for denotation in that he allows for 
a set which is. indeterminate as to whether they are denotata or not. 
Before considering denotation in any greater depth let us deal with the 
implications this view has for our representation of sense. In essence we 
must now consider the sense of a term as consisting of a number of compon-
ents, some of which will be optional. It is possible to further specify 
the semantic description by adding more distinctions. Lehrer (1970) 
suggests a quantification of the components of meaning. Such an analysis 
would involve marking each component with a numerical indicator, say 0-9 
with 9 indicating the most obligatory component (cf. Andersen, 1975). It 
is suggesbOOthat the presence or absence of an optional component is deter-
mined by the context in which the word occurs, as the following statement 
from Lehrer indicates: 
"In dictionary entries, a component marked optional 
may in some contexts be definitely present in other 
contexts definitely absent though in still other 
contexts it may be impossible to decide" 
(Lehrer, 1970:90) 
Lehrer's discussion of indeterminancy deals with the sema~tic compon-
ents of words but the strongest evidence for considering words to have 
vague boundaries comes from data on how we actually classify elements in 
the wor1dl Linguistic classification means, of course, that we are dealing 
with the denotation of a term. Concept formation is equated with knowing 
thE: relevant attributes of the stimuli which are included in that concept. 
Psychological experiments on concept formation initially viewed concepts 
as consisting of a number of conjunctive elements, such that knowing the 
concept 'dog' entailed knowing the criteria for doggieness. It was 
Vygotsky (1962) who initially pointed out that referents of a word may 
resemble each other by one or more different features rather than having 
a set of defining features in common. More recently Eleanor Rosch (1973) 
has developed this idea and pointed out that not only do categories have 
boundaries but that some category members are better examples. of the 
category than others. From Rosch's perspective, a.prototype is viewed <,lS 
the hypothetical member of a category that represents the most typical 
conceivable member of that category. Instances may differ to a greater 
or lesser extent in their relatedness to the prototype (or in language to 
the core meaning). For example an apple may be a more typical example of 
the category fruit than a 1ychee. 
"Many examples have shown that categories are coded 
in the mind neither by means of lists of each individual 
me~ber of the category nor by means of formal criteria 
necessary and sufficient for category membership, 
but rather in terms of a prototype of typical category 
member" 
(Rosch, 1977:213-214) 
Acquiring the meanini of most. words involves a categorization 
process: 
"With the exception of proper names ,the words of a 
language are not labels for specific objects but rather 
tags for concepts or categories encompassing a set of 
often infinitely large similar" yet different items" 
(Lenneberg , 1967:322) 
The implication is that there is at least a similarity in the manner in 
which we categorize objects and the manner in which we group the denotata 
of particular words. 
There are examples in the lexicon wh€!re a 'simple component 1S sufficient 
to distinguish the senSe of one lexical item from another but it is not 
clear that this simple component distinguishes their denotations. It may 
. . 
be that their denotations overlap. So the action - travelling from 
Australia to Scotland - might be regarded by me as "coming' (because I live 
in Scotland) but would be regarded by you as 'going' '(because you Ii Ve in 
Australia) - different senses but the same action. Perhaps a better case 
is the colour lexicon where, for example, red hair made into a rug might 
be called brown. Thus the same object belongs to the denotation of red-
-
and the denotation of brown • 
-
It seems that how we draw denotationa1 
boundaries depends very much on the context given {cf. Fillmore, 1977 for 
an excellent discussion of this issue in terms of scenes and schemas). 
The crucial question is whether we may deal with vague denotational 
boundaries whilst a) retaining a sharp concept of sense and b) supposing 
that "sense determines denotation. I am not proposing to attempt to solve 
this issue but simply to suggest that it is a possibility. The sense of 
'come'and 'go' can be distinguished by a single, simple component. 
Certainly there is no, need to "implement the notion of a core meaning. 
However, it is the application of the sense of the word to the world which 
determines its: denotation and it is the world which governs the vagueness 
of denotation and denotational boundaries. Such an analysis does not 
, eradicate the problems of fuzzy boundaries and vague denotations, but 
simply shifts the problems to our notion of world, context, schema or what 
ever. 
The fact that context and use can be shown to affect the appropriate-
ness of the term used is only the beginning of how we get from sense to 
denotation. One of the strengths of this approach is that the system 
actually originates from what is happening in the real world, ie. how we 
actually do classify. From a developmental perspective we must ask such 
questions as; where does the requisite knowledge for identifying clear 
examplars as clear ones and boundary ones as boundary ones come from ? 
Since the ability to recognize attributes of the prototype when they are 
separated from each other entails the ability to break down the word into 
some form of componential representation we must still explain the develop-
ment of these features as well as how some features come to be regarded as 
more central than others. So while viewing lexical representations from a 
prototypical perspective appears t~ have greater external validity than a 
solely componential view, we must still explain the nature of the relation-
ship between sense and denotation and deal with the issues involved in 
"~uzzy denotation". 
1.5.4 Procedural semantics 
Procedural semantics is a theory of meaning in which the sense ,of a 
word is represented as a procedure, a set of operations for deciding where 
the word can and cannot apply. The aim is not to enumerate the entities 
to which a word applie~ but rather the specification of a procedure that 
could produce such an enumetation (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1977). 
Table '1.1 presents a simple procedure. As the table shows the steps 
are represented sequentially and removing or altering one step will affect 
the next step or subroutine. Since each subroutine is related the effect 
of altering one subroutine on the overall procedure is a problem in a way 
that adding or deleting a component is not for a featural approach to 
meaning. 
Table 1.1: Semantic procedure fOT man or Man (x) 
Step 1 Is x human ? 
If so continue to 2 
If not, go to 5 
Step 2 Is x adult ? 
If so continue to 3 
If not, go,to 5 
Step 3 Is x male ? 
If so continue to 4 
If not, go to 5 
Step 4 The procedure succeeds: x is a man 
Step 5 The ,procedure fails: x is not a man 
(taken from Clark & Clark, 1977 :440) 
It is possible to show the relations between lexical items in a lexical 
field by means of a decision table (cf. Miller and Johnson-Laird, 19'76). 
Although in essence a decision table is merely a different mode of representing 
a procedure it does not constrain the sequential order in which the process 
is carried out. It also allows us to present lexical items where a flexible 
taxonomy is required, such as verbal semantic fields. Table 1.2 presents a 
decision table for the lexical item seat. Each schema (indicated-by the 
numbers running horizontally at the top of the table) specifies a set of 
conditions that must be satisfied for an appropriate use of a term~ For 
example, for appropriate use of the term chair, conditions 1, 2 and 4 must 
be met. Note that also kitchen chair specifies these conditions and it is 
argued that context and communicative intent can be incorporated into the 
model to determine the appropriate item at the appropriate time. The 
conditions may be used either to test the relationship between words or 
between word and object. For an object to be labelled chair it must 
satisfy conditions 1, 2 ahd 4. The relationship between 'chair' and 'sofa' 
is established by examining thecondidons which each lexical item satisfies. 
In contrast to the other modes of representation discussed the emphasis 
of this approach is in examining the relations between the word and the 
world. Table 1.2 may be taken as an example. To determine whether x is a 
chair test which conditions are verified or falsified. The analogy between 
the truth or falsity of propositions is evident. The Y's (yeses) and N's 
-(noes) in the previous table can be regarded as direct test of the truth 
of a particular condition in a possible world-and as such minimally 
different from a model-theoretic approach to semantics. However, it is 
argued that while model-theoretic semantic theories are based solely; on 
truth conditions, relating to the assertion of prop~sitions, procedural 
theories allow a wider range of functional possibilities eg: 
"Utterances can be made with a view not only to 
verifying the truth of a proposition, but also 
in order to answer questions, comply with requests " 
(Miller ?nd Johnson-Laird, 1976:268) 
As is implicit in the earlier discussion the proponents of this 
approach are well aware that individuals work with both senses and denot-
ations and have not omitted the sense relation from their formulation. In 
the case of 'sense' the procedures themselves are treated as the data for 
investigation, "if the procedure for 'converge' is discovered to be more or 
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Table 1.2 A Decision Table for Seat (x) 
1 2 3 .4 5 6 .7 8 9 10 11 12 
Conditions 
c1. Forone(s) N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
c2. PPRT (x, backrest) Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N N 
c3. Upholstered (x) Y N N Y N N Y Y N N 
c4. PPRT(x, leg) Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Actions 
a1. Sofa(x) x 
a2. Park bench (x) x 
a3. PLW(x) x 
a4. Bench(x) x x 
as. Pianobench(x) x 
a6. Chair(x) x x 
~ a7. Kitchenchair(x) x 
a8. Stool (x) x x 
a9. Footstool (x) x x 
alO. Ottoman(z) x 
all. Exit x 
(Taken from Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976:288) 
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less identical to the one for 'move mutually towards one another'" 
(Johnson-Laird, 1977:103) the expressions are deemed to have the same sense. 
I am well aware that there are difficulties in determining whether two 
expressions are synonymous but I am not convinced that talking in terms of 
"more or less identical" is any significant advance in our understanding 
of the issue. At any rate, is a logical consequence of such a statement 
that if two words have the same procedure they are necessarily synonymous ? 
Are the procedures for "the morning star" and "the evening star" the same ? 
If so this is identical to the Fregean definition of sense. 
How do procedures go beyond components? In the first instance words 
which cannot be defined in terms of necessary components may be incorporated 
in such a model: 
"Some words require disjunctive rules, others some 
combination of conjunctive and disjunctive rules. 
The judicious choice and ordering of steps can 
enable a procedure to handle these more complex 
instances~' 
(Clark and Clark, 1977:440) 
In a similar v~in we can include the idea of a prototype in a pro-
cedura1 framework. The prototype of the lexical concept with which we are 
concerned might constitute the basic conditions for our decision table. 
This might indeed be suitable for concepts like 'fruit' and 'animal' where 
it might be possible to enumerate the important features of the prototype 
but where there are no core concept difficulties are to be encountered. What 
conditions would one want to set for 'game' or 'love' or 'poor' ? In the 
final case the question might well be 'poor' in relation to what? Semantic 
components may not be able to handle these terms any more adequately but 
this is not the issue. The important point is that both modes of represent-
ation run into difficulties with these terms and both are constrained by 
similar and as we shall see also different limitations. 
In essence the question one must ask is whether procedural semantics 
does in fact provide a viable direct link between words and the world or 
whether it is more profitably viewed as a change in orientation as regards 
representational frameworks: 
"Although investigators such as Bierwisch (1970) ~ave 
argued that semantic components correspond to basic 
perceptual and cognitive operations, the analysis 
itself doesn't require this or make it explicit. 
Procedural semantics does" 
(Clark and Clark, 1977:441-42) 
It would seem that one of the main protagonists of this approach (Johnson-
Laird) has some sympathy with the latter interpretation: 
"The chief advantage of a procedural approach is 
that the 'compile and execute' strategy forces the 
theorist to consider processes as well as structures" 
(Johnson-Laird, 1977:193) 
Specifying knowledge by how it is used may well be a more psycho-
logical way of tackling the issue ••• dealing with processes rather than 
structures, but brings with it its own problems. As Winograd (1975) points 
out, frequently there is more than a single use for an item and specifying 
each use in advance is unsatisfactory. Since declarative representations 
are sets of facts or assertions about a particular lexical item, it is not 
necessary to specify their intended use. 
It may well be, however, that formulating certain questions in terms 
of procedures forces us to ask the right kinds of questions about the child 
as a word leamer, especially in relation to the word/world relationship. 
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) conclude that procedures are based on 
functional/perceptual schemas. This is a hypothesis which is testable and 
would. seem to be supported to a certain extent by the developmental 
literature (Bowerman, 1978; Clark, 1973a, 1974; Nelson, 1974; but see 
Anglin 1978 with regard to the importance of function). It is interesting 
that these results have been reached without the intervention of procedural 
semantics. 
Procedures ultimately break down to some sort of componential analysis 
- calling them "conditions" evades the issue. As such, "condition.s" are 
subject to the same criticisms as components e.g. criteria for choice. The 
difference between Man 0uman (X~~dult (x~t;~de (xB as opposed to the 
:5 .1 
procedure illustrated in Table 1.1 is minimal if not non-existent. The 
process of deciding what is entailed by human (x) is the key and may well 
in the end be reduced to perceptual/functional criteria. It seems to be 
the questions-raised by procedural semantics rather than the answers 
provided which are important. Miller and Johnson-Laird argue that 
previously "theorists' intuitions have generally stood in place of reasoned 
, 
argument" vis ~ vis the choice of components. Their argument that the 
choice of primitives should ultimately be broken down to psychological 
criteria of appropriateness seems sensible. 
Recently there has been a swing from a dichotomy between procedural 
and declarative modes of representation to a synthesis of these approaches 
(cf. Winograd, 1975; Sinha, 1978). The argument is directed mainly at 
representation of knowledge, but there are repercussions for semantic 
representation: 
" ••• conceptual system, requires both procedural and 
declarative/propositionalm~desofrepresenting knowledge. 
It requires procedural representations of fundamental, 
concrete conceptual processes, and propositional networks 
representing abstract universal structures of knowledge 
(Sinha, 1978:38) 
" 
However, it is not clear to me that for semantic representation we have 
really done any more than describe the psychological issues involved, in 
the distinction between sense and denotation. This is certainly no easy 
task and one which may prove helpful for developmental semantics. 
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The danger is how we ~ the approach. Although procedural _ semantics 
is in its infancy, Clark and Clark advocate it as the most satisfactory 
means of representation for dealing with child language. Their objections 
have to do with details - for example, that so few words have been mapped. 
In constrast, I would advocate it as a valuable approach because of the 
change in emphasis and the consequent (hopefully) result of leading us to 
ask new and insightful questions. This should not lead us to dismiss the 
other modes of representation, as some procedural semanticists have already 
accepted. 
1.5.5 Is it necessary to advocate a specific form of representation? 
The simple answer is, for our present purposes, no. In that the 
present thesis is concerned with what is developing for the child as a 
"word meaning" the hierarchical, semantic component and prototypical views 
all provide us with guidelines as to what we should be looking for. All of 
these modes of representation have their limitations, and, as will be 
subsequently shown, different experimental paradigms and forms of analysis 
provide us with different types of answers. Also different word classes 
may be more appropriately represented in different ways. 
The procedural. approach which implicitly focuses on knowing how to 
u~ea word warns us of the danger~ of an over-static what approach to word 
meaning (McCall, 1976). It can be argued that the what and the how will 
-- --
interact. What a word meaning involves for a child will influence how it 
develops. Simi1ar1y,how the child treats the word learning task on different 
occasions will influence what is ultimately re~~sented. 
It is because of the limitations of the preceding models and the 
complexity of the issues at hand that no particular model is advocated. 
The particular manner of tackling the problem does not require it. The 
information that we obtain from children will in the end help us to present 
a realistic mod~l for the child. This may be different from that of the 
adult. There is no guarantee that it is simply a quantitative difference 
, 
between child and adult, as Clarks Semantic Feature Hypothesis implies. 
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1.6 Experimental evidence 
I have spent a considerable amount of time discussing theoretical 
issues in the hope that in so doing I would clarify some of the issues 
pertinent to the task at hand. We must have some criterion or set of 
criteria for deciding on what constitutes meaning or partial meaning before 
we can credit the child with specific knowledge and/or capacities. A dog 
responds correctly when we tell it sternly to stop doing something; however 
we would not wish to credit it with the capacity to understand the meanings 
of the particular lexical items constituting the utterance. This thE!sis is 
an empirical one. My goal is not to p.resent a possible representation of 
meaning or a possible progression in the acquisition of meaning (cf. Quine, 
1960), but rather to focus on how the child actually proceeds when he 
encounters a previously unheard lexical item. The results may well lead us 
to reformulate .our present repre~entations of meaning..The key question is: 
how does the child actually construct the meaning of a term from an initial 
encounter to the final phase of knowing its denotation and sense ? 
There are three sources of information available to the young child 
who meets a novel lexical item: linguistic context, situational context 
and the linguistic and conceptual knowledge already present within the child. 
Attempts to tap the child's representation of a word and his use of 
the sources of information available to him have until recently depended 
upon two contrasting, but potentially complementary, methods with variations 
on the main theme within each approach. These are the cross-sectional method 
with an emphasis placed on carefully designed experiments and observational 
methods which tend to be longitudinal in nature. 
1.6.1 Observational studies 
Observational studies investigate a child's spontaneous utterances in 
a natural situation. Enquiry into the origins of children's early word 
meanings has only recently gained the attention of experimentalist&. The 
observational method and the· keeping of diaries of children's earliest 
utterances is on the other hand a 10ng~estab1ished practice (Guillaume, 
:3 5 .. 
1926; Leopold, 1939; Preyer, 1882; Shinn, 1893; Sully, 1895). The contin-
uation of these methods within psychology, in a more systematic fashion, 
has concentrated on the first words of children and their possible 'pre-
historical' origins (Bloom, 1973, 1974; Bowerman, 1978; Greenfield and 
Smith, 1976; Nelson, 1973). 
Painstaking recordings of all the speech behaviour of a child isnotonly 
'\ 
problematic vis 2 vis interpretation (cf. Frances (1979) on Halliday, 1975), 
but once the child reaches the age of approximately 2:6 the difficulties 
increase. The continual contactlbetween parent (who is usually the 
ohserverrand child diminishes and the corpus of utterances becomes so 
large that some form of selection is required. The parent is no longer 
able to record every utterance and every experience with a word and its 
context. What the studies of early word meanings have shown us is that our 
understanding of the child's meanings comes from the errors which they make 
ego over-extension. Children's word meanings, at this stage, are frequently 
not like those of adults. They are from one point of view, viz the semantic 
feature hypothesis, incomplete. Figure 1.2 shows the ways in which a child's 
denotation can differ from that of an adult. 
Bowerman (1974, 1977, 1978) has continued to record selected utter-
ances from her two daughters, Christy and Eva, and presents us with some 
intriguing data concerning the later development of word meaning. Bowerman 
discusses a phenomena that she describes as late emerging 'errors' in word 
use. These are situations where a child has correctly, by adult observational 
standards, been using a word for weeks, months or years and then begins to 
make occasional semantic errors, ego Eva 3:9 to mother who is making dinner: 
"Can I have any reading behind the dinner ?" 
Up until this point Eva had used the term behind correctly. 
Initially one might like to argue that the child has made a simple 
mistake ••• one without linguistic repercussions. However, rather than 
this being a simple error, Bowerman argues that the child has made an 
important linguistic insight. Eva has realized that 'behind' and 'after' 
world@cts 
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Fig. 1.2 Possible Differences between a Child's Denotation 
of a term and that of an Adult. 
are semantically related. Eva's error violates the distinction between 
position in space (behind) and. position in time (after). 
Bowerman argues that ~hese 'errors' are not isolated instances but 
ones that are systematic and which demonstrate the 
"child's continuing analyses of structural regularities 
far beyond what is needed for fluent communication" 
(1978:981) 
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The existence of these errors at a later stage in development suggests 
to Bowerman that the child was not initially aware of the semantic 
regularities holding between the words. So that while the child had 
previously. a general idea of the kinds of contexts in which the word is 
appropriate (denotation), she was now in the process of isolating aspects 
which were of linguistic significance for a particular lexical domain (sense). 
There are a number of questions which should be asked about these data, 
some of which pertain to the word-classes which produce these errors (cf. 
Chapter 6) and others which have to do with the genera1izabi1ity of Bowerman's 
findings. Bowerman is emphatic that these errors should not be taken as 
"isolated deviations that are best eliminated quickly" but rather as "the 
possibility that they reflect impor-tant strides forward". I think the 
• 
cautious reader would agree that we must be wary of situations in which we 
choose to record isolated incidents - towaat extent is this a general 
phenomenonacross children? What is the frequency within a particular 
child's productive vocabulary of such errors? Is it possible to demon-
strate a lack of lexical organization before error production experimentally 
and a subsequent presence of "lexical organizers"? Is the difference one 
of tacit organization versus explicit? Many questions remain to be 
answered in relation to Bowerman's thesis. The most important insight is 
that seemingly correct production of a word by a child need not correlate 
with "full adult mearling" and that the acquisition of "full meaning" is 
an extended process. 
In contrast to the observations made of children's utterances, Rogers 
(1975, 1978, 1979) examines the opposite side of the coin - the mother's 
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utterances. Rogers suggests that the child derives much of his knowledge 
" 
about the~anings of words from the ways in which his parents use those 
words. His aim is to describe and classify aspects of the mother's 
language which are potentially instructive about word meanings. The 
studies initially reported make no attempt to deal with the efficacy of 
these methods. 
From his analysis of protocols dealing w~th size adjectives (1975), 
animals(1978, 1979) and household utensils (1979), Rogers has been able to 
identify two main aspects of maternal speech which are potentially helpful 
to children in learning the meanings of words: elaborative linkages and 
semantic extensions. Elaborative linkages are cases where the mother 
supplies a comment which would add to the child's knowledge about a word 
or about a world in which the word can be used. Rogers distinguishes four 
main classes of elaborative linkages: substitutions which are either 
instances of synonymy, hypernymy or hyponymy; constrastive linkages which 
indicate that the two words belong to the same semantic field but that they 
are not synonyms, ego its short - not very long; statements of equivalence 
which are similar to substitutions but are more definitional in nature -
ego a dog is an animal; and inclusion ego an x is a kind of y. (It is not 
clear in Rogers' writing how one distinguishes between inclusion and hyponymy). 
Semantic extensions on the other hand are cases when the mother supplies 
the child with further relevant information without employing another 
nominal from the same domain. The criterionfor 'relevancy' is problematic 
as Rogers acknowledges. He has, moreoever, been able to identify just two 
categories of semantic extensions; functional and 'other'. Bridges (1979) 
reports a similar set of behaviours where the mother referred to the target 
object in terms of the children's background knowledge of the objects' 
functions or associations. 
I think it is plausible to argue that elaborative linkages are clearly 
semantic in intent and also have to do with the sense of the term •. However, 
one can envisage them affecting denot'ation - ego "No that's a lion and this 
one's a tiger". Semantic extensions on the other hand, are better 
thought of as relating to general knowledge. An example of functional 
extensions (Rogers, 1979) will serve to illustrate this point: 
Object: icing syringe 
Mother: "It's an l.cl.ng machine, to ice cakes with. 
An icing machine for Christmas and birthday cakes. 
You fill it up with icing and press that down and 
it squirts icing out." (p19) 
The majority of the information presented in this excerpt is merely 
contingent and not necessary to meaning of icing syringe. The issues 
in determining essential properties versus contingent ones are contro-
versial and I do not wish to enter the debate at this point. I do 
feel that Rogers' analysiS should make some attempt to disentangle the 
two. Surely, IMother, "What's that?", Child,"pussy", Mother, "Yes, 
pussy like Nana's" is not germane to the meaning of pussy. Semantic 
extensions is possibly a misnomer. 
The implications of Rogerst work are intriguing. He has 
provided us with unequivocal evidence that mothers provide their children 
with linguistic information which could be used in working out the mean-
ings of words, especially in the case of elaborative linkages. The 
question remains to be answered as to whether children can and do use 
this information. Rogers (1979) reports a pilot study directed specif-
ically to the question of whether children make use of contrastive 
information. His results on the whole suggest that they do, but the 
experiment is fraught with difficulties: the sample in each group is 
small, i.e. 3; the materials are complex; and there are problems with 
statistical analysis. There is considerable room for clarification and 
modification before we can determine to what extent children can or do 
use the information present in elaborative linkages. 
Rogers deals with the information that is presented to the child. 
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Bowerman deals with the information which comes from the Child; these stUdies 
are fruitful sources of information and point us in (possibly) the right 
direction. What they lack is the ability to control the variables 
that we wish to investigate systematically. They also deal with small 
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numbers of children and are primarily concerned with production. 
Production is not a sufficient means of testing the representation of word 
meaning (cf. Anglin, 1977; Thompson and Chapman, 1977). 
1.6.2 Experimental Studies 1 
The missing feature theory (semantic feature hypothesis) (Clark, 1973a, 
1975) has provided us with a framework to ask many specific questions about 
children's partial understanding of lexical items within many specific 
lexical domains. The first set of experimental studies that I will discuss 
attempt to deal with this issue. In fact these represent the majority of 
experiments investigating the acquisition of word meaning. The experiments 
mainly assess comprehension, though some work has been done on elicitation 
of opposites (Clark, 1972). The ultimate goal of these paradigms is to 
discover ways in which children's pattern of interpretation differs from 
that of the mature speaker, with the hope that the errors that the children 
make will be suggestive as to the way in which semantic development is 
proceeding. 
The initial impetus for these studies came from an experiment by 
Donaldson and Balfour (1968) which suggested that young children treat 
'less' as 'more" or ~. 
"What seems to be occurring is that 'less' is 
understood to refer to quantity, but that it remains 
largely undifferentiated from 'more', with 'more' as 
the consistently dominant interpretation for the 
undifferentiated pair" 
(1968;470) 
Represented featura11y this means that the lexical entry for ~ is 
presented as ~uantitYJ" r: po1~ whereas ~ is simply presented as 
~uantit~J. 
Since this initial work many experiments have been carried out in 
several different lexical domains, all considering various predictions of 
the featura1 approach to meaning: ego dimensional" adjectives such as 
long-short, narrow-wide etc.: Donaldson and Wales, 1970; Wales and Campbell, 
1970; Brewer and Stone, 1975; Eilers, Oller and ELlington, 1974; Townsend, 
1976; Temporal reference such as before-after, first-last: Clark, 1970, 
1971, 1972; Amidon and Carey, 1972; Barrie-Blackey, 1973; Locatives, in 
on and under: Clark, 1973b; Wilcox and Palermo, 1974; Hoogenraad, Grieve; 
Baldwin and Campbell, 1978; Grieve, Hoogenraad and Murrary, 1977; Com-
parative adjectives more-less, same-different: Donaldson and Balfour, 1968; 
Donaldson and Wales, 1970; Palermo, 1973, 1974; Glucksberg, Hay and Danks, 
1976; Carey, 1977; Gordon, 1977; Grieve and Stanley, 1980; Spatial 
relational terms, in front of behind: Clark, 1973; Kuczaj and Maratsos, 
1975. 
Recently Richards (1978) has reviewed this literature with the aim of 
evaluating three of the basic assumptions of Clark's theory. For ease of 
interpretation I will list these three as predictions: 
Prediction 1: Given the componential nature of word meanings, it is 
predicted that the more general or perceptually congruent features are 
learnt first and the more specific features are gradually entered into the 
lexicon over time. So that in the case of spatial adjectives the pair big-
little would be learnt before any others (cf. Carey, 1978a). 
Prediction 2: By corollary of prediction 1, terms varying in the number of 
criterial features will be acquired in the order from simpler terms to more 
complex. 
Prediction 3: The unmarked member of an adjective pair will be acquired 
before the marked~and there will be a stage where the - marked term 
will be t~ed synonymously with the unmarked one, ego -~ as ~. 
Certain pairs of adjectives exhibit the property of markedness (cf. 
Greenberg,1966). Roughly, one member of the pair has a wider distribution 
than the other and occurs in some contexts where the contrast relating the 
pair is neutralized. It is said to be unmarked for the semantic contrast 
whereas the other term is said to be marked. Other properties {such as 
simpler form and psychological primacy {cf. Clark, 1973»have- been claimed 
for the unmarked member of such pairs. 
Richards t conclusions are not very promising for the semantic feature 
hypothesis. Many of the predictions fail. The prediction which fares 
worst of all is the third one which Richards states is completely unsub-
stantiated. It appears that certain non-linguistic biases either within the 
child or originating from the structure of the experiment lead the child to 
treat the marked member of a pair as an apparent synonym of the unmarked 
member. Moreover, if one inserts a nonsense word into the question frame 
instead of the marked lexical item one gets the same pattern of responses 
(Carey, 1977). So, unless one cares to argue that the child has a partial 
meaning for a previously unheard nonsense word, we have no grounds to 
suggest that a synonymy stage occurs. 
The first prediction holds up best, but only in the domain of spatial 
adjectives. I will be discussing these in greater detail subsequently. 
Richards concludes that the evidence to support prediction 2 is 
equivocal: for example, unmarked terms are acquired before marked terms 
--ill Lhec8ae of_long~5hort,--wide-narrow; in the majority of cases, ~' 
is acquired before 'less but no asymmetry appears to exist in the cases of: 
before-after, first-last, front, back, side; in, on, under; same-different; 
come-go; bring-take, or if it does exist it goes against the prediction. 
It would not be surprising if one was initially disheartened after 
this review of the literature for it would appear that we really know very 
little about the word learning process. We now know that many of Clark's 
predictions appear not to hold, but what does hold? Before discussing the 
latter point r should like to pinpoint some of the lessons to be learnt 
from these studies. 
Glucksberg et al (1976) replicated Donaldson and Wales (1970) study 
with the comparatives same-different. They obtained similar results to the 
original study suggesting that in certain tasks different was responded to 
in the same manner as same. However, they introduced an important control 
condition which was absent in the original design - a group of adult subjects. 
The adults responded in the same manner as the children did for the request 
"one that is different from this one", that is they.handed the experiment_r 
another instance of the same class of objects as the standard. Surely, we 
would not wish to conclude that adults do not differentiate between 'same 
and different. The design of the task placed inappropriate demands on 
the child. We must be wary of setting tasks for children which are 
necessarily going to present them as incompetent with regard to some experi-
mental standards as opposed to the standards of the mature speaker of the 
language. 
Many of the studies have indicated that children have a repertoire of 
non-linguistic and linguistic response biases which come into play in such 
situations. For example, Grieve and Stanley (1980) have shown that chi1d-
ren respond to less as ~ (apparent assimilation of meaning) in a context 
where a response bias operates in favour of an appropriate response more, 
but they respond to ~ at random in a context where there is no such 
response bias. However, Grieve and Stanley's results t"eave us in a 
quandary as to how the child does acquire the' meaning of less ·since their 
second set of results suggset that the difficulty does not rest with the 
underlying concept of lesser amounts. How do they work out the meaning of 
less ? 
-
.The second set of experimental results which are pertinent here and 
which give us some insights about the children's ability to cope with the 
language system are those of Hoogenraad et al (1978) and Grieve et al (1977). 
Through a number of well-designed experiments and careful interpretation 
of their data these authors have been able to isolate a number of important 
variables affecting the young child's comprehension (apparent comprehension) 
of the locatives in, ~ and under. They make the point that the child's 
interpretation of the experimenter's request "Put the x in/on/under the y" 
will be constrained by how the child views the objects natural 'canonical' 
relations as well as the nature of the request, ie. whether an action is 
required or not. When the child has no understanding or only partial under-
standing of the locatives involved the child will respond in a manner which 
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he construes as appropriate from the context, .eg. cups go on saucers,not 
under them. These authors emphasize the initial asymmetry between context 
and text for the child. Now this is an important point for the experi-
menter since he must, at least, attempt to discover what pre-existing 
biases the child has. However, it may be that the child's biases and the 
contextual constraints provided in particular situations in fact help the 
child build up meanings for a new term. Some contexts will restrict the 
meanings a child will guess more than others just as his response biases 
will predispose him to respond in one way rather than another. These 
restrictions may limit the children's hypotheses to one particular semantic 
domain therefore limiting the possible meanings of the word. Hence, the 
child may progress from being correct in context to a later stage when he 
has abstracted the criterial features for acontextual meaning. We have 
yet to show that early contextual responses help the child get from an 
Dnbalance of text to context to a balance of the two. Campbell and Bowe 
(1978) have shown that in some cases text can dominate over context. 
We have amassed considerable information concerning the preschool 
child; about his understanding of tasks in contexts, about his particular 
response strategies and biases, about what he does not do - ego treat 
marked terms as synonyms for unmarked ones - but we are still unclear as 
to how the child acquires semantic features and the nature of his partial 
representation of words. The work of Carey (1978a) is important here and 
appears to be a significant advance in our understanding of the word-
learning process. 
Carey evaluated the child's processes in working out the semantic 
features of spatial adjectives. She was interested in the acquisition of 
the feature ~imensio~ having argued convincingly that ~patial exten!J 
and ~olaritil were worked out earlier.' Carey found that individual 
children's error patterns on five tasks, testing the production and compre-
hension of spatial adjectives/were inconsistent with the notion that 
children had simply failed to include ~imensio~ in their representation. 
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Rather th7re was evidence (which did not show up on single task evaluations) 
that the child had a fuller meaning than the semantic feature hypothesis 
suggested, ie. more than simply spatial extent and polarity. Carey argued 
that the child not only extracts a subset of components of the adult 
meaning for the word, but also more specific information about the typical 
objects to which that word applies: 
"Thus sample lexical entries might be 
tall: (adjJ Gomparative] [+pol;\ [~uilding, ground up; 
-,> person head to to:] 
short: Gdj] (comparativ~ [:POleJ [re::son head to toe; 
L: ha1r root to end; 
distance direction of motio," 
The child has not differentiated those relationships which are 
criterial from those that are contingent. In other words, he has not mapped 
out which features in the language are lexical organizers. From Carey's 
perspective 
"The child learns object by object, and particular part 
by particular part, what spatial adjective applies to 
what kinds of variation" 
Carey's analysis implies that there might well be a significant role to be 
played by Roger's semantic extension~eg. enumerating the particular 
instances which are appropriate uses of an icing syringe, and likewise 
context strategy exemplified in the in,~ and under studies the children 
might well be provided with potentially valuable information. 
Carey suggests that the development of a word's meaning will be a 
reflection of the child's haphazard encounters with the word, hence her new 
theory ••• missing feature plus haphazard account of the acquisition of 
word meaning. The process of working out the lexical organizers will be a 
slow one for the child and as such would appear to be consistent with the 
emergence of Bowerman's late errors, discussed earlier. Until the features 
are worked out by the child the word appears to function as a "unitary 
label" encompassing a number of irrelevant aspects with respect to the true 
meaning of the word. 
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Carey's results are particularly relevant in that they offer a 
number of testable hypotheses. In the first instance it is possible to 
investigate other semantic domains with this particular theory in mind. 
Secondly, there is a suggestion that features that are available to the 
child as lexical organizers because of previous knowledge should be mapped 
more easily on to new words than those that are not yet available. It is 
\ 
worth investigating semantic domains other than those of relational terms, 
which appear to be particularly complex for the child. 
However, before such predictions are tested we are missing two import-
ant pieces of information: what "bits" of information can be used by the 
child in a single exposure to a new term; secondly, we must try and trace 
the acquisiti~n of a new term so as to investigate the gradual ac'cretion 
of relevant and irrelevant features. The next section addresses the former 
point. The latter issue is discussed and investigated in Chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7. 
1.6.3 Experimental Studies 2 
The preceding experiments all deal with cases where the child had had 
previous exposure to the lexical item and hence time to assimilate some in-
formation, be it necessary or contingent, about the denotation of the 
word in question. The experiments to be discussed use nonsense words, con-
forming to the intonational and spelling patterns of the English language, 
and are therefore unknown to the child. As I have previously stated, the 
child normally has three sources of information about the meaning of a 
word: the linguistic and non-linguistic context in which the word occurs 
and his own general knowledge. The first experiments discussed offer the 
children both sources of information. The use of nonsense words reduces 
the semantic information available to the child and forces him to focus on 
the other sources of information to infer tpe meaning of the unknown item. 
Brown (1957) presented children (age range 3-4 years) with a picture 
of an unfamiliar action being performed on an unfamiliar substance in an 
unfamiliar container. Children were tested in three conditions, each 
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condition involving a different nonsense word and a different intended 
referent. The order of presentation was balanced across subjects as was 
the nonsense word chosen. The three conditions were as follows: 
1) Do you know what it is to sib? In this picture you can see sibbing. 
Show me another picture with sibbing in it. 
2) Have you ever seen any sib? This is a picture with some sib in it. 
Show me another picture with some sib in it. 
3) Have you ever seen a sib? This is a picture with a sib in it, 
Show me another picture with a sib in it. 
The experimental stimuli consisted of three pictures containing either the 
unknown action, object or substance. Thestudy is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 3 where I have modified Brown's technique. Brown's study was 
actually concerned with children's recognition of syntactic cues to parts 
of speech but what his results also indicate is almost 'instant' learning 
about semantic properties on the basis of information about syntactic class. 
A referential relationship has been established - children can identify an 
unknown object, action or substance on the basis of one exposure to a new 
term. 
Braine (1971) provides similar data for an even younger child. Braine 
introduced his daughter to two nonsense words, niss and seb. The terms 
were introduced as' isolated words to prevent giving the child any cues to 
their part of speech. Niss denoted a kitchen utensil which the child 
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played with and ~ denoted the action of Braine's "finger walking". 
Both words were rapidly and correctly taken up into the child's speech. 
In a similar manner W'ykes and Johnson-Laird (1977) provided children 
(mean age 3;10) with an opportunity to learn some verbs. The authors 
suggested that the sUbject and object occurring with a verb might help to 
define its meaning, by elucidating the se1ectiona1 restrictions for a 
a particular verb~ use. The verbs were nonsense words which had no single 
word corresponding to them in English. The verbs were presented three 
times in a story which was supported by a non-linguistic context, ie. 
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acting out. In contrast to Brown's single exposure technique the story 
was told four times. On the first two occasions it was acted out by ·.the 
experimente. and on the final two by the child. The child was then pre-
sented with four items, unrelated to the story, and asked "Which one can 
X?" In all the tests at least half the children learnt something about 
the selectional restrictions of the verbs from the stories. they heard and 
the acting out they witnessed. The authors conclude that children learn 
the meanings of verbs very rapidly, often using cues provided by the 
selectional information of the sentence as a whole. 
Durkin (1980) reports an experiment he carried out with a group of 
4-5-year olds investigating the elicitation and comprehension of novel 
prepositions. Durkin substituted six English prepositions (above,near, 
round, in, under, between) with nonsense words in sentences with both 
regular and irregular syntax. Children were presented with two sentences 
each containing the nonsense word. The sentences were provided with non-
linguistic context by the presence of the two objects referred to in the 
sentence, in the appropriate relationship to one another, eg.: 
Linguistic context Non-linguistic context 
The brick is ~ the cup (in) Brick in cup 
The man is .~ the box Man in box 
Make it so the man is fep the jar Comprehension 
Tell me about the brick now (in box) Elicitation 
I shall not discuss the results from the irregular syntax condition 
because of a number of obvious methodological inadequacies, ego irregularity 
of the sentence varied considerably between test items. 
Durkin's main results may be summarized as follows: children's ability 
to infer the meaning of a novel preposition increases with age. Compre-
hension was good; it was scored on a simple incorrect/correct basis with 
an average of 10/12 correct for the older group and 7/12 for the younger 
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group. Both sets of results are significantly above chance. The prep-
osition involved as test item was only a significant variable with the 
younger children with above and betwee~ being significantly harder than 
the rest. Durkin devised an ordinal scoring system for the elicitation 
results, but since 90% of the children's responses can either be classed 
as incorrect or fully correct, I shall only use these data. It should be 
noted that of the preceding studies only Braine's data relate to production. 
In this study slightly less than half of the responses were incorrect, the 
rest being correct ••• quite a remarkable result. 
Durkin draws the following conclusion: 
"Children are able to take into account the syntactic role 
of the novel word, the semantic information of the rest 
of the sentence as well as the perceptual cues provided 
in the initial example" 
(p29) 
Data from Hoogenraad et al and Grieve et al suggest that knowledge of normal 
relationships between objects and the syntax of the sentence will also be 
important. 
All these studies suggest that from a single presentation the child is 
extremely competent at inferring something about the referent of the term 
from the context of the encounter. It is impossible from the~ data to dis-
entangle effects of linguistic context from non-linguistic context since 
all the studies present the child with both sources of information. To 
what extent can the child use solely linguistic information? 
Werner and Kaplan (1952) designed a task - 'the word context test' -
to determine the ways in which children (aged 8! - l3! years) could grasp 
the meaning of an artificial word appearing in a solely verbal context. The 
nonsense word always replaced an already existing English noun or verb. The 
children were tested with 12 six-sentence series. Each sentence in each 
series gave progressively more information about the nonsense word. The 
task, was presented in a written fOrm one sentence at a time and responses 
were given verbally. Werner and Kaplan's discussion of their data is 
lengthy· but their main result is clear - children did not/could not complete 
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the task successfully until they were about 11 years of age. The.average 
correct score at 9 years was 6.7% and only 47.7% at 13. Werner and Kaplan 
note that the major problems for the younger children were isolating the 
word from the sentence and failing to integrate the meaning between 
successive sentences, though often succeeding on individual items. If we 
make a direct inference concerning the abilities of the preschool child, 
the conclusions do not look promising. However, the children were required 
to give a full verbal definition of the word and the concepts involved were 
generally quite abstract. 
Recently, Campbell and Bowe have modified Werner and Kaplan's tech-
niques for use with younger children. They presented a group of three and 
four-year olds with six verbally presented 3-item series. The nonsense 
words all replaced concrete . nouns which would already have been present in 
the child's lexicon, ego 
John painted a clat 
Sue went in a clat when she went to see her granny 
Clats go on railR 
Lesst~half of the responses to the first sentence were appropriate, from 
which they concluded that children at this age can to a certain degree 
make a reasonable guess as to the meaning of a noun from a single sentence 
in .which it occurs. Children responded with "don' t knows" frequentiy and 
from my perusal of the raw data there was a definite failure on the child's 
part to integrate the 'meanings' from the three sentences. There was an 
important modification in their design which was not present in the original. 
Their experiment was designed so that the linguistic context of the second 
sentence would offer conflicting information to the linguistic context of 
the first. Now this modification was included to test a specific hypo-
thesis concerning text/context asymmetry (cf. Campbell and Bowe, 1978) but 
I think for our present purposes it· may bn1y serve to confu~e the issue. 
There is a further series of experiments which might lead us to 
qualify and modify the conclusions arising from the initial experiments 
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discussed in this section. Braun-Lame,sch (1972) conducted an extensive 
series of experiments on a large group of 5-9-year olds. Twenty subjects 
were tested in each age group for each experiment. The first experiment 
was a modification of the Werner and Kaplan task. On this occasion there 
were four sentences in each series and the nonsense word replaced known 
nouns and verbs. Again the overall results are not promising; in the five-
year old group only 2 responses of a possible 120 were correct, where 94/120 
were correct for the nine-year olds. If we look at the individual sentences, 
rather than the series, the results are slightly more encouraging. So, 
although the task appears more appropriate for the nine-year olds than the 
original version, it seems to be well beyond the competence of the five-
year old. The second experiment involved the same materials but this time 
the nonsense word was replaced by a gap in the sentence. The children were 
effectively asked to fill in the blank. ,This produced higher correct 
responses in the individual sentences. Braun-Lamesch (1972:81-92) suggests 
three possible reasons for this difference: 
1) a new and unknown element in a sentence could distract the child and 
affect understanding of the sentence as a whole. 
2) the relationship between a gap and its context could be of a different 
nature than that of a context word and its context. 
3) in the cases where a nonsense word is present the child has a double 
task that is identification of the nonsense Word and determining the 
appropriate word in context. 
There is of course a fourth possibility, the nonsense word may draw attention 
to slang associations, something which occurred in both the Werner and 
Kaplan and Campbell and Bowe studies. 
It would seem that the presence or absence of non-linguistic context 
is a significant variable in the child's performance. The conclusions 
are, however,not that simple. In the first place Braun-Lamesch (1973) 
presente,d children with several opportunities (in one session) to learn 5 
new animal names with object present (El) and 5 new verbs (E2) and the 
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results indicated that the children had great difficulty in associating 
the new name and the new animal in the first experiment and even more 
difficulty (p < .05) in learning the relationship between the known animal 
and the noise it was said to produce (E2). The majority of the children 
learned only one or two words. It is certainly possible that the simult-
aneous processing of all five items was too much for the child , but it 
also suggests that non-verba1 context might playa role in limiting the 
alternatives for the child, ego if four of the items were known and one not, 
as well as offering support for the utterance. 
Another significant factor which must be considered is that in both 
Wykes' and Brown's studies the method of assessing the child's knowledge 
was different. Picking out one item of a limited set is clearly less 
informative than selecting a verbal response from an unlimited set. In the 
former case the adult chooses the range of objects for the choice response 
and the child is limited to that range. Whereas in the latter case the 
child chooses the item he deems to be correct from a self-selected range of 
possible and appropriate lexical items (this range is only limited, in 
theory, by the size of the child's actual vocabulary). Moreover, in Wykes' 
and Brown's case children are only required to identify a single referent 
whereas in Werner and Kaplan's, Campbell and Bowe's and Braun-Lamesch's 
(1972, expt.1) studies the children must work 'out the denotation of the term, 
that is discover the range of objects to which the word may be applied. 
There is a final issue which must be considered, that is the lexical 
item the nonsense word replaces. In Werner and Kaplan, Campbell and Bowe 
and Braun-Lamesch (1972) the word replaces a known lexical item for the child. 
As such, the possibility of pre-emption must be considered, although Durkin's 
results suggest that this might not be an important factor. Pre-emption 
occurs when there is already a pre-existing term in the vocabulary with the 
same sense and denotation as the new word. So when Campbell and Bowe 
introduce the children to the term Cla,t' (cL earlier discussion of their 
study) the term is pre-emptedbecause the child already has an appropriate 
alternative in his vocabulary (i.e. train). On the other hand, since 
Wykes and Johnson-Laird use nonsense words to replace words for which 
there is no corresponding word in English, the problem does not arise. 
But is pre-emption a problem? There is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that it is~ Clark (in press) does suggest that pre-emption 
by synonymy is a constraint on which nouns can be used innovatively 
as verbs. She demonstrates that nouns are used innovatively as verbs 
only when a lexical gap exists; that is they supply a meaning not 
otherwise expressed by any lexical items to the speaker in question. 
This does not necessarily mean that this is true for other terms 
which are pre-empted in the child's lexicon. There are three possible 
strategies for a child encountering a pre-empted term. Assuming that 
reference is established, he can either accept the new term and discard 
the one with which he is familiar, or he can reject what he is being 
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told somewhat bemused by the whole process or he can infer that the two 
terms are synonyms. As yet we have no concrete evidence to suggest that 
pre-emption is a problem let alone which alternative the child will take 
in any particular situation. 
issue in Chapter 3. 
It will be necessary to return to this 
In conclusion, data which appeared to be uncontroversial and 
enlightening are now overshadowed by a number of qualifications and seeming 
inconsistencies. These qualifications need to be investigated by the 
implementation of a number of control conditions. It is with some of 
these issues that the first set of my experiments will be concerned. 
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1.7 The Structure of the Thesis 
The present thesis is divided into two parts: Part I examines 
children's performance in a series of tasks involving minimal exposure to 
a novel word. Part II attempts to trace the course of acquisition of three 
new terms in three different groups of preschoolers. The experiments in 
Part II involve following the word's progression over a period of months. 
Part I attempts to elucidate the following points: 
1) To clarify the anomalies in the results concerning children's perform-
ance with nonsensewords. 
2) To discover exactly what information the child acquires about the 
meaning of a new word after a single presentation or minimal exposure. 
3) To assess the child's ability to derive the meaning of a new word when 
it is encountered in a solely linguistic context, that is how competent is 
the child when there is no supporting non-linguistic context. 
4) To investigate whether the theoretical distinction between sense, 
reference and denotation is an empirically useful way of interpreting the 
data acquired from studies in semantic development. 
S) Finally this section will discuss the validity of procedures, involving 
minimal exposure, for assessing the child's competence as a word learner. 
CHAPTER 2 
WHAT INFORMATION DOES A CHILD ACQUIRE WITH MINIMAL EXPOSURE 
TO . AN UNKNOWN TERM? 
Introduction 
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In Section 1.6.3 I discussed a number of experiments which have 
attempted to assess the preschool child's ability to infer meaning from 
minimal exposure to an unknown term. In the present Chapter I shall con-
centrate on two of the experiments reported, that of ~vykes and Johnson-
Laird (1977) and Campbell and Bowe (1978), in an attempt to clarify their 
conflicting results. 
It is a truism to state that the child's ability to acquire a new word 
will be a function of both the nature of the term and the sort of 
experience leading to its acquisition. It is, nevertheless, precisely 
these features which lead me to choose these two tasks for experimental 
investigation. The two tasks deal with different word classes, nouns and 
verbs, and both tasks present the child with different types of experiences 
before testing the representation of the term. Wykes and Johnson-Laird's 
story format with contextual support is arguably more familiar as an 
activity to the child and potentially more informative than the sentence 
series presentation of Campbell and Bowe, which lacks non-linguistic con-
textual support. There are, however, so many differences between the experi-
ments that it is impossible to isolate the main variable or variables which 
lead to their very different results. 
The studies differ (in design) with respect to the following five 
variables: parts of speech, verbal context, non-linguistic context, type of 
response required and whether the term was pre-empted or not. Wykes and 
Johnson-Laird tested their subjects with verbs, which were not pre-empted 
in the child's lexicon, in a story task with a supporting non-linguistic 
context and obtained results which suggested that the children were reason-
ably competent at deriving the meaning of a. new terin from a minimal number 
of exposures. On the other hand Campbell and Bowe presented children with 
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three exposures. to each new word, words which were likely to be. pre-emp'l:ed 
in the child's lexicon, in a wholly verbal context. Their results 
suggested that children were particularly bad at guessing the meaning of 
the new terms from such information. What variables might then account 
for these differences ? 
The literature on the acquisition of verb meanings is sparse and 
where it does exist there is no evidence· to suggest that verb meanings are 
acquired faster than nouns, in fact if any prediction were to be made it 
would run counter to this suggestion (cf. Go I don-Me adow , Seligman and 
Gelman, 1976). However, Brown's·data: (1957) suggested that children perform 
in a similar manner with both nouns and,verbs when presented with limited 
information with respect to meaning. As :such there is no obvioua reason 
to as.sume that this variable accounts for the higher success rates in Wykes' 
and Johnson-Laird's study. However, it does· seem that part of speech is a 
variable which should be considered in such studies for it may well be that 
d.ifferent WOT'd classes involve different processes of acquisition. 
The. second difference between" the two studies is the verbal context 
in whIch the new word is encountered. There is no evidence in the liter-
ature that children should pick up the meanings of words more readily in 
a story context than in a sentence series· context. However, children may 
pay a.ttention to different aspects of discourse in the two situations. For 
example the story presentation may deter. the child from focussing on the 
individual lexical items by placing more emPhasis on the theme running 
through t.he story, whereas the sentence presentation may lead to local 
identification of the linguistic elements involved. Such hypothesising 
would need to be empirically validated. On the other hand it might be 
that. the children are more familiar with a story framework and their very 
familiarity with the situations helps them to respond appropriately. There 
fs no a priori reason to assume that this variable accounts for the 
different rates in performance. 
The third difference between the two studies has to do with the 
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presence of a non-linguistic context. Wykes' and Johnson-Laird's study 
provided children with non-linguistic information in the form of acting-
out. Much emphasis is placed on the importance of non-linguistic context 
in the acquisition of word meanings and it therefore seems plausible that 
this was a significant factor in the differences between the two sets of 
results. However, the studies also differed in the type of responses that 
the children were required to provide. Wykes and Johnson-Laird asked the 
children to choQse the appropriate actor for the action from a range of 
four objects, whereas Campbell and Bowe required a verbal response. A 
choice response condition clearly limits the possible alternatives for the 
child. On the other hand, in the verbal response condition, responses are 
only limited by the size of the child's vocabulary. One would expect that 
responses would be limited to the domain of lexical items which the child 
deems as appropriate to the context. The limited choise of response items 
may therefore be a significant factor in the children's higher success 
rate in the Wykes and Johnson-Laird task. 
The final difference which exists between the two studies has to do 
with the womwhich the nonsense word replaced. In Wykes' and Johnson-Laird' s 
study nonsense words were used in situations where there is no English 
counterpart, ego 'sib denoted an action which involved both soaking and 
spilling, whereas in Campbell's study known lexical items were replaced 
with nonsense words. There is ncr evidence in the literature to suggest 
that children should have greater difficulty learning a new name for an 
object which they already have a pre-established name. In fact it would 
be impossible to learn superordinates, subordinates and synonyms if this 
was the case. 
Two experiments were designed bearing the first four of these five 
factors in mind. Table 2.1 presents the main differences between the two 
studies, which are the, basis for ,this work, as well as whether the variable 
was manipulated in the present study and whether any apdoripredictions 
were made, about the children's performance in a particular condition. 
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Experiment lA was designed to investigate the importance of the word 
class replaced by the nonsense word in a story context similar to Wykes' 
and a sentence task similar to Campbell's. Each child received either 
nouns or verbs in the two different verbal contexts. From these data we 
should be able to determine whether part of speech and/or verbal context 
is responsible for Wykes' and Johnson-Laird's superior results. However, 
to maintain comparability with Wykes' and Johnson-Laird's original study 
experiment lA presents the story with acting out and choice response. It 
is therefore necessary to design a second study which separates these two 
variables. Hence experiment lB was designed. In this task children were 
presented either with stories acted out with a choice response or sentences 
acted out with a choice responseJor with stories not acted out and a verbal 
response or with sentences not acted out and a verbal response. Hence there 
were four groups of subJects,each subjectbeing tested with both nouns and 
verbs in one of the previously ennumerated conditions. 
What sort of predictions can be made? In the first instance we would 
expect children to respond more successfully in the choice response 
condition regardless of the verbal context in which the nonsense word is 
presented. In the second instance we would expect children to respond more 
successfully when acting out accompanied the presentation of the new word. 
Since in both experiments acting out and choice response are conflated, we 
would expect significantly higher results for this condition regardless of 
word class or mode of verbal presentation. 
Clearly if these predictions were supported it would be necessary to 
design a task where choice response and non-verbal context were separate 
variables, but as the reader will see the children had such difficulties 
with the task that it was decided not to continue with this method of 
assessing the word learning process. 
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Table 2.1 Main experimental differences between the studies of 
Wykes and Johnson-Laird and Campbell and Bowe 
Variable A priori Variable W & J-L C & B manipulated 
in this study . Predictions 
Part of speech Verb Noun Yes No 
Verbal context Story Sentences Yes No 
Non-verbal Present Absent Yes Presence of non-
context verbal context an 
advantage 
_Response Choice Verbal Yes Choice response 
required better performance 
Pre-emption No Yes No -
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EXPERIMENT 1A 
METHOD 
Subjects: 
The subjects consisted of 40 chi1dren,- Twenty nursery school children 
mean age 4;2 (range 2;8 to 4;11) and 20 primary 1 children mean age 5;2 
(range 4;11 to 5;10). The subjects attended local state schools in the 
Alloa area. 
Materials: 
The materials consisted of four sets of three sentences and four 
stories (verbal stimUli) and a variety of toys (designed for use in a do11 f s 
house) to act out the stories. 
The verbal stimuli were designed specifically for the task and are 
presented in full in Appendix 1A. In the sentence condition each sentence 
contained a nonsense word in eve format, of low meaningful association (cf. 
Noble, 1961), which remained constant throughout each set of three sentences. 
Each new sentence within the set was designed to give progressively more 
information about the denotation of the nonsense word. In the story 
. -
condition each nonsense word appeared three times within the story. In both 
conditions the nonsense word always replaced an item which should have been 
present in the child's lexicon at this stage (Burroughs, 1957). A pre-test 
in another nursery containing a similar sample of children supported this 
. assumption. 
Design: 
The children were divided into two groups which were balanced for age 
and sex: I and II. Group I received sentences and stories where a noun was 
replaced by a eve. Group II received sentences and stories where a verb 
was replaced by a eve. Within each block of' stories and sentences the 
order of presentation of the stimuli was randomized. Half the children 
received stories first and half the children received sentences first. 
In the sentence condition children were asked for a verbal response 
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whereas in the story condition a choice response was required. Before the 
beginning of each test session the child received a trial item. 
Procedure: 
The children were tested individually in a mobile laboratory (caravan) 
parked adjacent to the school. The caravan was specifically designed for 
experimental purposes. Within the caravan the child sat opposite !. The 
children, who had previous occasions to meet the !, were asked to play a 
guessing game: 
"Let's playa guessing game. It's a very easy game, it goes like this" 
at which point the child was presented with the trial item. The trial was 
always in the format of the initial condition. For example, if the child 
was to receive sentences first, the trial consisted of a three-sentence 
series similar to the experimental condition. After each sentence the 
child was asked: 
What do you think an x is? for the nouns 
Hhat do you think to x is? for the verbs 
In the story condition the story was read and acted out. Once the story 
was completed all the materials were removed from the table and four 
individual toys were placed on the table. Two of these toys represented 
animate entities, ego boy and duck, and two of the toys represented in-
animate entities, ego plate and ball. After each story .the child was asked: 
Which one of these is an x? for the nouns 
Which one of these can x ? for the verbs. 
Any spontaneous comments from the child were noted. All sessions were 
tape recorded. 
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RESULTS 
The initial discussion of the results deals only with a quantitative 
analysis of correct and incorrect responses. A correct response is defined 
as an initially unambiguous correct choice for the story condition and a 
correct guess at the meaning of the nonsense word in the third sentence 
for the sentence condition (cf. Appendix 1A for correct responses). So for 
the following three sentences the child must guess duck for the third 
sentence to be classified as being correct: 
1) Jenny saw a ged on the pond 
2) I play with my rubber ged in the bath 
3) All geds make quack quack noises 
For the following story the choice of objects for response were a cat, a 
fish, a car and a plate. The child must choose the cat to be classified 
as giving a correct response: 
Paul was walking along one day when he saw a lup run across the 
road. Soon he heard a lot of barking. There was a dog chasing the 
1up. The 1up ran up the tree. 
A qualitative analysis incorporating children's spontaneous utterances 
from both studies will be presented after the quantitative results of the 
second experiment. 
Two main factors were varied in the present experiment: the part of 
speech the nonsense word replaced and the context in which the nonsense 
word occurred. Figure 2.1 presents the number of correct responses in each 
experimental condition by the two age groups. 
There was no significant difference for part of speech replaced in 
the story condition for either group of children. However, whether the 
nonsense word replaced a noun or a verb did significantly affect performance 
in the sentence condition. Both younger children (Mann-Whitney, 2 tailed , 
p < .05) and the older children (Mann-Whitney, 2 tailed, p < ·.05) performed 
better with noun sentences than they did with verb sentences. 
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Fig. 2.1 Total number of correct responses in Experiment 1A. 
by age group and condition. (possible no. correct 40) 
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The results of the two age groups were combined and a stricter 
criterion for success devised. To reach this criterion it was necessary 
for the children to make more than two correct responses. Three reasons 
exist for setting this criterion. In the first instance a more rigid 
criterion for success would separate those children who had gained a 
generalized understanding of the task from those subjects who were 
successful because of some irrelevant strategy or because of something 
peculiar about a particular stimulus item. (Appendix IB presents percent-
age success rates for individual test items) In the second place a more 
rigid criterion of success reduces the possibility of getting three res-
ponses correct in the choice condition to about five percent. Finally, 
such a criterion would allow a closer statistical analysis of children's 
differential performances with nouns and verbs in the sentence condition 
that is, is the difficulty with verbs peculiar to a small set of children 
or are all children performing at a low level in the verb sentence condition? 
Table 2.2 presents the results of the criterion analysis. The results 
of the earlier analysis are supported. There is no significant difference 
between the noun and verb story conditions whereas there is a significant 
difference (X2 = 8.025, p < .01) between noun and verb sentence conditions. 
The second factor that was varied in the present experiment was the 
context in which thE, word occurred. There was no context effect for the 
younger children's results. The slight significant effect for verbs 
stories versus verbs sentences for the older children (Wilcox 2-tailed, 
p < .05) is erradicated when a guessing criterion is included. 
In an attempt to gain a clearer picture of the results, the results 
from the two age groups were combined and an Anova was calculated. The 
assumption of normal distribution of error scores is not met but by in-
corporating both factors and combining the two age groups and therefore 
increasing the N within each condition, inferences are legitimate from 
such an analysis (cf. Hays, 1974:481), though clearly the detail brought 
out by a non-parametric comparison will be lost. 
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It could be argued that a guessing criterion should be applied to the 
data before the analysis is carried out. However, since the analysis 
reveals no significant difference between choice and verbal response and 
since application of a guessing criterion only serves to reduce the 
differences to a greater extent, for ease of interpretation I have not 
included the data here. If the analysis had shown the story condition to 
be significantly easier, a guessing criterion would have been required. 
The Anova summary table is presented in Table 2.3. From this analysis 
we may conclude that there is a significant interaction between the part of 
speech replaced and the context in which the nonsense word is placed, 
p <.02. Children perform significantly better in the noun/sentence 
condition. 
6 6 ..... 
Table 2.2 Results of criterion analysis for Experiment 1A 
Stories/Choice Sentences Verbal 
<2 >2 <2 >2. 
- -
Noun 14 6 Noun 10 10 
Verb 14 6 Verb 19 1 
, .... . . ... 
Table 2.3 Summary table Allova for Experiment 1A 
.Source. DE S.S .MS. E. P 
Subjs. 39 57.987 
Nouns/Verbs (B1) 1 2.113 2.113 1.3870 .2448 
Error 38 57.875 
Sentences/Stories 1 2.112 2.112 1. 6128 .2093 (WI) 
W1/B1 1 6.612 6.612 5.0482 .0293 
EW1/B1 38 49.775 1.310 
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DISCUSSION 
The children demonstrate a definite progression in their ability to 
deal with the problems set. The hardest condition for the children is the 
verb. sentence condition. In the story context, nouns and verbs are of 
equal difficulty and with noun sentences children are most successful, with 
50% of the children being correct on three or more trials. 
Who do the children perform differently in the two tasks? It may be 
that they require different modes of solution. The story is global in nature. 
It gives the child a general impression of the intended denotation of the 
term. The new term is embedded in a continuous text and the information 
pertaining to the term's denotation is indirect. The intended referent in 
the sentences on the other hand, is explicit. In the noun cases it is 
physically present and with verbs the action is clearly acted out. The 
sentences present the child with information adequate to identify one 
intended denotatum. In theory the sentence task requires a coordination of 
the new linguistic information with the previous responses given if the 
child is to infer the appropriate denotation of the term. The child may be 
either helped or handicapped by having to make a series of explicit res-
ponses. Either way, the final sentence provides the child with sufficient 
information to make a correct guess, the possible range of application of 
the term being severely limited. The task appears to be more a matter of 
problem-solving than mapping meanings onto words. If the term had not been 
pre-empted in the child's lexicon we would be presenting the child with 
information which would count as Rogers' (1975, 1978,.1979) "elaborative 
linkages" and "semantic extensions" but since the term is pre-empted we are 
in fact asking for a translation from one language (English) to another 
(Experimentese) by means of the information presented ••• solving a problem. 
The discussion of children's differing performance with nouns and verbs 
will be dealt with after I report the second experiment. 
EXPERIMENT 1B 
This experiment was designed to permit within-child comparisons for 
noun/verb effects and to supply the needed controls for the (confounded) 
effects of acting out and mode of response with context in Experiment 1A. 
SUbjects: 
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The subjects consisted of 48 children - Twenty-four nursery school 
children, mean age 4;3 (range 2;7 to 4;11) and 24 primary 1 children, mean 
age 5;2 (range 4;10 to 5-6). All the older children attended a local state 
school as did half the nursery school children. Twelve of the nursery school 
children attended the student-run university nursery. 
Materials: 
As in 1A. 
Design: 
The children were divided into four groups of 12, balanced for age and 
sex: groups I, II, III and IV. As Figure 2.2 shows, group I received the 
story condition requiring a verbal response with each child receiving both 
nouns and verbs. Group II received a sentence condition requiring a verbal 
response with each child receiving both nouns and verbs. Group III received 
a story condition including acting out and choice response with each child 
receiving both nouns and verbs. Group IV received sentences including acting 
out and requiring a choice response with each child receiving both nouns and 
verbs. 
Procedure: 
As in Experiment 1A. 
, , 
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Condition Response Stimuli 
Group I Story Verbal Nouns & verbs* 
Group II Sentence Verbal Nouns & verbs * 
Group III Story Choice Nouns & Verbs * 
(acting-out) 
Group IV Sentence Choice Nouns & Verbs * 
(acting-out) 
* presentation of blocks of nouns and verbs were 
randomized between children 
Figure 2.2 Experimental design - IB 
RESULTS 
The pattern of correct responses for all 48 children is summarized 
in Table 2.4. The difference between nouns and verbs in the sentence 
condition found in Experiment lA is replicated and this difference is 
maintained across different forms of response~' Mode of response (verbal 
versus acting out and choice) does not affect children's performance in the 
sentence task. However, performance-in.the-story task i. affected - fewer 
co't:'rect r;~.sponses are given in the verbal condition. This reduction in 
overall performance has no effect on the. children's differential rates of 
success with nOuns and verbs. In the.story task the difficulty of dealing 
with nouns and verbs is the same regardless of which type of response is 
required. 
Table 2.S presents the results~of'anAnova carried out on the data. 
The Anova supports the intuitive analysis of the-data. There is a signifi-
cant effect of the part of speech replaced by the nonsense word, p < .0005, 
and there is a significant interaction between the part of speech replaced 
and the context in which it occurs, p < .0009. 
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Table 2.4 Pattern of correct responses for children in Experiment 1B 
Stories Sentences 
Verbal Choice Verbal Choice. 
Noun Verb Noun Verb Noun Verb Noun Verb 
12 14 24 21 31 16 34 14 
(48) (48) (48) (48) (48) (48) (48) (48) 
26 45 47 48 
(96) (96) (96) (96) 
, 
71 95 
(192) (192) 
Note: numbers within brackets are total possible score 
Table 2.5 Summary table Anova for Experiment lB 
Source DF SS MS F Probe 
Subjects 47 89.958 
Sentences/ 1 6.000 6.000 3.4547 .0665 Stories (Bl) 
.. 
Response (B2) 1 4.167 4.167 2.3391 .1246 
B1/B2 1 3.375 3.375 1.9433 .1668 
E B12 44 76.417 1. 737 
-
Nouns/Verbs (WI) 1 13.500 13.500 14.6969 .0005** 
* 
_ W1/B1 1 12.042 12.042 13.1093 .0009 
W1/B2 1 1.042 1.042. 1.1340 .2931 
1U/B12 1 .0000 
.. 
.0000 .0000 1.000 
EW1/B12 44 
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DISCUSSION 
Perhaps the most interesting result which arises from the present 
study is the lack of effect of the mode of response and a supportative 
non-linguistic context. In theory the presence of objects or actions in 
front of the child should help in establishing reference and hence develop-
ing a subsequent meaning. For instance Braun-Lamesch (1972) found that 
children, of the same age range as those tested here, performed signifi-
cantly better in a condition that offered non-linguistic support (a picture) 
in contrast to any similar wholly verbal task. However, in Braun-Lamesch's 
task children were not required to identify an intended referent but 
merely report whether a sentence and picture were compatible or not. In 
my own study children must identify the intended referent and it appears 
that this is where the difficulty lies. 
There is one significant difference between the natural situation and 
that provided in the present experiment. In the natural situation the new 
phonemic sequence is raired with an object, quality or action for which the 
child does not have a name. There is a gap to be filled. In contrast this 
experiment poses exactly the opposite problem for the child - the child is 
presented with a variety of objects for all of which he as a familiar name-
the t~rm is pre-empted. The acting out gives the child no unfamiliar, 
unnamed element to focus on. Similarly when responding the child is asked 
to identify the referent of a new unfamiliar word from a group of objects 
all of which he can already name. What strategy should he resort to 7 
Choose any object that was used in the story ? Perform randomly? Perhaps 
the child's failure to soive the problem illustrates ~ a lack in his 
abilities to acquire language, but rather an inability to see the problem 
objectively, to dissembed his thinking, to see the problem as symbolic - as 
a problem of the language system, that of synonymy. 
There is, however,evidence blatantly in contradiction with this 
suggestion within the exp~riment itself. How can one account for the 
children's higher success rates with the noun sentences if we are postu-
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1ating interference because the child knows the name of the intended 
referent? Why should he be able to cope with synonymy in one situation 
and not in the other? It is not simply a matter of saying that there are 
no tangible objects in the sentence condition to confuse the child. For 
there is no enhancement of performance in the story condition when verbal 
responses are required and acting out is omitted as there is no decrement 
in the sentence condition when choice response and acting out are included. 
The sentence task draws the child's attention to a particular defining 
attribute of the new word's denotata in a way reminiscent of young children's 
guessing games, ego I spy with my little eye something that is blue. If we 
assume that the child is familiar with this game the unambiguous inform-
ation in the final sentence provides him with the basis to make a guess 
and we have seen he is often correct. An alternative psychological account 
is that the children only pay attention to the last few words in the 
sentences. This would mean that in three of the four noun sentences, the 
child could be successful without paying attention to the nonsense word at 
all. Since the last few words contained highly specific information the 
children's guesses had a good chance of being correct. In the one case 
where the sentence ended with the nonsense word rather than the "defining 
words" the children showed a reduced rate of success but not to the level 
of the majority of verb cases. 
How then do we account for the significant and robust difference in the 
child's ability to deal with noun and verb sentences? Is the result 
simply an artifact of the experimental .stimu1i, that is, is there a lack 
of internal validity? Are the children not receiving enough information 
about the denotation of the verb to make a correct response? Miller and 
Johnson-Laird (1976) have suggested that 
"Verbal semantic fields exhibit meaning patterns more 
complex than the relatively simple hierarchical 
structure we found in nominal semantic fields" 
(1976 ;323) 
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Certainly in designing the stimuli it was a simpler matter to produce a 
series of sentences which gave progressively more information about the 
intended referent when it was a noun that when it was a verb. Miller and 
Johnson-Laird's comment suggests that the problem is not peculiar to the 
present experiment and there is, of course, the possibility that verbs 
might be a problem in their own right for the child. 
Let us first discuss another methodological criticism which might be 
raised. One methodological difference between the two situations is the 
type of question asked. Now there is an abundance of evidence in the develop-
mental literature (eg.McGarrigle, Grieve and Hughes, 1978) that the type 
of question asked can significantly affect the type of response given by 
the child. It might be argued that the results of Experiment lA are due to 
the form of the question, in that asking "What do you think to x is ?" is 
more complex than asking ''What do you think an x is ?". However the fact 
that the form of the question does not produce a difference in performance 
for nouns and verbs in the story, verbal condition in Experiment lB seems 
to refute this hypothesis. 
Experimental results from Kean and Yamato (1965) suggest that the mean 
homogeneous response (that is children gave nouns in response to nouns) for 
count nouns remains relatively stable through the three age groups they in-
vestigated, whereas the mean homogeneous response for verbs continued to 
increase from kindergarten to fourth grade. They attempt to explain this _ 
phenomemn by postulating that "in a child's life, the static world becomes 
increasingly dynamic". Rather than resort to explanations which involve the 
child's basic representat~on of reality it might be more feasible to suggest 
that there is some element in the nature of verbs 'per se which cause the 
difficulty. 
The final sentence in the preceding paragraph brings to light two 
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implicit problems of dealing with verbs: what exactly do we mean by the 
nature of verbs, semantically ?;and is there any relation between parts of 
speech defined syntactically and what they denote ? 
In discussions concerning the semantics of verbs psycholinguists tend 
to restrict themselves to one particular semantic domain (Abrahamson, 1975; 
Bendix, 1966; Gentner, 1975, 1978; Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976) .. and 
within that domain proceed to examine the necessary components for a re-
presentation of that particular class of verbs. This type of analysis is 
appropriate for a fully developed semantic system or one in which the term 
has acquired more than an initial referential relationship, but it may be 
an inappropriate method of analysis for a child's initial encounter with a 
word. Bowerman (1974) has suggested an alternative way of viewing the 
problem. In her discussion of the acquisition of the structure of causative 
verbs, she suggests a two-level model which would: 
"differentiate between hypotheses about a' child's 
non-linguistic (sensory-motor or representational) 
understanding of an event and those about his know-
ledge of which aspects of that understanding have 
special linguistic relevance within the semantic 
system" 
(1974;159) 
This distinction is implicit in the work of Gentner (1975). Bowerman 
develops her line of argument by presenting evidence which indicates that 
causative verbs are initially "unanalysed forms". The child is using these 
lexical items as 
"unitary labels for various types of events without 
yet recognizing the underlying presence of combinatory 
independent semantic components which contribute to 
both the meaning and syntactic properties of the word" 
(1974;160) 
It seems that a single presentation of an unknown word and a subsequent 
jnvestigation of the child's comprehension of that word could only examine 
the "unitary label" stage, that is a word being investigated as an 
"unanalysed form", a representational understanding. Brown's investigation 
(1957) of children's knowl~dg~ of the intended reference of parts of speech 
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must necessarily be of this nature and he found no discrepancy in children's 
performances with nouns and verbs. On the other hand, a similar investi-
gation by Herriot (1968), again entailing a unitary label level of analysis, 
found that children had significantly more problems when a verb was sub-
stituted by a nonsense word as did Braun-Lamesch (1973): 
"The difficulty of the nonsense sentences was localized 
in the verb and was explained in terms of the relational 
nature of the referent of a sentence"-
(Herriot 1968:273) 
Schlesinger (1974) has argued that what he ca11s "relational speech". 
involves semantic relationships which are fundamentally different from 
naming. It is therefore possible that there is a problem which is inherent 
in the verb and that this lies in the relational nature of the term. If 
Herriot and Schlesinger are correct, in that it is the relational nature of 
the term which is the critical aspect, then I am wrong in confining the 
problem specifically to verbs. It may be a problem which can be applied 
to all relational terms. This would also include relational nouns as well 
ego mother, brother* 
Go 1 in-Meadow , Seligman and Gelman (1976) postulate a different explan-
ation for a similar discrepancy. They report two stages in the development 
of the vocabulary of two-year olds •. The important issue for the present 
discussion is the fact that "nouns were easier to produce than verbs". 
Their explanation rests in what they suggest is a fundamental difference 
between simple nouns and simple verbs: 
"We can point to a concrete noun's referent, but not 
to any instantaneous referent of a verb" 
They continue: 
"Of course, we realize that such differences between 
nouns and verbs also lead to task differences in 
our testing procedures. Those task differences, 
however, seem unavoidable and to a certain extent 
are part of the phenomenon i tse 1£" 
( 1976 ;199) 
*Note: ,Inhelder and Pia.get' s (1964) investigation of the pre-operational 
child's difficulty in reallzing that "his brother has a brother" 
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Whether the problem is the relational nature of the term or the 
transient and changing nature of the referent of the verb, verbs do appear 
to be complex even as an unana1ysed form. 
As a final point in support of the preceding argument about the complex 
nature of the verb, I should like to quote an excerpt from a paper by 
Granger (1977). Granger in designing a computer program, the aim of which 
was to "figure out likely definitions for unknown words, and to create 
context-specific definitions for such words" continues: 
"Nouns are typically slot-fillers, builders of small 
structures containing relatively little of the overall 
information present in a given conceptualization. They 
also have a reasonably consistent and complete represent-
ation in terms of conceptual classes. Thus the process· 
for figuring out unknown nouns from context is relatively 
straightforward. Verbs are builders of large structures 
which contain most of the expectations for a given sentence, 
and which supply most of the structure to conceptualizations. 
They also have a consistent and complete representation in 
terms of primitive acts. Thus they are more difficult to 
figure out from context than nouns" 
(1977;178) • 
What information is available to the child to derive the meaning of 
the unanalysed verb form? Basically the child has two sources of inform-
ation; the first being the syntactic properties of the word, and secondly 
the arguments of the unknown predicate. We might postulate that one of 
the basic "bits" of information used by the child is the elements with 
which the new word occurs, so that deciphering the initial meaning of the 
nonsense word involves, in the case of verbs, focussing on nouns which 
occur in conjunction with it. Fillmore (1968) has suggested that within 
symbolic logic itself there are essentially three ways in which the prop-
erties of predicates can be exp,lored, the extensional, the intensional, 
and the definitional (p374). He suggests that 
"Predicates are described extensionally as the set of 
objects, or:sets of pairs or triples of objects etc, 
for which the relationship of properties in question 
hold true" . 
(1968;375) • 
Now Fillmore argues that: ~ 
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"No use of the extensional properties of predicates 
can serve us in identifying linguistically interesting 
properties of verbs" 
(1968 ;,379) 
However, Fill~ore is referring to the internal structure of the lexical 
item, Bowerman's analysed forms. What I would like to argue is that in 
the case of the unanalysed.form, that is a lexical item lacking internal 
structure, it is precisely these features which may be important. 
It seems that although we cannot conclude from the present experiment, 
because of the problems with the verbal stimuli, that verbs have special 
problems of their own, an interesting problem has been posed. This and 
the indications from other scattered sources in the literature suggests 
that the actual processing involved in the two levels of semantic represent-
ations of verbs warrants further expleration. Both the immediate and the 
extended semantic representation should be investigated. 
Implicit in the discussion to this point has been the assumption that 
there .is a clear relation between syntactic and semantic definitions. The 
distinction between nouns and verbs is syntactic: it is a grammatical classi-
fication and it is questionable as to whether this dis.tinction is made in 
all languages (Robins, 1952). The association between the grammatical and 
semantic properties of words is complex (cf. Lyons, 1977:423). In dis-
cussing parts of speech verbs are typically characterized as denoting actions, 
states, qualities etc, but as Lyons (1968) points out this is not a satis-
factory procedure: 
"Adjectives are frequently said to denote 'qualities' 
and verbs to denote either 'action' or 'states'. But 
the difference between a quality and a state '(if it 
is not entirely 'illusory) is less striking than the 
the difference between an 'action' and a 'state' 
(1968;324) 
The present experiment is therefore naive in its use of syntactic 
terminology in an investigation of semantic representations. It is a 
logical consequence of this naivety to associate a semantic problem with 
a certain kind of syntacti~ element, an analysis which is evidently mis-
guided. In the first· instance it would seem much more appropriate to use 
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such terms as 'relational speech'. However, 'relational speech' is a 
much wider phenomenon and as such precludes the detailed investigation 
which I feel is necessary at such a preliminary stage. A more satisfactory 
procedure might be to retain the term verb, because as Lyons (1977) states: 
"It is because there is an intrinsic connexion between 
syntax and semantics with respect to the definition of 
focal subclasses which contain the most typical nouns, 
verbs, adjectives and adverbs that we can ask sensibly 
whether all languages have nouns, verbs, adjectives and 
adverbs" 
In so doing and in maintaining the awareness that many of the properties 
of verbs are not specific to elements which we traditionally describe as 
verbs, ego events or actions, the distinction of 'analysed' and 'unanalysed' 
forms discussed earlier is pertinent here. Using the term verb is less 
questionable for 'analysed' forms where the investigation of meaning 
patterns lies within a particular semantic field, ego travel, possession 
or vision, than it is for 'unanalysed' forms. 'Unanalysed' forms must be 
denoted in some way and traditionally this has been by the use of syntactic 
labels. The difference between the 'analysed' and 'unanalysed' form is 
that in the former case the analysis is internal (to the lexical item) 
and in the latter case the analysis aims at establishing a relationship 
between the lexical item and some other linguistic or non-linguistic element. 
Until a more systematic investigation has been performed we must use general 
terms such as action word or verb, perhaps one day to be replaced by 
expression classes or first order properties(c~ Lyons, 1977). 
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QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Coding responses as correct or incorrect is an empirically sound 
procedure, assuming of course that the experiment is internally valid. 
However, much information is lost by ignoring the nature of the responses 
that the child gives on one or more occasions. In fact, the majority of 
attempts to understand the word-learning processes of younger children 
depend explicitly on establishing interpretations of utterances rather 
than on a single criterion of correctness (eg. Bloom, 1974a; Bowerman, 1974; 
Halliday, 1975). An Braunwa1d (1978) states: 
"Participants' processes of comprehension must not be 
.mistaken for the literal referential meanings of the 
child's word" 
yet she is aware that 
"Laura's system of communication was effective as long 
as her listener could use the situational context to 
figure out the referent of her word and the intention 
of her utterances" 
(1978;13) 
Analysis of this type of data is coloured by the orientiation of the 
'interpreter'. The choice of responses discussed and·the interpretation 
of these responses can only be subjective. It is, however, through the 
child's spontaneous utternances and the experimenter~ subsequent inter- . 
pretation that I believe we can understand a) how the child views the task, 
b) what information the child uses to make his response and c) to generate 
empirically testable hypotheses. This orientation originates from the 
traditional Genevan clinical approach. 
The two types of tasks. presented to the children in these experiments, 
ie. stort~ and sentences, are on the surface very different in what they 
require the child to do and as such they will be dealt with separately in 
the following analysis. The isolated presentation of the sentence forces 
the child to make an initial decision after a minimal presentation of 
specific linguistic information and in theory requires the child to inte-
grate a series of separate~guesses about meaning. The story situation 
on the other hand allows continuity and a final global assessment after a 
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unified presentation. The sentence task places an emphasis on deduction 
and inference, whereas the story attempts to present the child with a 
general picture allowing implici t connexion of the word and its referent. 
Sentences: 
The sentence task is a problem-solving task. It requires an abstract 
symbolic attitude to language and tells us how the child anSMmS questions 
about the meaning of sentences when he does not yet possess the semantic 
structure necessary for correct interpretation .• Although each sentence 
was designed to follow on from the previous one, solution of one sentence 
allows a concrete analysis whereas interpretation of several requires a 
more abstract approach to language and words, which of course presupposes 
that the child is capable of associating the three in a meaningful series. 
I believe that in the present task the .children are treating each sentence 
as a discrete entity. Whether this is because they are unable to make the 
logical leaps or because the child does not realize this is required or 
that the task inhibits this for some reason is unclear. Werner and Kaplan 
(1952) report a similar phenomenon which they call incomplete-final solutions: 
"These results reflect a young child's lack of 
recognition of the necessity for integrating by 
a single solution, the cues offered by all six 
sentences" 
(1952;75) 
The same problem manifests itself in the work of Braun-Lamesch (1972): 
"A 5 ans, 8 sujets enoncent deux ou souvent m~me 
trois fois Ie mot pertinent sans avoir l'idee de 
I' appliquer a toute la serie ••• " 
(1972 ;74) 
An analogous factor appears to be influencing the solutions in the present 
set of experiments. The majority of children appear to be treating the 
sentences independently. For example there are cases where the subject's 
response is congruent for the presented sentence but totally incongruent 
with the previous presentation. 
Subject No. 60: There are zums in the park. "swing" 
Daddy bought a Christmas zum. "pudding" 
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On the other hand there are cases where the child gives a correct response 
for the second presented sentence which would be correct and congruent for 
the third, but changes his response. 
Subject No. 14: Mummy juked at the dog. "Don't know' 
I can juk very loudly. "shout" 
The teacher juked at us when we were naughty. "hit us" 
The final response would seem to be coloured and dominated by the child ~,s 
own private experience. This factor will be discussed in 'greater detail 
later. There are also cases where children initially give a correct 
response for the term yet in the second sentence response "don't know" and 
in the final sentence are again correct. The existence of such a response 
pattern is interesting in itself because it suggests that even when chi1d-
ren do have a preferred response they are sometimes unable to use the 
responses already given even if only in a perserverative manner. On the 
other hand there are cases where the child responds with "don't know" for 
the fir.~t. ~nd third presentation and gives the correct response for the 
second sentence. 
Finally there are cases where a series of correct' congruent responses 
are tied directly to the sentence given. 
Subject No. 66: There are zums in the park. "pond" 
Daddy bought a Christmas zum. "present" 
All zums have branches. "railway track" 
Each individual response is correct in this sequence, but there is no 
evidence whatsoever that the child has attempted to integrate his individual 
solutions into one overall correct solution. The fact, therefore, that 
many children are correctly identifying the intended referent of the last 
sentence has more to do with the amount of information given in that parti-
eular sentence than the child's ability to coordinate the information 
presented in a series of isolated sentences. The fact that children give 
.. 
more correct responses to final sentences with nouns than they do to final 
sentences with verbs may be a direct reflection of the amount of information 
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that I have given them. 
Of course any child who repeats a single response throughout the series 
of sentences may be offered as contradictory evidence to the preceding 
suggestion. It could be argued that such a child has grasped the "nature" 
of the task, ie. that the responses to the sentences are related. Very few 
responses of this nature were given, out of a possible 256 responses, 14 
repetitive ones were given. Only 4 of these were correct repetitions. The 
other 10 gave no indication that the children understood the task at all. 
Frequently no attempt was made to integrate the repetition with the presented 
sentence. 
Subject No. 30: Paul threw the lev. "caravan" 
There are lots of games you can 
play with a lev. "caravan" 
Most levs are round and bounce. "caravan" 
Other children might add a preposition or change a verb ending in an 
attempt to make the repetition more congruent with the presented sentence. 
Subject No. 19: Bad dreams are tissing "jump" 
It is not nice to tis people "jump on" 
Mary started to cry when she was 
tissed by the noise. "jumping" 
On the whole, however, repetitions are rare and although on its own this 
does not show that children treat the sentence independently, in conjunction 
with the other evidence, especially the number of correct first guesses and 
ensuing changes, I believe at best it can be regarded as supporting and at 
worst not in contradiction •. 
Effectively then what I am arguing is that the majority of children, 
despite the repetition in the test sentences of the new term, treat each 
sentence as a separate entity, a good reason to conclude that this task 
does not mimic the natural word-learning situation for in vivo the child 
must associate a number of independent presentations to grasp the term's 
.. 
meaning. This does not invalidate the information that. can be gained by 
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examining the single responses given by the children. It is not unrealistic 
to assume that the types of responses given by the children reflect the 
information that they pick up and therefore regard as salient and may be 
used in a more natural task. The passage of time that normally ensues 
between a child's initial encounter with a word and a subsequent one may 
result in a considerable modification of the information retained, perhaps 
with the more idiosyncratic responses being eliminated. I think this line 
of argument can be substantiated by illustrating that some of the inform~ 
ation that the children use to make these single responses is similar to 
those reported by authors for much younger children. For example, 
Lenneb erg (1964) discusses the phenomenon of phonetic association and 
Braunwa1d (1978) and Bloom (1974) discuss the importance of contextual 
associations for the development of meanings for their subjects. What the 
following qualitative analysis attempts to do is to suggest some of the 
sources of information (both from the child's own cognitive framework and 
from the v~esented linguistic information) that the child can use in an 
attempt to arrive at an initial reference and a stable denotation of the 
new term. 
Whac information do the children use? There are a variety of strat-
egies that the children employ: these range from the very primitive use of 
phonetic information in "clang" associations to correct responses which 
utilize all the information given in an individual sentence. The most 
advanced form of response for this task is undoubtedly one where the child 
progressively develops the, correct meaning of the word taking into account 
the information presented in each sentence. As I have stated, the children 
did not appear to treat the task in this manner, but ·these types of 
responses are not totally absent, ego 
Subject No. 30: 1. Jenny saw a ged on the pond "swan II 
" b It 2. I play with my rubber ged in the bath oat 
3 All d k It duck /I • ge s ma e quack quack quack 
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Although it could be argued that each sentence is being treated in iso-
1ation here it is equally plausible that there is a systemati~deve1opment 
with each response being appropriate for the preceding sentence{s) as well 
as the present one. 
"C1ang"associations are responses of solely phonetic origin. They 
have frequently been recorded in the initial speech attempts of much younger 
children. Of a possible 160 responses in Experiment lA only 14 could be 
traced to phonetic origin. Interestingly, these responses were equally 
distributed across the two age groups. 
Examples: 
" " Lev Lavy pan 
Lev "living at home" 
Tis "teas ing " 
Tis "kiss /I 
Jod ,\. " Jug 
All of these responses make no sense whatsoever in relation to the test 
sentence and could only be traced to phonetic origins. 
"' 
Responses which are solely situation-bound are another primitive kind 
of response, ego mentioning objects in the testing room or the caravan in 
which the testing occurred. Once again this phenomenon is recorded in the 
early language literature. Examples can be found in Bloom (1974), Bowerman 
(1974) and Braunwa1d (1978). These responses tend to reflect something 
which is salient in the testing environment. Again very few responses of 
this nature were recorded - three out of a possible 160 for Experiment 1A. 
Responses of the two former types are of no constructive use to the child. 
They are learning nothing important about when to use the word or about 
its possible contextual determinants. 
The third type of response I wish to illustrate deals directly with 
the issue of contextual determinants, but rather than spurious connections 
drawn from the physical situation of testing these responses, reflect 
associations which are (appear to be) directly generated from someassoc-
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iation with the linguistic elements presented. In many cases they appear 
to integrate some aspect of the child's world knowledge and elements within 
the presented sentence. Often these responses appear bizarre if an attempt 
is made to replace the new term by the children's "explanation" of it, but 
the associations are clear. The child is attempting to make sense of the 
task. 
Subject No.8: Paul threw the lev "stairwell" 
Follow-up: E "Is the lev a stairwell 7" 
~ "Yeh. You go through the stairwell to go home" 
The child has interpreted threw as through although this interpretation 
is syntactically impossible. 
Subject No. 15: It is not nice to tis people. "slamming your fingers in 
the door" 
Explanation: It does not appear wildly improbable to conclude that at 
one point the child had either slammed his fingers in a door and decided 
.it was not nice or slammed someone els~s fingers in a door and been told 
that it was not a nice thing to do. Regardless of which interpretation is 
correct the incident is salient to the child, regarded as not nice and a 
possible interpretation of tis. It is therefore possible that the child's 
next encounter with tis in a different situation will bring to mind two 
associations 'fingers in door' and 'not nice', the-appropriate interpretation 
being governed by the new situation and the old information. 
Subject No.20: Daddy bips in an office. "daddy cleans curtains" 
Explanation: Whether the association here rests with a) something that 
daddy does or b) somewhere daddy cleans curtains or c) some implicit under-
standing of' 'bip' and work, is unclear. In any event the child has learnt 
something to attach to further presentations of the word bip,. 
Subject No. 28: I play with my ged in the bath. "to put over your head" 
Explanation: Here the reference is to a rubber bath cap. 
~ 
There are many more such examples, some of which stretch the interpretive 
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powers of the experimenter more than others. The point to be made is that 
there is an attempt on the part of the child to make sense of the problem 
by using associations which originate from his own experience. Clearly 
some of these associations are more appropriate than others and some would 
be more useful than others in the mapping processes involved in deriving 
the meaning of the word if a) the child remembers the initial presentation 
and b) sees thE: connection between the two presentations of the word. It 
is b) that I have argued is lacking in the majority of cases in these 
experiments, a problem which I believe reflects the children's inferential 
abilities in this task rather than their word-learning abilities. 
Uses of such contextual abilities are documented in the early word-
learning literature and interestingly enough the only factor other than 
perceptual features that Anglin (1977) has found to be important in concept 
formation is contextual association. 
The occurence of this type of response is much more evident in the 
case of verbs than it is for nouns. There is a problem in interpreting 
this reus1t, however. It might be intuitively satisfying to argue that the 
derivation of a verb's meaning is bound to a greater extent to a series of 
presentations of the term (eg. problem of deriving reference in one attempt 
Granger (1977)), and it is therefore possible that the only interpretation 
is this type of contextual association sparked off by some word or some 
inherent sense in the sentence and some previous experience/experiences 
of the child. In other words, since the child can't derive the meaning of 
the predicate he relies on, some association with or interpretation of the 
argument. For example, Nelson (1978) found that 
"When the term to be defined is an action or function 
it elicits people, places and things which are 
related though that action or function to the self" 
(1978;64) 
The problem, here, is that children were also much less likely to give 
multi-word responses to nouns and this allowed the experimenter more scope 
.. 
to develop the origins of these responses for verbs. So although the 
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single noun responses appeared to be less coloured by the child's assoc-
iations with his own experience, we cannot say whether this is due to the 
hypothesized complex nature of verbs and the necessity to buiid up the 
features to complete a semantic domain, or whether children's single word 
responses to nouns were equally affected· by previous experiences but the 
methods employed in the task did not allow the appropriate investigation 
••• or ultimately that the very nature of a verb requires mu1ti-word 
definitions regardless of their semantic complexity. 
The nature of the responses discussed up to this point gives no evi-
dence that the child is treating the word as a functional entity in its 
own right. Rather, they look more like global attempts to make sense of 
the situation. These global attempts can provide the chi1den with inform-
ation which may be used. The responses to be discussed now seem to me to 
show a direct attempt by the child to use the word in relation to the 
information given in the sentence. It might loosely be suggested that they 
are attempts on the part of the child to give information adequate to 
define the word. 
These responses can broadly be divided into two groups: those responses 
where the child uses information given in the sentence to define the word 
and those responses where the child uses the new term in a different 
sentence suggesting that they have achieved some understanding of the 
intended denotation. 
In the first group of responses identification is tied directly to 
the specific information given to the child, ego 
Subject No.4: All geds made quack quack noises "Ged, something that 
makes quack quack noise" 
Sub j ec t No.6: There are zums in the park "find 'em in parks" 
On the surface all the child is doing is restating the information already, 
presented in the sentence. It seems that more might be involved. 
1) Children recognize that the information presented to them is relevant 
to their understanding of the new term. 
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2) The children define the term as an entity/event not as an association 
with other situations. 
3) There is also a suggestion that the design of the task is wrong for 
this age group, that is, we are not going to extract the information we 
are looking for - the specific referent of the term. It's a silly question 
if the child doesn't see that the aim of the task is to produce a synonym 
for ged. What would the child do if we'd said that a duck makes quack 
quack noises and then asked what a duck was ? 
The second group of responses shows the same failure to identify the 
denotata,yet again the children use their understanding to suggest some 
partial representation of the term. Here the child, uses the general sense 
of the sentence to derive a representation, eg.: 
Subject No. 12: When I am full I don't want to biv anymore. "need a plate 
to biv" 
Subject No. 20: The teacher told us to biv all our dinner "to biv it 
all up" 
Subject No. 48: Mummy juked at the dog. "I can juke too" - the child 
proceeds to yell. 
Let us suppose that the child can retain some of this information. From 
the first example the child in another situation seeing an animal 
making a quack quack noise has the information to deduce that it is a 'ged'. 
Even if mapping is not complete he can now add more features to the initial 
mapping,say eertain perc~ptual ones. Similarly from the second set of 
examples the child with the information that you "need a plate to biv" 
has one bit of information to help him in the task of developing the mean-
ing of the word biv. There is, not a high proportion of these responses 
and several factors may account for this: 
~l) The children who give these responses may be verbalizing information 
that the other children retain but do not explicitly state because they 
can't or because they do not see it as relevant information to give to 
the experimenter. 
9 0 
2) The actual stimuli presented to the children may playa role in the 
number of such responses generated. For example, some words are more 
easily placed in novel contexts than others. Biv seems easy for the 
children to handle in such 'a manner whereas jod (nonsense word for bed 
cf. Appendix I) does not. Equally, some of the defining criteria presented 
in the sentence are more appropriate than others, for example "All geds 
make quack quack noises" as opposed to "The teacher juked as us when we 
were naughty". 
The final group of responses I should like to examine are those which 
suggest that children have problems accepting that an object which the 
child already has a name for can have a new name, that is, the new term 
is pre-empted. This line of reasoning is supported by two quite distinct 
types of responses. There are children who correctly identify the intended 
referent but rather than accepting for example that a 'zum' is a tree, 
they reply that "it's like a tree" or that a 'ged' is "like a duck". For 
some reason there appears to be a refusal on the part of some children to 
accept that a 'ged' could be a duck. The second type of response which 
appears to support this explanation occurs when after a wrong response from 
the child the experimenter prompts with "Could an x be a y 1". Frequently 
these responses were followed by vehement denials or responses of "don't 
know". The denials were often followed by spurious justifications "a zum 
couldn't be a tree cause then you could take its branches off". It is as -
if the children reject the possibility of having two separate labels for 
the same entity. Clearly this is also a time-saving strategy. If you are 
'. learning a lot of new!.names then it makes sense to assume that once you 
have learnt a particular name - natural kind pairing that this natural 
kind will not be referred to by another name. The problems children en-
~counter with class inclusion and understanding of subordinate and super-' 
ordinate categories may well reflect this difficulty. It may be that a 
basic linguistic competence is necessary before the children realize that 
there is no incongruity in referring to the same object by two distinct 
names. Clark (1980) cites data from Fantini (1976) which suggest that 
bilingual children will at one stage reject having two separate labels 
(from different languages) for the same entity. 
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The fact that these types of responses are only given for nouns 
suggests that a clear indication of the intended referent exacerbates the 
problem. The vagueness associated with the verb terms appears not to draw 
the child's attention to the problem. If I am correct in attributing 
some of the children's difficulties in the fact that the terms are pre-
empted (this assumption must, of course, be empirically validated) then 
the task as set may not be testing the child's competence with respect to 
learning the meanings of new words but rather assessing his ability to 
learn new names for objects and actions for which he already has a name. 
Stories 
On the whole the verbal responses to the storim are less informative 
than the verbal responses to the sentences. It must be remembered that 
the data base is much smaller in this case. Only 12 children gave verbal 
responses to the storiesand in each case there is only ~ne response per 
story as opposed to three verbal responses per sentence series in the 
sample of 42 children. 
There appears to be a high proportion of spurious responses, ego 
subject no. 21's response "plum" to story no. 2 (noun). Several of the 
children use words which occur in the story in attempts to define the 
term ego 
Story No. 2 (noun) dog for 1up 
Story No. 3 (verb) hit 'em for pid 
Story No. 1 (noun) push 'em for kog 
Story No. 4 (noun) burning people for riz 
Again, as in the discussion of the sentence task, it might be argued 
that at least the children are attempting to use the information provided 
in the stories to answer the questions. They may retain some information 
which would be useful if they were to encounter the term again. 
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There are few responses which appear to originate from the child's 
own experience, eg.: 
Subject No. 25: Response to story No.4 (verb) "crab bite 'em" 
Presumably the child's response reflects an encounter with crabs at the 
seaside. This may help the child in his next encounter with piv, viz. 
something to do with the seaside. 
There are no responses where the child uses defining criteria in the 
story in response to the question just as there are no responses where the 
child uses the new term in a new but appropriate context. This most likely 
reflects the way the information is presented in the stories rather than 
an inability to perform such operations. It would appear that it is this 
more general representation of the new term which is responsible for 
lowering the successful performance with nouns and therefore equating them 
with verbs. There are, however, a few "like a" responses: 
Subject No. 78: "like a lion" 
Subject No. 81: "like a book" 
The most interesting suggestion as to the children's difficulties with 
the story task come from the discussions held with the children after a 
choice response. These interactions were generally initiated by the 
experimenter. There are many cases where a totally wrong choice response 
by the child is followed by comments from the child which indicate that he 
has some global understanding of the story. Indeed, in some cases he knows 
exactly what the intended referent of the term is. The following are clear 
examples of this phenomenon: 
.. Subject No. 6 chooses a plate for Story No. 2 (noun). His explanation is 
that it is for the cat (correct response) to drink from. Subject No. 64 
chooses the cat in response to Story No.3 (noun), yet when questioned 
~about the story reports that the little girl was allowed to see the fire 
engine (correct response). Subject No. 10 chooses a little girl for her 
response to Story No. 3 (noun) but when asked about the story says "Ben 
~ . 
was reading a book" (correct response). 
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The children are finding it difficult to coordinate what they know 
has happened in the story with their particular choice response. It is 
as if the child has grasped some global sense yet has difficulty arti-
culating the story element which goes with the word. 
There are a number of possible explanations of these results. In the 
first instance, the child may well be hampered because of the existence of 
pre-emption. So while the child knows what is occuring in the story, he 
need not make any inferences about the new word because he can make sense 
of the situation without doing so. If he does try and make sense of the 
new word what he finds is that all the objects and actions occurring in 
the situation already have names - a problem exists. 
Alternatively it might be that the nature of the story does not 
require specific identification of a referent, so that the problem of pre-
emption does not arise (in contrast to a situation like "Pass me the x"), 
the child does not objectify his thinking so as to consider the word-object 
pairing. 
'Regardless of whether all or any of these explanations are correct, 
the responses, as measured, dramatically underestimate the child's ability 
to make -sense of the story. The task is not appropriate as set. Perform-
ance in this instance seems to be a poor indicator of competence. 
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SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The present experiment was designed to clarify the conflicting 
results of two studies designed to investigate children's abilities to 
gain information pertaining to the meaning of unknown terms. Four vari-
ables were isolated and the results may be summarized as follows: part 
of speech appears to be a significant factor when the unknown word is 
presented in the sentence condition, with nouns being easier than verbs, 
though these results may simply reflect the difficulty of standardizing 
materials; verbal context without non-linguistic support can be inform-
ative to the child provided the linguistic information is sufficient to 
specify the denotation of the term. Acting out and choice response appear 
not to have enhanced performance significantly, though this result may 
reflect the fact that in all cases the new term was pre-empted by a term 
already present in the child's lexicon. 
It has not been possible to isolate a single variable that might 
account for the differences between Wykes' and Johnson-Laird's study and 
that of Campbell and Bowe. The one variable which reaches statistical 
significance in r~lation to the children's performance does so in the 
opposite direction to what would be predicted by the original studies. 
Why is it that Wykes' and Johnson-Laird's subjects perform well with verbs? 
The children's superior success rate with verbs appears to be inconsistent 
with the results of the present experiment and the present explanation of 
these differences. A more detailed investigation of the differences which 
might exist between nouns and verbs is required before any conclusions 
can be reached. It would appear that part of speech is a variable which 
must be considered in its own right when investigating the word-learning 
abilities of young children. 
Despite the failure to explain the two different sets of results a 
number of potentially important variables has been elucidated, many of 
these arising from the qualitative analysis. The importance of word class 
has already been mentioned. The second issue which came,tDlight was the 
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possible importance of pre-emption. Initially pre-emption was excluded 
as a relevant difference between the two original tasks on the basis that 
children must learn subordinate and superordinate relations. It would appear 
that this assumption might be misguided. Children appear to be having 
difficulty accepting that two names can be used to denote the same object. 
This speculation, based on qualitative data, must be empirically tested. 
If children do have difficulties with pre-empted terms not only might we 
be able to explain the differences between the Campbell and Bowe study and 
that of Wykes and Johnson-Laird, but such a result would also have reper-
cussions for children's abilities to handle subordinate and superordinate 
terms and the traditional Piagetian class inclusion task. 
From the qualitative analysis a suggestion was made that children 
have difficulty associating several presentations of the same unknown word. 
The methodological implications of this are two-fold. In the first instance 
if we are looking at children's abilities to develop a referential relation-
ship we should confine our presentation to a single example of the unknown 
item. If, on the othE~r hand, we wish to look at the child's ability to 
coordinate a number of different pieces of information the present task is 
clearly inadequate - a new means of assessing the child's competence must 
be devised. Interestingly, this lack of coordination on the child's part 
suggests that we are not in fact looking at a task which investigates 
semantic acquisition, since semantic acquisition necessarily entails co-
ordinating information gained over a number of exposures. 
It is significant that despite these problems with the task, children 
did, in single responses, provide definitions (responses) which suggested 
that they were using sources of information similar to the child in the 
natural situation. They were able to draw on their own experiences and 
upon the linguistic information present in the sentences in an attempt to' 
gain some representation of the term. 
These tasks do have a number of inherent problems. For example, the 
story task as set failed to reflect the child's abilities to comprehend 
the text. Intuitively, such a task appears to be a sensible way of 
investigating the young child's abilities, since story-telling: is a 
familiar activity to the child. However, the child need not pay any 
attention to the individual words in the text. Tasks must not only con-
form to the demands of the experimenter but also to the expectations of 
the child. Secondly, the children showed little enthusiasm for the task. 
Failure to maintain a child's attention will inevitably lead to an under-
estimation of the child's competence. As far as possible the child should 
be involved in the task with the experimental manipulation being a natural 
part of the interaction. Finally, although the experimental approach 
attempts to assess what information the child can gain in a single present-
ation of an unknown lexical item, such structured tasks are hardly re-
presentative of natural word-learning situations. 
This experiment was designed to clarify a set of conflicting results. 
It has not been successful. It has been possible to suggest certain ways 
in which different types of experiences and different word classes may 
affect the child's performance. The next experiment attempts to develop 
and clarify some of the issues presented here. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ESTABLISHING REFERENCE FOR NOVEL NOUNS AND VERBS 
Introduction 
The previous set of experiments brought to light a number of factors 
which may be of importance" for the child in the process of acquiring new 
words. 
One of the possible explanations for the children's poor performance 
in the first set of experiments was the fact that the children already had 
a lexical entry for the objects/actions referred to, that is pre-emption 
was a variable, and hence were hindered in identifying the referent of the 
new term. l-lithout pre-testing the child it is not possible to ascertain 
whether the child does in fact have a pre-existing term and because of the 
large numbers of children tested and the variety of stimuli presented 
this approach is not practical. At any rate, unless carefully done this 
pre-testing may in fact prime the child as to the key variables. It is 
possible to design sets of stimuli which either contain terms which child-
ren are likely to be familiar with or terms which are "likely to be un-
familiar. Information from vocabulary counts ego Burroughs (1957) can be 
used as an objective guideline. For ease of discussion these terms will 
subsequently be referred to as known or unknown. Following this line of 
reasoning it would therefore be possib1e.to test the hypothesis that 
knowing the name of an object/action hinders establishing reference when 
an unknown term is used in the referential act. For example, 'Pass me the 
lUp' when names for the objects present are already incorporated in the 
child's lexicon, would be problematic but if one unknown/unnamed item was 
present the same difficulties might not arise. This variable should only 
be a problem when the term's level of specificity is clearly determined by 
the accompanying discourse. 
Level of specificity is a difficult concept to characterize since to 
, 
a certain extent the appropriate level of specificity will be determined 
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by the context. Brown (1965) suggests that the name we use to designate 
common objects categorizes at the 'level of maximum utility', for example 
we would normally refer to an apple as apple rather than fruit or 
MacIntosh Red. Brown maintains that it is this 'level of maximum utility' 
which governs adults' communication with the young child. The adult, as it 
were, anticipates the appropriate level of reference for the child. Tbere 
are a number of problems with this suggestion. In the first instance it 
is clear that there will be situations when a more specific ego MacIntosh 
Red or less specific ego fruit reference is required and appropriate. 
Secondly, if the child learns terms only at one 'level of utility' how does 
he master the hypernym re1ationship~ Even if we dismiss these two problems 
we are left with a more persuasive one: what determines 'maximum level of 
utility'? Rice may well be 'maximum level of utility' for Western Euro-
peams, but not so for Indonesians. Cruse (1977) has attempted to clarify 
this issue. He describes Brown's 'maximum level of utility' as an 
inherently neutral level of specificity (INS). Cruse defines the INS as 
'level of specificity which is least motivated contextually'. Cruse's 
analysis also allows for a contextually neutral level of specificity (CNS)} 
that is the level of specificity which is neutral in the given context. 
Frequently the INS will be the CNS but where this is not the case abnormal 
communication will result. The crux of Cruse's analysis, into which he 
incorporates various elements of Grice's (1975) conversational postulates, 
is that the linguistic and-non-linguistic context in which the term occurs 
will affect the appropriateness of the term chosen. The relevance of this 
analysis to the present study and series of studies is two-fold. We must 
be aware that there is a level of specificity which the child is most 
likely to assume is being used but,in addition,the context will playa 
significant role in supporting or questioning the initial assumption made. 
Insofar as this study is attempting to assess the child's inferences 
concerning the referent of the 'new terms, the INS and the context will be 
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in harmony, that is they will conform to the normal requirements of 
conversation, the level of specificity indicated by the universe of dis-
course and the intended referent will be the same. An example will per-
haps clarify this. Suppose that in the sentence "the children are playing 
with the ball" ball is replaced by a nonsense word. I think it is reason-
able to suggest that the INS in this situation is ball though toy and 
basketball are obvious alternative referring terms. However, in this study, 
the supporting context picture clearly indicates a ball and there is no 
extraneous reasons why the type of ball should be specified. As such I 
would like to say that the level of s·pecificity,in some senses, is deter-
mined in the present study. 
As well as the possibility of pre-emption, a second interesting and 
significant result arose from the previous set of experiments. That was 
the difference in the children's performances with nouns and verbs, a 
difference which was not initially predicted. There is, however, evidence 
from diverse sources in the literature which suggests that such a result 
might have been expected. Despite the suggestions that such a difference 
might exist, there is no explanation as to when in the word learning 
process this factor is important, nor in reality any clearly valid 
empirical evidence as to the nature of the difficulty. If we accept that 
the acquisition of nouns and verbs does differ we must discover where the 
problem arises ~ is it referential, conceptual or methodological? It 
may be that the difficulty lies in the transient and changing nature of 
the intended referent of a verb so that establishing the referential 
relationship is the difficulty and that once this link has been formed, 
the word learning process proceeds in much the same way for all words. 
Alternatively, it may be the complex nature of verbal semantic fields 
. . 
which causes the difficulty for the child, so that establishing reference 
is not the problem but the more detailed conceptual semantic mapping of 
the term is. At present w~ have no way of disentangling these two hypo-
theses and clearly we must if we wish to characterize the child's 
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difficulty with action terms. Unfortunately, the data from Chapter Two 
shed no light on the latter problem and any support which is provide.d 
for the distinction between nouns and verbs must be accepted with caution 
because of the nature of the experimental stimuli. A solution to the 
methodological problem would be to design materials which could be 
standardized with respect to the amount of 'information' they contain for 
both nouns and verbs. Prior to any such design modifications a decision 
must be made whether to investigate the analysed or the unanalysed verbal 
form. Since investigating verbal semantic'fields is complex both theor-
etically and experimentally and because it can be argued that unless the 
initial referential relationship is established no subsequent'represent-
ation of the new term can be developed, it is reasonable to suggest that 
initially we should look only at the unitary label stage, that is the 
unanalysed form. It would then be possible to contrast a response to one 
referential presentation of a noun with one referential 
a verb directly. 
presentation of 
One of the major problems of designing tasks of this nature is that 
the task construction is approached from an adult perspective. There is 
no reason to assume that the child will treat the task in a similar 
manner to the adult and in fact there is considerable evidence to the 
contrary (cf. Donaldson, 1978). Using the verbal responses of children 
in the previous study it was possible to circumvent some of these diffi-
culties and (a) to identity a number of methodological inadequacies in the 
design of the experiment and (b) to enrich our understanding of the cues 
the children were using to solve the problems. There were still a number 
of problems with these responses. A simple verbal definition leaves the 
option open for the child simply to $ay "don't know", a response which 
frequently occurs and gives the experimenter no information at all. The 
verbal responses which were collected were difficult to classify and posed 
a number of problems of interpretation. Also there was a suggestion that 
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when a series of items was presented verbally (and a response to each was 
required) that each item was being treated in isolation. Rather than the 
child being able to build up a systematic representation of the term as 
the experimenter might expect, each item appeared to be a separate 
problem. So although the experiment was designed to investigate the 
problem of denotation the children treated each sentence as an isolated 
referential act. Clearly reference must be initially established in this 
situation before the child can decide upon the extension of the terms. 
In the first instance we must see whether reference is established. What 
is needed is a method which in a single presentation of an unknown term 
provides sufficient information for the child to identify the intended 
referent followed by a testing procedure which forces the child to choose 
a stimulus. Having chosen a stimulus a verbal response would supplement 
the already obtained non-verbal information. We would then have at least 
one if not two sources of data. 
To gain full benefit from a choice response situation we need to 
know the distribution of responses among the incorrect items as well as 
the ratio of correct to incorrect responses. The information in such a 
distribution is only valuable if the alternatives differ in some signifi-
cant way. If we vary the information presented in each alternative we 
may be able to ascertain the situation in which one source of information 
is more salient or valuable than another. First,'we must be sure that the 
child does in fact make the association between the test and choice 
situation~ There was evidence in the stories that even testing with the 
same objects that were used for acting out the story did not meet this 
requirement. Constructing a 'universe of discourse' and a set of res-
ponses which were clearly related to this world, possibly because the 
child was familiar with such situations, would circumvent such problems. 
Bearing each of these factors in mind the present experiment was 
designed and a number of specific predictions about ratios and distrib-
utions of response were made. A pictorial task was chosen for two reasons. 
\ a 2-
Brown (1957) had shown that such a method could be used successfully with 
children of this age, although he was asking a different psychological 
question. Secondly, presenting pictorial test stimuli and pictorial 
response stimuli allows the child to set up a framework for the referential 
act which is appropriate in both sections 6f the task - a universe of 
discourse is established. 
Pictures have the added advantage in that we can vary their content 
in specific ways and in so doing construct a group of test stimuli which 
focusses on different elementspresent in the original stimulus. Four 
choice stimuli were used in the present experiment, each one fulfilling 
a specific function. One item would depict the correct referent, a 
second would depict a similar but incorrect referent, a third would depict 
the original context excluding the correct referent and a final one 
would be totally irrelevant to the original picture~ 
The next methodological problem which has to be tackled is the manner 
in which the children would be introduced to the new term. Giving verbal 
criteria for the use of the new term is not satisfactory as we have already 
discovered. A child presented with the sentence 'A ged goes quack quack' 
is quite correct in defining a ged as something that goes quack quack. The 
new term must be incorporated in a sentence so that is 'is commenting on 
the picture rather. than focussing on the new term. It was therefore 
decided to have a single sentence which accompanied the picture and was 
constructed in such a way as to comment on the picture, the new term being 
presented as a known item, ego 'Look, the little boy is lupping in the lake'. 
Hopefully this would help to restrict the child's responses to some item 
of the picture. It would then be possible to follow the pictorial identi-
fication with a request for a verbal definition of the term without the 
task being regarded as bizarre from the child's perspective. 
In what follows a known item is an item for which the subject has a 
readily available lexical~referring expression whereas an unknown item is 
an item for which the child does not have a readily available lexical 
referring expression. 
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In conclusion, in a referential situation two main experimental 
variables were to be tested - known versus unknown items and-nouns versus 
verbs. The following predictions were made:-
1) Bearing in mind the results of the previous experiments and the 
evidence in the literature, it is predicted that children will be 
more successful in their identification of nouns than verbs. 
2) Overall performance for known items will be poorer than performance 
for unknown items. 
3) Where children do not correctly identify the referent the distribution 
of responses will not be random. 
a) in the case of verbs there will be a greater tendency for the 
child to choose the context picture, due to the difficulty in 
actually identifying the element which is being referred to. This 
should be true in the case of known and unknown items. 
b) in the case of nouns there, will be a greater tendency for the 
child to choose the picture containing the similar but' inapprop-
riate reference, due to the fact that establishing reference 
should not be a problem but the precise perceptual criteria may 
well be. 
c) we should expect greater variation in the case of known nouns 
where the known object is clearly referred to by a term the child 
does not know. This should produce confusion as to the important 
element or in other words the response required. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Sixty children were selected for the present experiment. Twenty of 
the children at tended a local day nursery and had a mean age of 4; 2 (range 
3;8 - 4;5). Forty children were in their first year at primary school 
with a mean age of 5;4 ('nnge 4;5 - 5 ;6). The catchment area for both 
schools is deprived, with high levels of unemployment. 
Design 
The children were randomly assigned, subject to balancing for age and 
sex, to one of two main experimental groups: Group A received pictures and 
test sentences with a nonsense word replacing a known object or action and 
Group B received pictures and test sentences with a nonsense word replacing 
an unknown object or action. Words were categorized as known if they were 
of the highest frequency count for children of this age and if every child 
in the control group· identified the object or action with that word. Words 
were categorized as unknown if they were of the lowest frequency in the 
vocabulary counts. Within each main experimental group half the children 
received the object items in a block first, see Table 3.1. 
Each block consisted of one unscored trial item and four test items. 
The trial item was consistent across children whereas the order of present-
ation of the test items was randomized across children. A short break 
occurred between the two ,block presentations. 
Each test picture had an accompanying informative sentence. The 
informative sentence (IS) contained a nonsense word referring to an object 
or action in the accompanying picture. All nonsense words were of low 
meaningful association value and of the eve format (cf. Noble, 1961). No 
nonsense word occurred more than once. All sentences conformed to the 
noun-verb--uoun format with the nonserLse word always appearing in the third 
position for nouns, eg: 
~ 
Sixteen children, mean age 4;"6 (range 3;6 - 4; 11), from the 
student-run University nursery were used as a control group. 
\ 0 5 
The children are playing with the *NS-Ball 
The boy is NS-running to the house 
Materials 
The materials consisted of 20 test pictures and 80 response pictures. 
The pictures were constructed individually. The pictorial elements were 
cut out of felt and placed on a plain background and subsequently photo-
copied. Each pictorial element was then emphasized by tracing the outline 
with a black felt tip pen. The resulting pictures contained silhouettes. 
of objects, people and animals portraying simple scenes. As discussed in 
the Introduction, each response picture contained different types of 
information. In the case of nouns R1 (response picture number 1) the 
picture always contained the object referred to in the test picture and 
hence was deemed the correct response. There were no contextual 'filler' 
items as in the original stimulus picture; simply the original object. 
R2 was constructed in the same manner as R1 but it contained a context-
ual1y plausible but denotationa11y incorrect alternative. R2·s were all 
uncommon onjects. R3 was an exact replication of the test picture but 
lacking ~the object referred to and R4 was an irrelevant full context 
picture. Examples are presented in Table· 3.2. 
In the verb cases Rl depicted the correct action but being executed 
by a different person or animal. R2 contained a contextually plausible 
but denotationa1ly incorr~ct alternative. R3 was a replication of the 
test stimuli lacking the appropriate action: a different individual was 
. added to the picture to keep the content balanced. R4 was an irrelevant 
full context picture. Examples are presented in Table 3.3. Figure 3.1 
depicts the materials used for the IS, the girl is NS-sitting at the table. 
* The abbreviation NS will be used to refer to a nonsense item. NS~run 
will indicate that a nonsense. word replaced the following item in this case 
run.· NSN or NSV will indi'cate tha.t the nonsense word was either a noun or 
a verb respectively. 
TABLE 3.1 
GROUP A 
* 
(i) Trial item 
4 Test items 
(ii) Trial item 
4 Test items 
(i) Nouns 
(ii) Verbs 
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 2 
GROUP .B 
(i) Trial item 
4 Test items 
(ii) Trial item 
4 Test items 
* Half children received (i) first and the remaining 
children received (ii) first. 
TABLE 3.2 EXAMPLES OF RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES FOR NOUNS 
NSN - Known 
IS: The indians are dancing around the NS-fire 
R1 R2 R3 . R4 
Fire Teepee Original stimulus irt"e1evant 
- minus fire 
N~ - Unknown 
IS: The girl is playing the NS-violin 
R1 R2 R3 R4 
Violin Trumpet Original stimulus irrelevant 
minus violin 
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TABLE 3.3 EXAMPLES OF RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES 'FORVERBS 
NSv - Known 
IS: The boy is NS-running to the .house. 
Rl R2 R3 R4 
indian running different boy original stimulus irrelevant 
jumping minus boy running. 
Boy kneeling on 
ground 
NSV - Unknown 
IS: The horse is NS-tangled in the rope 
Rl R2 R3 R4 
Cat tangled in Horse rearing original stimulus irrelevant 
a ball of up minus rope 
string 
TEST STI~UlUS 
I 10 00 
RI Rl 
FK;. 3et Xinmturi.ed version of experiment4 material. tor -
'!he girl i. lfS -.i ttinc at the table. Contd, .. en page. 
lO 9 
R3 
R4 
FIG. 3.I-CONTD~ 
1.1 0 
Procedure 
All test pictures were shown to a group of adult subjects to ensure 
that the action/object that E intended to depict and emphasize with the 
sentence was clear. The pictures were also presented to a group of pre-
school children who were required to identify each silhouette in the 
picture. This was done to ensure that the materials were appropriate for 
the intended experimental population. 
Each child was tested individually. There was a brief period of 
introduction where the child and E discussed books and looked at pictures 
in books. The child was presented with a single test picture and allowed 
to examine it. ! then uttered the appropriate IS. The sentence was 
articulated in such a way as to suggest that the information being given 
applied to the picture. The IS was prefixed by exclamations such as "Look" 
or "See". The child was asked to repeat the IS while looking at the 
picture, another means of ensuring that the child was paying attention to 
the two elements of the task. 
The test picture was then· removed from the child's view and the four 
response pictur~s were placed one by one, in a random order in front of 
the child, see Figure 3.2. The actual position of e~ch response stimulus 
was varied on each trial. The child was then asked to: "Look at all the 
pictures carefully and show me which picture has a NSN in it" or "someone 
NSVing in it". After the child had made his response the pictures were 
removed from view. Depending on the conditions one of the following 
questions was asked:-
1) "l.fuat do you think NSN is?" or 
2) "l.fuat do you think to NSV is?" 
M If no response or a "don't know" was obtained, E asked the prompt questions. 
The prompt question referred directly to the original picture and the 
.. 
intended object or .action. For example, in the case of the following IS, 
A 
"The children are playing with the NS-ball", the child was asked "what were 
the children playing with?" 
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The same procedure was followed for all test items. The informative 
sentences can be found in Appendix II. 
'\ t Z -
D 
Test stimulus CEJ 
-----._---
8 
DO 
Response stimuli m 
Fig. 3.2 Presentation of Test Material 
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RESULTS 
Before discussing the main results of ~hepresent experiment, it is 
necessary to validate empirically the assumption that the probability of 
correct responses does not differ significantly between items within each 
condition, that is for our present purposes the test items are homogeneous. 
A Cochrane Q test was carried out on the items within each of the four 
conditions: Known nouns, unknown nouns, known verbs and unknown verbs. 
There was no significant difference between items in each condition. 
Therefore in the following analysis each condition is treated as a unit. 
Choice response 
The distributionsof responses for each condition and for the two 
different age groups are presented in Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. 
Because of the small number of correct responses given by the young~r 
children (cf. Figures 3.5 and 3.6) and the fact that apart from responses 
to unknown nouns they do not deviate from chance, the present statistical 
analysis will deal only with the responses of the older group of children. 
Choice'response, older children 
Table 3.4 presents the total numbers of correct responses in each 
conditions and the distribution of wrong responses across stimuli. An 
Anova looking only at correct responses, ie. Rl, was carried out. Table 
3.5 presents the results of this analysis. As the results indicate, there 
is a significant difference between known/unknown items, with known items 
producing fewer correct responses, p = .0033 •. Similarly there is a signi-
ficant difference between nouns and verbs.with verbs producing fewer 
correct responses, p < .00001. There is however a significant interaction 
p = .01 which may be interpreted as the variable known/unknown affecting 
nouns to a greater extent than verbs (cf. Table 3.4). In fact the variable 
known/unknown has very little effect in the verb condition but a powerful 
effect in the noun condition~ The importance of this finding will be 
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amplified in the Discussion. It is interesting to note that the only 
change in response to different conditions which occurred for the younger 
children was with the known/unknown variable for the noun group, with 
children performing better in the unknown noun condition. 
It is not only the number of correct responses which is of interest 
here but also the distribution of the children's choices when the correct 
stimuli is not chosen. Therefore the individual hypothesis presented in 
the introduction concerning the iike1ihood of particular choices given 
that the correct response was not chosen was tested. Each condition was 
analysed separately using the Binomial Theora.m.· The actual raw distrib-
ution scores can be seen in Table 3.4. 
The number of correct responses was subtracted from the total number 
of responses and the probability of the distribution of errors calculated. 
It was predicted that in the case of verbs for both the known and the 
unknown condition that if the child failed to select the correct picture 
he would choose picture 3, that is the picture that depicted the initial 
situation but did not contain the action referred to. This prediction was 
supported for both known verbs F (z) = .99, p < .001 and unknown verbs 
F (z) = .99, p < .001. In the case of nouns it was predicted that if the 
child failed to choose the correct picture there would be a greater 
tendency to choose picture 2, that is the picture which contained a per-
ceptua11y similar but incorrect referent. While this prediction was not 
supported in the case of known nouns there was a significant effect in the 
case of unknown nouns, F (z) = .99, p < .01. In conclusion we can say 
that although children are making a high proportion of errors in this task, 
the distribution of these errors is not random and in three out of four 
cases can in fact be predicted ~ priori. 
Verbal response (sense of term) 
Again, I shall only deal with the responses given by the older group 
of children. Having made· their choice responses children were asked 
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TABLE 3.4 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES GIVEN BY OLDER CHILDREN 
CHOICE 
GROUP A (KNOWN) N=20 GROUP B (UNKNOWN) N=20 
54 (160) 89 (160) 
NOUNS VERBS, NOUNS VERBS i 
31 (80) 23 (80) 59 (80) 30 (80) 
Responses ~ Responses ~ Responses.~ Responses ~ 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R1 R2 R3 R4 
31 11 21 17 23 8 36 13 59 12 8 1 30 14 29 7 
Note Brackets indicate total possible score 
TABLE 3.5 RESULTS OF THE' ANOVA BY EXPERIMENTAL GROUP AND WORD CLASS 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Subj 39 82.987 
B1 1 17.112 17.112 . 9.8712 .0033** 
(¥.nown/Unknown) 
EBI 38 65.875 1.734 
W1 1 17.112 17.112 22.5203 .0000** 
(Noun/Verb)' 
W1B1 1 5.513 5.513 7.2545 .0101* 
EW1B1 38 28.875 0.760 
W 40 51.500 
verbally about the referent of the nonsense term. Table 3.6 presents 
the breakdown of verbal responses given. This table is ~ directly 
comparable with Table 3.4 Whereas the breakdown in Table 3.4 initially 
deals only with the correct responses, Table 3.6 deals with numbers of 
children who gave any verbal response. It might be expected that giving 
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a verbal response in the' case of known objects and actions might be easier 
because the child actually had a word present in the lexicon,but this 
difficulty was avoided by accepting 'definitions' which could adequately 
refer to the object/action though not actually containing the appropriate 
term. In effect these responses were very clear, see Table 3~~ for 
examples. In some cases children appear ~o be relying on the picture to 
produce their definition, ego "like a guitar but you get a stick with it". 
In other cases the accompanying sentence appears to be the critical factor, 
though of course the sentence is supported by the scene depicted in the 
picture, ego "play it" for IS "the girl is playing the NS-violin". On the 
whole it was not possible to separate these two variables. 
Strictly speaking, it is only the sense questions as opposed to the 
prompt questions which allow us to infer anything about the 'meaning' of 
the new term for the child. All the prompt question does is focus the 
child's attention on the intended object or action in the original picture 
and ask for a description, eg.: 
What was the girl pushing along the path ? 
What was the girl doing by the tree ? 
Accordingly I will deal mainly with the responses to the sense 
questions. There is no significant different between the number of such 
responses given to NSN-known and the number of responses given to NSN-un-
known (X2 = 1.6129) though the trend is in the same direction as the choice 
responses. Similarly, there is no difference between the number of sense 
responses given to NSV-known and NSV-unknown. 
TABLE 3.6 TOTAL NUMBER.OF VERBAL RESPONSES PROVIDED BY THE 
CHILDREN WITHIN EACH CONDITION 
GROUP A (KNOWN) N=20 GROUP B (UNKNOWN) N=20 
99 (160) 79 . (160) . 
NOUNS VERBS NOUNS VERBS 
53 '(80) 46 (80) 50 (80) 29 (80) 
Sense Prompt Sense Prompt Sense Prompt Sense Prompt 
26 27 13 33 36 14 13 16 
A* B A B A B A 
20 7 21 2 2 12 10 
*A - real word 
B - repetition of nonsense word 
Note Brackets indicate total possible score 
TABLE 3.7 EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTABLE RESPONSES FOR SENSE QUESTIONS 
CHILD'S DEFINITION 
Giant animal 
Goat or something like that . 
Big animal 
Thing with horns 
Indian boat 
Kind of boat 
Toy and thing you throw 
Sticks that are bent 
Thing you throw 
Like a guitar but you get 
a stick with it 
Thing you play 
Play it 
INTENDED REFERENT 
monster 
monster 
monster 
monster 
canoe 
canoe 
boomerang 
boomerang 
boomerang 
violin 
violin 
violin 
B 
6 
11 9 
12 0 
To my knowledge there is no statistical 'test available to contrast 
the responses for the within-group differences for nouns and verbs. So 
without drawing any definite conclusions I should like to mention that in 
the case of both known and unknown items rate of response for sense 
questions to nouns was greater than the number of sense questions to verbs. 
Table 3.8 contrasts choice responses with the sense responses. It 
can be seen that although children are less accurate in sense responses, 
the pattern of responses for sense and choice follows the same trend. In 
both cases nouns are easier than verbs and the NSN-unknown are easier than 
the NSN-known. There is little effect of the known/unknown variable 
for verbs in the choice response and no effect for sense responses. 
A brief comment on responses to the prompts is now warranted. Since 
the prompt question refers specifically to the picture and does not use 
the nonsense word, we would expect a higher proportion of correct responses, 
as opposed to simple repetitions of the nonsense word for pictures which 
depicted known objects or actions rather than unknown ones. This is the 
case for nouns. Seventy-four percent of these responses for known nouns 
identify the object in the picture whereas only 14% do so in the case of 
unknown nouns. This is not the case for verbs. Sixty-three percent of 
the responses to prompt questions for the NSV-known are appropriate and 
62% are appropriate for the NSV-unknown. In the NSV-known condition 
children identify the action intended by E whereas in the NSV-unknown 
condition it is always the case that the children are using a known but 
potentially appropriate alternative eg.: 
1. IS: the donkey is NS-refusing to go with the boy. 
Prompt: What is the donkey doing ? 
Child: Looking at the boy 
In effect this is accurate because in the picture the donkey is looking 
at the boy. This child's choice response for this item was R3. 
TABLE 3.8 
KNOWN 
TOTAL OF CORRECT RESPONSES GIVEN IN ALL CONDITIONS 
FOR CHOICE AND SENSE RESPONSES 
NOUNS VERBS 
UNKNOWN KNOWN UNKNOWN 
CHOICE SENSE CHOICE SENSE CHOICE SENSE CHOICE SENSE 
31 26 59 36 23 13 30 13 
1 2 1 ' 
2. IS: The dinosaur is ~~"Sy-a.ttacking the rabbit 
Prompt: What is ,the dinosaur doing? 
Child: Chasing the rabbit. 
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This is not exactly what is depicted in the picture and no adult offered 
this response even when pushed, but it is possible that the child believes 
this to be the case. However, her choice response of R3 is not inter-
pretable in this way. Certainly the dinosaur and rabbit are present, but 
in this picture the rabbit is sitting looking at the clearly stationary 
dinosaur's front. 
So in contrast to the NSN-unknown, where children do not offer a 
known alternative when they cannot identify the intended object in the 
picture (that is, they repeat the nonsense words instead), in the NSV-
unknown condition the majority of children produce a response referring to 
an alternative action. I would like to argue that this pattern of responses 
supports the prediction that in the verb case it is harder for the children 
to identify the intended referent and the child given a prompt simply 
reports an action which he believes could be occurring. In other words, 
in the NSN-unknown condition the child knows he does not know the object 
and hence gives the NS as a response whereas in the NSV-unknown the child 
is unaware that he does not know because reference has not been established. 
It is significant that in the NSV-known condition the children produce a 
response referring to the action intended by ! - it is not simply that in 
all cases the interpretation of the action is ambiguous. 
The responses to the prompt question tell us two things: 
1) Children can identify known objects and actions in the pictures 
though this may not be reflected in the choice of responses to the 
NS. The complete lack of "don't know" responses supports this 
interpretation. 
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2) They always respond with the appropriate part of speech to the 
question. Again this is not reflected in their choice responses for 
in the case of verbs there is a tendency to choose R3 - a picture 
which does not show an appropriate action. 
I believe we can therefore conclude that any responses are due to 
the child attempting to determine the referent of the NS rather than any 
inherent problems with pictorial representation of NSV-known, NSN-knownand 
unknown. The interpretation of NSV-unknown results is unclear. Children 
may function exactly as they do in NSV-known conditions because of the 
existence of alternative known actions in their vocabularies. 
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DISCUSSION 
An initial perusal of the results might suggest some unambiguous 
conclusions. Children find the verbs in this task harder than the nouns 
and the known replaced lexical items harder than the unknown lexical items. 
Patterns of responses to choice and verbal items are similar though per-
formance with verbal responses is poorer. There are, however, a number of 
issues which need to be clarified. In the case of the known/unknown 
distinction we must explain why this difference arises whereas in the case 
. . 
of the verb/noun distinction there are a number of methodological as well 
as conceptual issues which must be clarified. 
Known/unknown appeared to be a significant variable only in the case 
of nouns. The most likely explanation for this result is that although 
identification of the correct response is easy for NSN-unknown, this is 
not so for NSV-unknown. I will deal at this point only with the noun case. 
Let us envisage the task from the child's perspective. The child hears a 
sentence in conjuction with a supporting pictorial scene. In the case of 
the known object he has a previously established label for each item in 
the scene whereas in the case of the unknown object there is one item 
depicted for which he has no label. In the latter case there are two 
unknown elements, a strange object which is being acted upon by a known 
and labelled animate being and an unknown phonemic sequence, whereas in -
the former case there is only the unknown phonemic sequence. Note that in 
the noun case the expression always refers to a concrete object - there can 
be no doubts about the nature of the object. It seems reasonable to suggest 
that the establishment of reference is pre-empted in the known noun 
situation because of the existence of an appropriate label. The strategy 
. I am proposing that the ch~ldren adopt is that if an unknown phonemic 
sequence is heard, whose reference is made clear becuase of the linguistic 
elements which accompany it or because of non-verbal information, the child 
will look for an unknown object; if no such object exists the child will 
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have to adopt an alternative strategy. rt is significant to note at this 
stage that when children fail to identify the. unknown referent in the 
NSN-unknown situation they opt for a close alternative •••• again unknown. 
However, in the case of the NSN-known referent the whole process appears 
to be disrupted with a random choice of items ensuing. Note that children 
did have the alternative of making an R2 choice which contained an unknown 
referent. However, it seems in this case that knowing the name of the 
intended referent interferes with choosing an unknown but potentially 
appropriate alternative. Although such an interpretation is intuitively 
pleasing it does raise a number of conceptual difficulties - the key one 
being how do children come to learn that an object can be referred to in 
more than one way? A dog can be referred to as dog, Fido, animal etc. 
There are three points which should be kept in mind. In the first instance 
we must consider the age of these children. Three and four' -year olds 
have fairly well developed lexicons and the size of the lexicon is in-
creasing rapidly (cf. Carey, 1978a). A strategy of pre-emption would be 
a useful way of limiting alternatives. The second issue which is relevant 
here is the level of lexical specificity which the speaker uses. As I 
mentioned in the Introduction to this Chapter both Brown and Cruse discuss 
the fact that there is a level of lexical specificity which is neutral; 
one which is more likely. to be used than another unless some contextual 
element in the discourse requires a greater or lesser degree of specifi-
cation. Brown has argued that adults use this criterion when speaking to 
children. This ability of adults to anticipate the nature of the child's 
world is likely ~to lead to children being presented with instances of 
synonymy or subordinate/superordinate relationships unless some extra form 
of information is included. There is evidence from Curtis (1974) that 
learning to master such relationships does in fact cause difficulties for 
the early word learner. Interestingly, McGarrigle, Grieve and Hughes 
(1978) have evidence which reflects on this issue though it was not 
intended to do so directly. McGarrigle et al were investigating children's 
solutions to the traditional quantification class-inclusion task. This 
task requires a comparison between class and subclass. The child is 
presented with an array of wooden beads four of which are white and two 
of which are brown. This child would then be asked "Are there more 
white beads or more beads?" (cf. Inhelder & Piaget, 1964). The typical 
response of the preoperational child is that there are more white beads. 
McGarrigle ~ al found that altering the presentation of the task and 
giving a greater emphasis to the total class helped the children in 
solving the problem. I shall report one of McGarrigle's experiments so 
the reader can gain an idea of the manipulations involved. 
McGarrigle used four toy cows, three of them black and one white. 
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The cows were placed on their sides and the children were informed that they 
were 'sleeping'. The dependent variable in the experiment was the child-
ren's performance on two different questions:-
1) Are there more black cows or more cows? (traditional Genevan form) 
2) Are there more black cows or more sleeping cows? 
McGarrigle found in this and a series of other tasks that the 
children were more successful in answering the question when the appropriate 
distinc,tion between class and subclass was linguistically and perceptually 
marked (cf. McGarrigle, Grieve & Hughes, 1978 for greater detail). What 
I am arguing is that by the inclusion of terms like sleeping cows (or, in 
other cases, the exclusion of distracting words) children are given inform-
ation as to level of reference intended. Grieve and Garton (1980) have 
shown that children succeed in making comparisons between sets of objects 
when the comparison questions are symmetrical with respect to the refer-
ential status of the term, that is comparison of set with set or subset 
with subset. but when the comparison questions are referentially asymmet-
> ~ rical, calling for comparison of set with subset. young children typically 
fail. Again this is evidence that children are capable of using refer-
ential'information, but it is comparisons between different levels of 
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lexical specificity which causes them difficulty. 
This brings us to the third issue which is relevant here. Not only 
do adults tend to use terms of a set level of specificity (INS), but they 
also supplement the information by using such devices as lexical contrast. 
The two most commonly used devices are mothers' linkages of words to 
words in the same semantic domain and their supplying of comments which 
would add to the child's knowledge about a word, or about a world in 
which the word could be used. 
In essence, what I am arguing is that children have two good reasons 
not to expect the new word in this situation to refer to a known named 
object; their own strategies for word learning and the lack of any 
linguistic information which would indicate that a change in level of 
analysis is required. Yet they are confronted with a referent clearly 
demarcated lexically and pictorially. They are, not surprisingly, confused. 
The present task emphasizes the difficulty in such situations because it 
is highly constrained. We must be aware that interpretation of this 
known/unknown dichotomy will vary between children and situations as well 
as with the degree of certainty the child has about the real word. For 
example, one can envisage a task in which while the new term refers to a 
known named animal the child interprets the new phonemic sequence as a 
proper name. Katz, Baker and McNamara (1974) have illustrated that the 
nature of the object is also of significance in such situations. Children 
17-24-months old learned nonsense names for dolls and blocks. These 
authors concluded that for dolls children first discriminate individuals 
and learn their names; for certain other objects they do not discriminate 
individuals and learn only the class names. Clearly there must be a time 
in the child's development when he will be able to cope with expressions 
which explicitly refer to known named objects - a topic which warrants 
further investigation. In conclusion I would like to reiterate one point. 
In the choice of alterna~ive responses in the known noun condition the 
situation potentially allows for a referential link to be established but 
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because of the child's lexical competence this process is inhibited. 
The results of the present e~eriment indicate that children's 
performance with verbs is poorer than their performance with nouns. 
Despite my initial attempts to control for any such result being a con-
sequence of methodological artifact, we are once again left with problems 
of interpretation. It can be argued that actions are not satisfactorily 
presentable pictorially. The core element of a verb for children is 
action (Brown, 1957) and the use of static displays is an unacceptable 
way of depicting action. Bruner~l communication) reports that children 
enumerate the pictorial constituents and only later (6-7 years) begin to 
describe the relationships among the objects. This does not seem to be 
a satisfactory explanation. As I stated earlier, one of the reasons for 
choosing to present the task in a pictorial fashion was because Brown had 
used a similar procedure and obtained results which suggest that children 
were happy to have an action presented in a static picture. Brown found 
that children could clearly differentiate between nonsense words referring 
to movement, particular objects and extended substance (mass noun). Brown's 
choice stimuli were three pictures each containing an action, object and 
extended surface so there is no reason to suggest that one stimulus was 
more salient than another. Brown's study was directed at a different 
issue. He was concerned to know whether children could determine semantic 
properties on the basis of morphological and syntactic cues to parts of 
speech membership. He argued that the semantic distinction between parts 
of speech is .much clearer for children than it is for adults. So we can 
only conclude that children are able to use such syntactic information 
and that with the prototypical examples of noun denotata - concrete objects 
- and verb denotata - actions - they are very successful. My results on 
the other hand suggest that children haven't grasped the part of speech 
because not only do they not choose the appropriate action but their 
alternative choice is not a ·similar action but rather the stimulus that 
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depicts the original scene lacking the action. Despite this, their 
respOnse to the prompts do suggest that they know the intended part of 
speech. There are a number of possible explanations for the difference 
between the present study and Brown's but I shall focus on two, a method-
ological one and a conceptual one. The options which Brown offers in the 
choice situation are more limited than in the present one. Brown offers 
neither a pure context picture nor an irrelevant option. Each picture 
contains one of the original pictorial elements. It may be that if the 
opportunity of making a context choice had been available the children 
might have found this more salient. This alternative is lacking and the 
other two picture options were representing quite different actions:in 
one case the container was actually being raised. These are both actions 
which can be clearly depicted and ones which the child is likely to be 
able to name. The child's choice is more sharply circumscribed. 
The conceptual explanation involves the nature of the verbs used. 
In the present study all the verbs used are two-place predicates, stating 
a relationship between two elements which are pictorially represented, ego 
'The boy is run~ing to the house'. We might like to represent this 
semantically as run (x, y). Seen in this light the child 'knows' x and 
y perceptually and linguistically but not the word ~ and may be unsure 
of the exact action being depicted. What appears to be happening is that 
children are treating their knowledge of x and y, which are stable elements, 
as their criteria for choice response. They are not using their knowledge 
about parts of speech. Brown's terms are one~place verbs. However, we 
cannot conclude that it is the relational element which is critical for 
R3-type responses because as mentioned earlier Brown offers no context 
picture. In fact Brown's presentation of 'the new words to the children is 
somewhat artificial*, all~wing no associations with actors or objects 
(cf. 1.6.3.) Surely this approach lacks external validity. It seems to 
~ 
* In this picture you can see sibbing, show me another picture with 
sibbing in it., 
me that if these tasks can be said to be externally valid and to reflect 
the child's competence asa word learner at all, then my task has 
parallels in the child's own experience. Consider a story situation. 
Even in the case of an ostensive definition one is more likely to say 
'Johnny is running' than 'you can seen running' as Brown does. I am 
arguing that with verbs of a relational nature the problem is establishing 
what kind of relationship is being indicated in a single referential act. 
It may take a number of encounters with the term for the child to tease 
the important elements out. In fact Gentner (1975) has suggested that 
motion is rarely used when establishing criteria for application of a new 
term. In Gentner's experiment both children and adults will tend to use 
form and use in preference to action, which suggests an extended learning 
process if the motion is in fact the key element. 
Why is it then that children succeed in the tasks designed by Wykes 
and Johnson-Laird when the verbs are presented in sentence frames that 
clearly associate a subject and object with a particular action? My 
initial explanation of this difference suggested that part of the child-
r en's success was due to the fact that none of the terms used had a 
corresponding single term in English. However, the failure of the known/ 
unknown variable to affect response rates in the verb condition indicates 
that this is not an adequate explanation. It seems to me that the differ-
ence may lie in the choice of verbs and in the range of response alter-
natives presented to the child. The published report of these studies 
does not contain detailed description of the stories presented or the 
objects presented in each response condition and it has been impossible 
for me, despite repeated requests, to obtain this information. One 
example is given and since this example represents a condition in which 
60% of the children gave correct responses and was the second highest 
rate .. (66% ,60%, 46%,33%), I do not feel I am being unjust by using it to 
put forward an alternattve interpretation. I have argued above that it 
is the objects (x and y) that occur with the verbs that the children 
131 
initially focus their attention on. This is similar if not identical to 
the argument these authors put,forward: 
"In particular the subjects and objects that occur 
with a verb might help the child to infer its meaning •• " 
(1977;326) 
The difference that I see between the two studies is two-fold. In the 
first instance the range of actions associable with the subject or object 
in the story must be restricted because of the design of their experiment. 
So, for example, in the story that we are given, the term mib denoted the 
action of spilling and soaking and therefore always occurred with a 
subject noun phrase denoting a liquid. The possible actions associated 
with my subjects was much greater. In the second place the choices for 
response offered in this instance were highly constrained. There was a 
female doll, a car, a ball and a container with orange juice in it. The 
story contained no female doll, no car, no ball but did include a cup 
with coffee in it and mention of another liquid ,(water). The container 
with a liquid in it is the closest physical possibility for response 
especially considering that a,1l the noun phrases occurring with the novel 
verb denoted a liquid. What I am arguing is that the children need only 
have associated the occurrence of liquid with the presentation of the 
novel verb and learnt nothing more about the nature of the verb. So 
-
while focussing on the objects which occur with the verb in Wykes et al's 
study is informative and may lead the child to make a correct response, 
such a strategy in my study is less fruitful because the subjects and 
objects which occur with the verbs are not highly constrained and because 
the choice of responses allows the child to be misled by the context 
occurring with the verb. In one case the context is highly informative 
and a good basis for starting to construct a representation of the term; , 
in the other case the context is less informative and will entail a longer 
mapping process. This example brings home the fact that although paying 
~ 
attention to the subjects and objects that occur with relational'terms can 
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be an informative means. of constructing a meaning, the extent to which 
such a strategy will be successful will depend on the number and nature 
of the se1ectiona1 restrictions associated with a particular verb. I 
think it is the latter factor which may well explain the failure rate of 
the children in experimellts 1a and b. In these story situations the verbs 
used were often nebulous, in that the subjects and objects occurring with 
them lacked the explicit restrictions forced in Wykes' study. As such 
Wykes et a1's results can be seen as supporting the present hypothesis 
that it is the subjects and the objects occurring with the verbs that the 
children initially focus on when attempting to discover the intended 
meaning of a verb. 
It is possible that the differences between the verb studies 
discussed here and my own one is due solely to the methods used or to the 
problems of using stative verbs. Alternatively, they may be due to a 
combination of the methodology and an intrinsic problem of establishing 
reference with a verb. At present I am in favour of the latter inter-
pretation but there is no unequivocal evidence on which to base this claim. 
The implications of raising these issues as potential problems for the 
child as a word learner are fascinating. For example, it might be more 
appropriate for the child to deal with the acquisition of terms of concrete 
reference in a different manner from verbs, adjectives and relational nouns. 
This dichotomy might be associated with different strategies for estab-
1ishing reference and discovering the denotation of a term. Clark and 
Clark (1977, Chapt.13) discuss two hypotheses concerning the acquisition 
of word meanings. The first hypothesis they discuss concerns semantic 
inclusion relations. The suggestion is that more complex meanings include 
. ~ . 
simpler meanings - that is the one with the least semantic components • 
For example, in the case of dimensional terms the order of acquisition 
reflects the relative semanticcomp1exity of the terms, with big and small 
~ 
being learnt before tall and short or long and short etc. (cf. 1.6.2). 
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Evidence from 'Gentner (1975) on the acquisition of verbs of 'mixing' 
follows this same pattern. The alternative,hypothesis that the Clarks 
discuss to predict the acquisition of terms concerns basic level cate-
gories. Basic level terms name a middle level of categorization, Cruse's 
INS. Rosch etal (1976) argue that basi~ level terms should be acquired 
before more general or specific level terms. As such a child should 
learn the word dog before he learns animal or Irish setter. However, not 
all categories can be placed in such neat hierarchial arrangement (cf. 
1.5.1). In certain instances the basic level hypothesis and the semantic 
inclusion hypothesis lead to different predictions about the order of 
acquisition. As the Clarks point out the semantic inclusion hypothesis 
would predict that children should learn the term animal before they learn 
'dog because animal is less semantically complex. In this instance the 
data support the basic level hypothesis rather than the semantic inclusion 
hypothesis. However, data such as Gentner's conform to the predictions 
of the semantic inclusion hypothesis. There is, I believe, an'underlying 
problem with these relational terms as to what exactly a basic level might 
be. It is surely a strange question to ask what the basic level for verbs 
of ,~tirring ", is. The Clarks' suggest that such a difference might be 
explained in the following manner: 
"Semantic complexity of the inclusion type applies to 
relational terms and the simpler the relation the 
easier it is to acquire. But since category names are 
not relational in this sense those predictions do not 
apply and basic level predictions do" 
(1977;501) 
Speculation of this nature is stimulating but we do not have definite 
information that the acquisition strategies are different let alone that 
there "are differences in semantic representation. In any case, differences 
in acquisition strategies do not necessarily imply differences in semantic 
representations. 
4.1 The story so far 
CHAPTER 4 
THE MISSING LINK 
In section 1.7 I identified a number of experimental issues which I 
hoped to investigate in the first part of this thesis. A reappraisal of 
successes and failures is warranted before we examine the child's ability 
to deal with unfamiliar words from a different methodological angle. 
An attempt was made to clarify some of the anomalies in the liter-
ature concerning children's competence with single presentations of 
previously unknown (novel) lexical items. It is suggested, there, that if 
the child identifies the referent intended by the speaker he can subse-
quently identify another instance if the new lexical item is not preempted 
in his vocabulary. As the reader will have realized, the situations pre-
sented to the children are highly constrained and when it is stated that 
the child can identify "another instance" I am in effect saying that the 
child chooses the most appropriate instance from a limited set. One of 
the major shortcomings of these experiments is that they make no attempt 
to determine the child's denotational boundaries. What these studies do 
provide us with is a systematic investigation of the child's (potential) 
data base for the ensuing development of denotational and sense relations. 
If the child identifies the intended referent of the nonsense word 
and if this new term is preempted by a known appropriate term in the child's 
lexicon, the process of establishing reference is impaired. It is as if 
the children have made the inference that if an object already has a name 
it cannot be referred to and hence denoted by a different name. This con-
fusion, which occurs in the case of preempted words, does not arise 
because the children do not know which item is being indicated. The data 
from the story task follow-up discussions and from the final sentence in 
the three sentence task suggest that the child does know which item is 
being indicated (only in the 'noun case) but is confused by the use of a 
new term for a previously named item. 
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The fact that children are able to isolate the correct object in 
these cases indicates that they are sensitive to the cues presented by 
the experimenter which indicate the intended level of specificity (CNS). 
If the child were not aware of the intended level of specificity we could 
not get the effect of known versus unknown nouns in Chapter Three. That 
is, if the children had not isolated the intended level of specificity it 
would have been possible for them to infer that the new word denoted some 
previously unnamed object or attribute of the object in the known noun 
condition and hence eradicate any difference between the conditions. It 
may be that the children do not identify the correct "action" because 
information concerning level of specificity is not appropriate for such 
terms and that to examine the acquisition of verb meanings we must use 
different cues to help the child identify the referent initially and then 
, 
to proceed to discover the terms denotation, perhaps by the use of more 
specific selectional restrictions as in the Wykes and Johnson-Laird study. 
What the child learns about the novel lexical item depends to a 
certain extent, as I have argued, on the nature of the new term. In the 
case of new terms denoting objects it seems that children pick up inform-
ation pertaining to the object per se whereas in the case of the verbs 
studied, in Chapter Three, many of the children focus on the elements 
involved in the relation rather than on the specific action of state. It 
is suggested that this occurs because a specific action is harder to iso-
late and that one of the possible ways of isolated the elements or com-
ponents of the verbs meaning is to discover which actors and objects can 
appropriately accompany it. Further work is necessary to test this hypo-
thesis. It may be that different types of words require different 
systems of semantic representation, but this is by no means a necessary 
result. It is possible to use different routes on a map to reach the 
same destination; alternatively taking a different route may in certain 
cases entail arriving at~a different destination. 
As is often the case in studies concerning cognitive or language 
development the children's erroneous responses and their general comments 
about the task are often as informative as their correct responses. The 
studies discussed here are no exception. If we focussed solely on the 
correct responses it would not be unwarranted to conclude that learning 
the meanings of words is a complicated and haphazard affair,and that 
children really aren't very good at it. Beneath the superficial confusion 
I think there is some impotant information both concerning the child as a 
word learner and for the psychologist designing such experiments. In 
Experiments 1a and b,where children are performing extremely poorly, many 
of their responses attempt to draw on the linguistic information presented 
in the sentences. Few of these responses are semantically empty. As we 
saw in Chapter Three when children make incorrect responses there is often 
an underlying pattern, as in the case of verbs where children choose the 
original context picture. 
There is a basic problem with such tasks and it manifests itself in 
the difficulty the children have in successfully completing them, whereas 
in other ways they demonstrate some semantic competence. The crux of the 
matter 'is what we are requiring the children to do. The tasks fail to 
mimic the natural word learning situation if only because the child is 
required to reflect back on the linguistic input in a meta-linguistic 
manner. The child is being forced to pay attention to the word, an aware-
ness which he may not have until later (cf. Papandropou1ou & Sinclair, 
1974), in a way that the normal process of communication may not require 
him to do. Although I have attempted to make the tasks as realistic as 
possible by the introduction of pictures and suchlike it seems evident 
that by asking a question of the form "Wh~t do you think an x is 1" we 
are forcing the child to become explicitly aware of a process which may 
normally be functioning tacitly. 
Litowitz (1977) argues that children must learn how to make verbal 
definitions. Dealing with words that are functionally present in the 
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children's vocabularies (ages 4.5 - 7.5) she describes 5 levels of verbal 
defini tions : 
Levell. - A non-verbal statement or a verbal statement which is 
semantically empty. 
Level 2 - Word associations to the original stimulus. 
Level 3 - Concrete examples of actual experiences associated as a predi-
cate to the stimulus word. Occasionally the attribute given will 
be evaluative or an affective marker of the original stimulus. 
Level 4 - Some awareness of a definitional form (a set predicate) and a 
beginning abstraction from the individual experience towards 
social information. 
Level 5 - An abstraction from the individual experiencing of a lexical 
item in terms of class inclusion or membership and salient 
attributes or properties. 
There are three points which I will make about Litowitz's data. The first 
concerns her own results. Even by the age of 7.5 no child had reached 
levelS for any of the terms used and the verbs were. extremely difficult 
for the children to define, a late acquired skill (cf. Wolman & Barker, 
1965). The second point relates the ·form of definitions Litowitz received 
and those produced in Experiments la and b here. Many of the children in 
my study were responding in a manner which could be equated with level 3, 
that is they were attempting to draw parallels with their own experience 
to define the word. So the responses to nonsence words are not so 
different to those of known words. The nonsense word task places extra 
demands on the child since it involves either translating the unknown term 
into a known one, ie. lup = cat, or constructing an initial representation 
of a new term,and therefore the child may use more primitive definitional 
strategies. However Litowitz's data suggest that the form of these 
definitions is not solely experimentally generated. 
The final point rela~es·to any study which attempts to get children 
to define words and has to do with the level of linguistic sophistication 
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required to succeed in these tasks. There is considerable evidence that 
the emergence of meta-linguistic skills is a process acquired after a 
considerable degree of linguistic competence (cf. Levelt, Sinclair & 
Jarvella, 1978) and we may be underestimating the child's semantic compet-
ence by forcing an awareness which is particularly difficult and not 
required in the normal word use situation. The difficulties with meta-
linguistic awareness are compounded when we take into consideration the 
work of Karmiloff-Smith (1979) which suggests that the processes by which 
children make linguistic decisions are not necessarily the same as the 
one's they say they are using. 
So far I have gathered some useful bits of data. It is now necessary 
to attempt to integrate them into a more complete whole. To do this we 
must investigate the development of the child's denotational boundaries 
for comprehension and production (if possible); the semantic represent-
ation of the new term in relation to other words in the same semantic 
field; the importance of the linguistic input in determining the approp-
riate semantic domain. All these issues require that the children's know-
ledge of wordsis tested over a period of time rather than in a single 
presentation situation. 
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4.2 Where to next ? 
We find ourselves in an experimental dilemma. On the one hand we 
must design tasks that make human sense to the child (cf. Donaldson, 1978), 
that is the tasks must have external validity and as such not force the 
child to respond in a meta-linguistic manner, yet we wish to do this 
without abandoning our goal of isolating the important variables in the 
word learning process. It appears that eithervue make the task realistic 
to the child and by so doing present him with a wide range of linguistic 
and non-linguistic information pertaining to the meaning of a new term or 
we severely limit the amount of information presented and hence force the 
child to place undue weight on single sources of linguistic or non-
linguistic information. Similarly, since we require a response, either 
we wait for the child to present evidence of comprehension or production 
of the word spontaneously, and possibly never get our data, or we force 
the child to show signs of comprehension and production and in so doing 
possibly make the child aware of a process which is arguably tacit. The 
problem of designing experimental tasks is a practic.a1 one and ultimately 
rests upon the questions to which we want answers. The questions must be 
, 
clearly formulated before attempting any empirical investigations. In 
this section, therefore, I will initially consider the key theoretical 
issues and will then discuss a methdo10gica1 approach which has the 
potential to be developed so as to incorporate these issues and hopefully 
present us with some enlightening data. 
Four topics concerning the acquisition of word meanings will be 
discussed: the formation and representation of semantic categories; the 
relationship between comprehension and production; the conceptual/semantic 
framework into which the new word enters; linguistic contrast as a source 
of semantic information. Each of these issues has been raised in some form 
or another with respect to the methodology or results of the preceding 
experiments. Consequentl,y, each of these issues is viewed as cri tical and 
worthy of further investigation; the missing link is how to investigate 
these variables experimentally for the age group under consideration. 
4.2.1 The formation and representation of semantic categories 
Acquiring the meanings of most words involves a categorization 
process - that is, the production and comprehension of terms of reference 
implies an underlying organizational process which is capable of guiding 
the application of a given word to an assortment of objects, actions etc. 
It is this categorization process, which objectively manifests itself in 
the child's actual choice of denotata for a given word, which constitutes 
the basis of a theory of the development of word meaning: What criteria 
do children use for restricting and extending the denotation of a new 
term? In turn, ~at kind of relationship eventually holds between the 
various denotata such that they form a coherent whole, - a concept ? 
The studies that were presented in Chapters Two and Three dealt with 
the sources of information children draw on in an attempt to grasp the 
meaning of a term in a single presentation. There was no means of 
assessing the denotationa1 boundaries of these terms, nor if and how the 
de1ine?tion of these boundaries changed over time. Though the basis for 
future development of a word's meaning may begin from the first referent 
for which a word is used (Anglin, 1977; Bowerman, 1978) this is only the 
beginning of the word learning process. The development of word meaning-
is not, as I have emphasized, a simple one-trial affair; rather the 
process of learning the meanings of words is done slowly by repeated en-
counters with a word in a number of specific contexts (Campbell, 1978; 
Carey, 1978 a & b; Clark, 1973; Rogers, 1978). En route the children make 
two distinct errors (although it is arguable there are other less evident 
ones): errors of over-extension and under-extension of a term. Cases of 
over-extension are cases where a child's application of a word to a 
denotatum is seen from the adult's perspective as lying outside the denot-
ation of that term, ego the use of the term dog to refer to a cat. In 
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under-extension, on the other hand, the child's clenotata are only a subset 
of the denotata that an adult would include in the denotation of a 
particular term. That is, denotation is more restricted for the child. 
Since acquiring the meaning of a new word is a lengthy process, 
ideally one would wish to trace its progression from the child's initial 
encounter with the term to a later date when a case for the existence of 
full meaning could be made. As I stated in Section 1.6.1 this has not 
been done with preschoolers for a variety of methodological reasons. The 
data for this age group are either of the partial meaning stage (cf. Section 
1.6.2) or of initial encounters with a previously unknown item (cf. Section 
1.6.3). Most of the evidence concerning the semantic development of 
lexical items comes from diary studies 
" For it is necessary to be in frequent contact with 
a child to discover spontaneous applications " 
(McShane, 1979:895) 
One of the criticisms made about studies in semantic acquisition is 
that the 'strategies the children manifest are strategies for processing 
language rather than acquiring language. Nelson (1973) for example argues 
that the difference between these two strategies can be characterized in 
the following manner - Acquisition strategies are ones which add new 
elements to the original repertoire whereas processing strategies deal 
with how elements from the existing repertoire are employed in production 
and comprehension. I think there can be little doubt that the data from 
the diary studies reflect upon acquisition strategies. 
What is the basis for children's early semantic categorization? Two 
opposing explanations have been proposed: thooe of Clark (1973, 1974b) 
and Nelson (1974). Clark maintains that children's extension of words to 
novel ohjects are based on perceptual similarity. Shape is regarded as 
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the primary basis for extension but other perceptual features such as size, 
texture, movement and sound are also important. An example from Clark 
will serve to illustrate·this point: 
" Let us suppose that the child has learnt the word dog 
(or doggie); however, he only uses one feature to 
characterize the meaning of this word, so the set of 
objects that he will put into the category named dog 
will be larger than the set in the adult category. For 
instance, he might have characterized the word dog as 
meaning four-legged; the set of objects referred to 
as dog, therefore might include cows, sheep, zebras, 
llamas, dogs and anything else that is four-legged" 
(1973: 72) 
I have discussed the semantic feature hypothesis in some detail in 
section 1.6.2 and concluded that the theory needs some modifications. This 
aspect of the theory does not concern us at present. The crucial point 
here is that to Clark the children pick out specific perceptual features 
as criteria1 when they first encounter a new word. 
Nelson, on the other hand, stresses the primacy of functional or 
action-based categories. She argues that children are unable to break the 
object down into its perceptual constituents initially, and so the child 
first experiences the object as an unanalysed whole and classifies it 
according to the actions associated with the object and the relationships 
into which the object enters. Words are extended to new instances if the 
objects are regarded as functionally similar, ie. acted on or act in a 
similar manner •. > Perception in this theory plays a secondary role. It is 
not the basis for classification but plays a predictive role only. 
According to Nelson, therefore, the child must learn which relations are 
concept defining and which are not. 
There is an implicit assumption in Nelson's theory that the child 
need not perform a differentiation analysis since the object is viewed as 
an unana1ysed whole. It.is as if somehow functional based categories are 
cognitively easier because the problem of analysing the object into 
components is removed. However, it appears to me that isolating which 
actions are criteria1 with relation to an object requires exactly the s~me 
type of selection and might in fact be harder because objects can be acted 
on in. innumerable ways whereas perceptual features are possibly more re-
stricted. It is noteworthy that despite the emphasis Nelson places on 
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the importance of relational and functional activity, her theory does not 
attempt to explain how words for actions and relationships are acquired. 
Nelson's theory is in conflict with the ideas put forward in the 
preceding chapters that words denoting actions and relationships are in 
fact harder to acquire than object words. So far I have only established 
that children have difficulty identifying the referent of a relational 
term. But if actions and relations are the givens by which objects are 
classified, how is it that children have difficulty isolating relations as 
semantic categories per se ? It might be suggested that Nelson's argu-
ment is specific to the child learning his first words but in a more recent 
paper dealing with three to five year olds she concludes: 
" We have found, then, that young children have a 
definition of object and category words which differs 
from their general knowledge and that this definition 
is functional " 
(1978:66) 
In this same paper Nelson makes the point that the definitional 
criteria which words elicit depends on the type of word: 
" Thus, when the term to be defined is an action or 
function, it elicits people, places and things which 
are related through that action or function to the 
selL When the term to be defined is, however, an 
object or category, the functional aspect of the 
relation is central and the people, places and things 
are peripheral " 
(1978:64) 
As far as older children's categorization processes are concerned, 
despite Nelson's initial claim, it seems that different word classes 
produce different types of definitions, a result she acknowledges. Her 
conclusion here seems somewhat empty. It appears that all she is saying 
is that in defining a word children will give definitions which contain 
elements which are associated with the denotata of the word iu real life 
• ego "eat"-"app1e". Learning theoris ts have said such things for a long . 
. time. 
Further, there is empirical evidence which casts doubts on a solely 
functional basis for semantic categorization. For example Anglin (1977), 
1·43 
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examining the relationship between lexemes and their denotata found that 
perceptual features were the best predictor of over-extensions. Over-
extensions by contiguous associations also occurred but there were no over-
generalizations with a functional basis. It is possible that Anglin's 
lack of functional over-generalizations cccurred because of a methodological 
weakness - his use of static pictures. However the same criticisms cannot 
be made of the data from Clark (1975) and Bowerman (1976, 1978). Both of 
these authors report cases of over-extensions which involve the use of 
given words for objects that are perceptually similar but have different 
functions. The children kn'ow from personal experience that the objects 
have different functions. Similarly, the fact that children first use 
particular object words to label objects in a non-action context (cf. 
Greenfield & Smith, 1976:213) seems at odds with Nelson's predictions that 
" When instances of first concepts come to be named, it 
would be expected that they would be named only in the 
context of one of the definitionally specified actions 
and relationships" 
(1974:280) 
Clark's theory is not without its difficulties. The perceptual basis 
for over-extensions is not a satisfactory explanation when we consider 
relational categories. As Bowerman (1978) states: 
" Something other than perceptual similarity is clearly 
involved in the acquisition of words like 'more' 
'allgone' 'up' etc. since the objects or activities 
involved in the contexts in which children say these 
words are extremely varied. For many such words the 
governing concept or cross-situational invariance 
involves a certain kind of relationship between two 
objects or events or between two states of the same 
object or event across time " 
(1978:268) 
Gruendal (cited in deVilliers.and deVilliers, 1978:134) reports data 
from a child who used the word bep to denote objects that were round and 
the word hat to denote any object he could put on his head regardless of, 
form. Rings, marbles, lollipops and so on were bep; keys, a newspaper 
and a box he put on his head were hat. Such evidence would suggest that 
for the young child a varlety of systems are at work and that which 
categorization process is activated may depend on the iso1atabi1ity and 
saliency of criteria as well as the context in which the child first meets 
the word and what the child initially be1reves is being referred to. 
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Accepting that we may find differences both within a particular child 
and between children as to their basis for categorization, what relation 
holds between the various denotata to which the child ascribes a word ? 
Is it, as Vygotsky (1962) suggests/that the child's concepts are associa-
tive and diffus7 or should we assume as Clark and Nelson do that the 
denotata to which children extend words share particular attributes or 
features; t'hese features, be th~y perceptual or functional, cons ti tuting 
the meaning of the word to the child? Bloom (1973) suggests that 
comp1exive association, that is the shifting from one feature to the next 
as the basis for categorization (cf. Vygotsky, 1962; Werner, 1948), occurs 
prior to any featural analysis. So that from Bloom's perspective there is 
a development from an initial complexive stage in word meaning to a 
featural stage. In contrast to Bloom, Bowerman (1978) provides data which 
lead one to conclude that both associative complexe~, complexes where 
individual members do not necessarily share anything with each other but 
all share. at least one feature with a central instance or prototpye, and 
single feature analysis may occur contemporaheously. Different words may 
be represented in different ways. Such a conclusion is the most harmoni'. 
interpretation of the data accumulated so far. 
4.2.2 The production-comprehension dichotomy 
By their very nature diary studies reflect the productive linguistic 
competence of the child and tend to capture children's over-extensions 
rather than their under-extensions. It is obvious to the parent when the 
child over-extends a word to an inappropriate denotatum, whereas a 
variety of reasons may account for failure to name an object. Production 
data maY provide us with a biased sample of the errors made by young 
children. Furthermore, the data from the child's productive vocabulary 
may underestimate the number of words in the lexicon - there may be words 
the child can comprehend but not produce. 
A common view, held until recently, was that comprehension develops 
in advance of production. That is, that children understand many words 
and grammatical combinations before they produce them (cf. Fraser, Bellugi 
& Brown, 1963). Go1din~eadow, Seligman and Gelman (1976) conclude that 
young children initially have receptive vocabularies several times the 
size of their productive vocabularies. The logic of the comprehension-
before-production argument rests on the assumption that while comprehension 
entails only identifying the item referred to, production includes both 
identification and a procedure for selecting a word appropriate to the 
initial identification and is therefore cognitively more complex. However, 
Clark, Hutcheson and Van Buren (1974) suggest that production and compre-
hension are less divergent than normally assumed. They suggest that there 
is an association between the child's capacity to produce an item and its 
availability for comprehension. That is, a word that is in the child's 
productive vo.cabulary is also more readily perceived and responded to. 
These authors make an important point by emphasizing the redundancy in the 
interactional setting for the child interpreting what is said to him, ego 
pragmatic factors, intonation and various non-verbal cues. It is there-
fore possible that what might initially be seen as comprehension of a 
lexical item may in reality not involve semantic knowledge at all. 
It is possible, as I have stated above, to argue that by focussing 
on the child's productive vocabulary the diary studies are in fact rather 
a stringent test of the child's linguistic competence, albeit one that 
tends to obscure phenomena like under-extension. This argument is viable 
only if Clark ~ aI's suggestion that the two processes, production and 
comprehension, are intrinsically related is true. We have reason to 
question this conclusion. 
Clark (1977) suggests that comprehension and production draw on a 
common lexical store. If., as she sugges ts (1973), the child's over-
extended word use arises from the word's underlying semantic feature 
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structure we would expect that words over-extended in production would be 
over-extended in comprehension. The empirical evidence indicates that an 
alternative theoretical explanation is needed. 
Thompson and Chapman (1977) have evidence that some words are over-
extended in comprehension and production, others are over-extended in 
production only. This is an indication that: 
" the child's representation of word meaning and its 
development cannot safely be based on production 
data alone " 
(Thompson & Chapman, 1977:371) 
Over-extensions in production are explained in a number of ways. 
Gentner (1978) suggests that children prefer to use a word they know well 
whereas Hutten10cher (1974) suggests that retrieval errors occur in 
labelling a referent. Bloom (1973) proposes that productive over-
extensions arise because of vocabulary limitations. When a child doesn't 
know the correct term he may use some word related to it in meaning. 
Presumably, relation in meaning is based on either perceptual or functional 
criteria or degree of similarity to a prototype. The over-extension of 
words in production is seen as a communicative strategy. However, there 
were instances recorded i.n Thompson and Chapman's data where words were 
over-extended to inappropriate examples when the child had the appropriate 
word in his vocabulary. Bloom's limited vocabulary explanation cannot 
account for these instances. In summary, there is an indication that an 
asynnnetry between the child's production and comprehension abilities exists. 
Campbell and Bowe (1979) come to some startling conclusions after 
studying the production and comprehension of children's colour terms. 
Not only do they find evidence of inclusion of the comprehension range in 
the production ran~e, as just discussed, but they also find instances 
~ where the pattern is reversed: that is, where the comprehension range is 
broader than the production rang~. These authors even report instances 
where "the production and comprehension ranges are disjoint. In an attempt 
to"deve1op further their idea that children's comprehension and production 
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ranges are "simply not inherently related" a supplementary study was 
carried out. Two groups of 12 children were presented with a sequence of 
three alternating sessions of elicitation and comprehension training with 
two kinds of unknown animal. The children were presented with a large 
array of animals, some known and some unknown, for the comprehension 
session and were taught to select anteaters when asked for tapirs and 
llamas when asked for gizmos. In the elicitation task the denotata were 
reversed, so while gizmo is correct for the anteater in produttion, it 
denotes a llama in the comprehension task. I ran a third group of children 
to examine the case where the denotation remains constant across the 
elicitation and comprehension sessions, as well as including the reversed 
denotation condition. Children were no better at learning the word with 
constant denotation than the words withsystematica11y varying denotation 
and raised no objection to this bizarre procedure. This seeming lack of 
association between the two ranges raisesa number of important questions. 
Is this lack of connection between comprehension and production applicable 
to all lexical domains or only p'articu1arly complex areas like colour ? 
Does the relationship vary with the linguistic competence of the child or 
with the nature of his initial introduction to the term ? 
The reversed denotation data are insubstantial on its own. For 
example, the child's failure to comment on the bizarreness of the procedure 
may simply indicate that he is unwilling to question the adult experimenter. 
Hughes and Grieve (1980) have sho~~ that children are willing to make 
judgements about bizarre propositions such as "Is milk bigger than water ?". 
The willingness of children to respond to such questions without comment 
may mean that the children's failure to comment in the reversed denotation 
task is due to the nature of the adult-child interaction and the child's 
reticence in such situations. Alternatively, the child may be so over-
whelmed by the minimal exposure to several animals that he is unable to 
maintain any systematic pairing. When Braun-Lamesch (1973) attempted to 
teach children five new animal names she frequently found that the children 
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were using the wrong name for an animal. In her study there was a very 
low rate of learning to criterion. Certainly her results are most satis-
factori1y accounted for in terms of processing limitations. The pro-
cessing limitation criticism is perhaps more pertinent to my own rep1ic-
ation and extension where three new animal terms were introduced. 
Irrespective of such methodological problems I think the ground is 
clear for a revision of our ideas concerning production and comprehension. 
We are no longer sure if an initial relationship between production and 
comprehension can be assumed and any attempt to comment about the child 
as a word learner must take both sources of data into consideration. We 
must also continually bear in mind that evidence of comprehension ~y not 
be evidence of semantic knowledge because of other strategies for under-
standing available to the child. It is only through a systematic 
evaluation of these two systems in various contexts and with different 
word classes that we will be able to evaluate the relationship between 
production and comprehension. 
4.2.3 Semantic fields 
I suggesteg in the introduction to the thesis that knowing the full 
meaning of a word entails knowing the sense of the word as well as its 
denotation. The previous two sections have been predominantly concerned 
with denotation. The important issue at this point is what relationships 
between words are significant to the child? lVhen a child learns a new 
word, how is it viewed in relation to other words, that is, what meaning 
, 
does a 1exeme have vis a vis other 1exemes that the child knows? 
One way of regarding the lexicon is to envisage it as divided into 
various semantic fields. Semantic fields are groups of words which are 
related to a particular conceptual domain. So for example the conceptu~l 
domain of colour is articulated linguistically by colour terms, the number 
of which vary between languages. As Lyons (1977) points out: 
,. 
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" the set of 1exemes in anyone language system which 
cover the conceptual area and, by means of the relations 
of sense which hold between them, give structure to it 
is a lexical field; and each 1exeme will cover a certain 
conceptual area, which may in turn be structured as a 
field by another set of 1exemes (as the area covered by 
'red' in English is structured in turn by 'scarlet', 
'crimson','vermi11ion' etc) 
(1977:254) 
The crucial question for someone considering the child expanding his 
vocabulary is when does he become aware of relationships within and 
between semantic fields. Bowerman (1974) believes that the child's 
knowledge of the relationships that words contract with other words in 
the lexicon is acquired after the child has been using the term in a de-
notationa11y correct manner (cf. discussion of the hypothesis in Chapter 
6). In contrast, evidence from children's knowledge of colour terms 
sugges~that they know something about the sense of the word before they 
are sure of the denotation of the term. Children realize that X is a 
colour before they have mapped out which colour X actually denotes. 
In deriving a sense of a new term I think a number of factors will 
be significant for the child. In the first instance if the new word is 
a member of a semantic field for which the child, because of previous 
knowledge, has a number of features which are already established as 
lexical organizers (as long as the child realizes the new term belongs to 
this semantic domain), it may be acquired more easily. Similarly, if the 
child's conceptual knowledge regarding a particular domain is differ-
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entiated, ego in the case of animals (Nelson, 1973) and the child is aware 
that the object being referred to is an animal, he is given considerably 
more information than he would be in being told that X is a polysaccharide, 
for example. In fact Harris (1975) has demonstrated that if an unknown 
word is predicated as a familiar entity, ego a mib is a bird, five-yea~­
old children will ascribe properties to it that they would ascribe the 
entity itself. Harris assessed this knowledge by asking children 
questions about the attributes of the novel word, ego can a mib fly ? 
--, 
,. 
There are certain meaning relations that are undeniably sense based 
such as synonymy, antonymy, converseness and hyponymy •. A child saying 
that 'red' is a colour or 'dog' is an animal indicates that they have 
grasped the hyponymous relationship between the two lexemes. There are 
cases where the borderline between semantic knowledge and conceptual know-
ledge is difficult to determine, especially whE:D. dealing with children. Is 
a child who states all animals are alive presenting evidence of semantic 
knowledge or world knowledge 7 One could argue that [animate-1 is a com-
ponent of the word 'animal' and that the child has grasped this; alter-
natively it might be that the child knows from his real world experience 
that animals are alive, or at least has not encountered any evidence to 
the contrary. 
Nelson (1978) has attempted to draw an' empirical distinction between 
the child's concept of a thing and his semantic representation of a thing. 
Nelson used two questions which were intended to illuminate the difference 
between lexical knowledge and knowledge about the world: 'What is x 7' and 
'What do you know about x 7'. Nelson argues that: 
"if the semantic system is originally undifferentiated 
from the general knowledge system, one would expect 
that the two questions would elicit similar amounts 
and types of information for younger children, but 
that both the amount and type of information would 
become increasingly differentiated as the child's 
semantic system contracted and the knowledge system 
expanded" 
(1978:54) 
Nelson's results support this expectation. There is a less interesting, 
but perhaps simpler, interpretation of these results and this is the 
questions simply produce different amounts of information with older 
children:kn.lMing more. Certainly the "amount" of data that Nelson has 
collected supports this interpretation and the data collected from the 
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"type" responses does not contradict it. Children always give more inform-
ation when asked the "What do you know about" question and this is true 
for 'all. "types" of responses. The child being asked "\-Jhat is x 7" 
" . 
responds with a simple response, whereas the child being asked "\.Jhat do 
you know about" presents a multiple response. The amounts of information 
required are implicit in the question. There is no logical reason to 
assume that the single response is based on semantic knowledge whereas the 
mUltiple responses are based on conceptual knowledge. The single response 
might simply indicate a salient conceptual feature if the child has no 
single defining criterion. 
152 
Nelson's wdrk demonstrates how diffidult it is to separate semantic 
from conceptual knowledge for the child already in possession of the vocab-
ulary items under investigation. Is it possible then to assess a new word's 
semantic representation and .hence its relations with other words? I 
be lieve so, but it means maintaining a degree of flexibi Ii ty wi th regard 
to conceptual versus semantic knowledge. The basis of this approach is 
that children will respond to words in the same semantic field in a similar 
manner. If a new term is treated in the same way as other words in a 
semantic field, we can infer that the child has some understanding that the 
two lexem~are related. So for instance if a child has just begun to 
produce the word banana, the sort of question which I am arguing is 
critical is whether it is used in the same context as other fruit words 
does the child even realize it is a fruit, that it is eaten etc? If the 
child knows, in some sense of the word, that banana is' a fruit, he may 
attribute it with certain characteristics of his prototypical example of 
fruit, ego that it is eaten for dessert. The latter is an example that 
reflects real world knowledge but if the child treats all fruits in a 
similar manner he is presenting evidence of a sense relation between the 
newly acquired term and a previously established semantic field. Anexperi-
mental development of this idea would allow us to distinguish between 
lexemes which have sense and denotation and those that have only sense or 
denotation. 
4.2.4 .. Lexical Contrast 
We are interested in two aspects with respect to sense relations: the 
sense relations the child develops _upon acquiring a new word; and secondly 
the information the child can obtain from the linguistic context in which 
a new word occurs. 'Linguistic context' is without a doubt a vague and 
relatively uninformative phrase. Since the previous set of experiments 
were exploratory in nature they did not allow an identification of which 
source or sources of linguistic information were valuable to the child. 
There was an indication that if synonymy was not explicitly indicated, it 
was a difficult relation to grasp. That is two words denoting the same 
entity caused the children problems. 
It is possible to present the child experimentally with different 
kinds of relations between words and to see whether this affects their 
representation of the new item. Hyponymy, symonymy, antonymy, part-who1e 
relations and lexical contrast are all possible alternatives. It was 
impossible in the time available to investigate all of these variables, so 
it was decided to focus on one particular relation, that of lexical 
contrast. 
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Lexical contrast by its very nature allows one both to set up a 
semantic field and to limit the denotation of the term involved. When two 
terms are contrasted lexically this serves as an indication that the two 
terms are similar but that they differ in some manner that is not explicitly 
defined, ego this is a boy, not a girl. The informative nature of the 
contrast depends on the terms involved and their semantic fields. Provided 
with a lexical contrast such as the one given above, the child not only 
knows that the two lexemes are related but also it limits the range of 
denotata to which the term can be applied, that is human juveniles that 
are not female. Barrett (1978) has proposed a theory of semantic develop-
ment in which learning the relevant contrasts between objects is crucial. 
Barrett's theory is in reality only a variant of the semantic feature hypo-
thesis (cf. Nelson, 1979) but it does emphasize an important aspect in the 
acquisition of word meanings - the differentiation process. 
For the child to m~e use of lexical contrast he must (a) have some 
idea of which semantic field is involved and (b) be able to differentiate 
the field. 
Rogers (1979) has pointed out that mothers use two different forms 
of lexical contrast in their speech to young children: contrast within 
fields and constrast between fields. The existence of contrast between 
fields causes some difficulties for my suggestion - that it is an 
important source of information to the child. Contrast between fields 
does not delimit the child's denotation nor help to structure the semantic 
field in the same way that contrast within fields does. Rogers makes a 
similar point and his qualification concerning the nature of the between-
field contrasts suggests that his data are not quite as awkward for my 
:arguments as might initially seem: 
"Clearly, contrastive linkages, cannot serve as an 
infallible indicator of relations between terms in 
a domain, because of the occurrence of between-
category lfie1ql contrasts. However, these are 
usually well marked as corrections, and show some 
intonational differences from within-category ~fie1qJ 
contrasts" 
(1979:13) 
4.2.5 The Method 
Recently, Carey (1978a) has devised a novel experimental approach 
which combines both longitudinal and cross-sectional methods in examining:. 
the acquisition of unfamiliar terms by preschool children. She studied 
the course of development of a single colour term in the lexicon of 14 
three to four-year olds. The term Carey chose was chromium and it was 
intended to denote the colour a LIVE GREEN. The children first encountered 
the term in a situation which, Carey maintained, allowed the child the 
possibility of gaining the full meaning of the novel lexical item. Carey 
does not attept to define "full meaning", so I shall resort to my own 
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operational definition for guidelines at this stage. "Full meaning" entails 
knowing the sense and the denotation of a term. 
In the introducing event children were asked to "Bring me the chromium 
tray, not the blue one'~, ,·there being only two trays availab 1e. Clearly, 
successful performance in this introducing situation did not require the 
. . 
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child to pay specific attention to the new word per~. ~arey plotted 
the development of the new colour term over a period of six months, both 
in a natural playgroup situation and in a number of production and compre-
hension tasks. Prior to the introduction event the children were presented 
with a colour identification task and their preferred term for olive green 
was established. Children tended to label olive green either as green or 
brown. Throughout the six-month testing period it became clear that two 
distinct forms of response to this experience emerged: one group of child-
ren interpreted 'chromium' as a synonym of green and the other group of 
children seemed to realize that olive was an odd colour and that it 
required an odd name but did not necessarily produce this name. Carey 
describes these two types of responses as fast mappings. In a fast mapping 
the child picks up some but not all of the relevant information about the 
new word. Only one child by the end of the six months had established full 
meaning of the term. It is, however, impossible from the limited nature of 
the assessment to see whether full mapping had been established as there 
were no checks for the sense/conceptual repres~ntation of the term. Carey 
herself is aware of this and repeated the experiment employing a number of 
-
design modifications (1978~. These alterations included a hyponym task. 
This task assessed whether children had learnt that chromium named a colour 
regardless of whether they had learned that it designated a particular hue. 
Children were asked if purple was a colour, cold was a colour etc. Included 
in these question frames was chromium and a nonsense word tearval. To be 
credited with a correct response children has to respond that all the named 
colours and chromium were a colour and that tearval and the non-colour 
terms were not colours. The task was not very informative as the majority 
of children replied to all questions in either the negative or the affirm-
ative, although there were a few children (6/20) who gave the correct 
response sequence. In the replication, two of the children had establihsed 
full mapping, six child~en could clearly be credited with some information 
about the novel term, eight children demonstrated no learning whatsoever 
and two children were difficult to score. Carey concludes: 
"At one level, these results are demonstrational: 
they show that half of the children picked up some-
thing about the new word "chromium" or the naming of 
olive from a single experience with the word. They 
managed to display that knowledge at an assessment 
one week later, in a context totally different from 
the one in which the introducing event had occurred. 
That almost half of the children learned nothing 
indicates that these presentation and assessment 
conditions might be close to the limit of a three-
year old's ability to achieve a fast mapping for a 
new colour word. Nonetheless, the first demonstrational 
results confirm the existence of a fast mapping, at least 
under these conditions" 
(1978b:28) 
Carey's method is the missing link for investigating word meanings. 
Her method allows us to trace the acquisition of a new word over time, to 
contrast comprehension abilities with those of production, to attempt to 
analyse the relations between words, to use linguistic contrast as a means 
of setting up a semantic field and to control the information that is 
presented to the child without making the task appear contrived. 
There are a lot of questions which remain to be answered. Are child-
ren's mapping strategies always as idiosyncratic as Carey's data suggest? 
Is the'lexical domain to which the word belongs important? Does Carey's 
procedure really test the limits of the child's abilities? 
4.3. Aims of the second part of the thesis. 
Using Carey's minilongitudinal method as a framework, the aims of the 
second section of the thesis are as follows: 
(1) To attempt to trace the development of word meaning over time and to 
therefore get a clearer picture of the development of the child's denot-
ational boundaries. 
(2) To exanrinewhether the distinction which manifested itself between 
different parts of speech in the first section of this thesis is upheld. 
(3) To examine both the .,child' s comprehension and production of the novel 
lexical item and the relation of this new term to other terms in the same 
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semantic domain. 
(4) To investigate the role of linguistic contrast as a source of inform-
ation restricting meaning for the preschool child. 
157 
CHAPTER 5 
A NOVEL ANIMAL TERM 
This experiment is designed to trace the acquisition of a new animal 
term in the vocabularies of a group of three and four year-old children. 
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A simple concrete noun was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, there is 
very little information in the literature, at present, about the acquisition 
of simple nouns by children who are reasonably advanced in the word learning 
game, that is three and four year-olds. Is the older child so advanced 
that acquiring a new name of this sort causes no difficulties? Secondly, 
I suspect that part of the reason that Carey found so few children reaching 
full mapping of the colour term is due to the complex nature of the colour 
vocabulary. Several studies have suggested that the colour vocabulary is 
rather complex (cf. Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976: 350-355). The correct 
use of colour terms by children generally develops rather late and as 
Campbell and Bowe's data (1979) suggest there is something idiosyncratic 
about the acquisition of the colour lexicon. The difficulty with colour 
terms appears to be a semantic one since children are able to sort objects 
into their respective colour piles and children as young as 15 days have 
been shown able to discriminate between colours (Chase, 1937 cited in Miller 
and Johnson-Laird). It may be that because colours are on a perceptual 
continuum that children have difficulty isolating the appropriate denota-
tional range. By choosing an animal term I am presenting the children with 
a distinct perceptual entity. There is evidence (Nelson, 1973) that small 
concept domains such as animal terms are differentiated from the beginning 
of the acquisition period. By the age of two or three, children have fairly 
firm ideas of what constitutes animalness, though this need not necessarily 
be in accordance with adult ideas. How does a child go about learning a 
new word which fits into a firmly established conceptual framework ? 
.. By the use of linguistic contrast I hope to make clear to the child 
that the new term denotes an animal. Of course it is not certain that the 
children will associate the word with my intended referent, animal. The 
child may choose to associate the wqrd with a salient aspect of the object 
that I present as the prototypical example of this new word,eg. its 
patterning. Alternatively, the child may associate the new word with a 
more general idea, for example in this case all animals who are found on 
farms. 
However, assuming that some children will associate the new term with 
the particular animal, choosing a new word which fits into an already 
established concept allows us to examine how the child incorporates new 
instances of a category into an existing conceptual framework. Even in 
the initial stages of word learning children are by no means passive 
entities. By the age of three or four, children bring a great deal to the 
task at hand in the form of pre-established frameworks and expectancies. 
One of the main aims of the present experiment is to see how children can 
use their knowledge. A series of questions was , therefore, designed to 
assess whether children would ascribe the qualities they associate with 
animals to the new term. 
159 
The present experiment is designed to give children a series of quasi-
natural contexts to develop the meaning of a word and to pursue the following 
goals'. To explore the child's ability to acquire a new animal term and his 
ability to produce and comprehend this term in natural conditions with his 
peers. To look, in a series of experimental tasks, for any disassociation 
between comprehension and production within and between experimental 
situations. To extend Carey's work and to examine the possibility of fast 
mappings and the important elements in these mappings. To investigate 
whether the child does associate the new word with a particular type of 
animal, and if so, how it relates to his general concept of animal. 
160 
HEl'ROD . 
SUBJECl'S 
Sixteen nursery school children, mean age 3;9 (range 2;11 - 4;8) partici-
pated in the study. l'en of the subjects were female, mean age 3;8 (range 
2;11 - 4;8) and six were males, mean age 3;9 (range 2;11 - 4;7). l'he 
sample included all the full-time at tenders of the Stirling University 
playgroup. 
MAl'ERIALS 
One large toy farm, including two barns, a 10ft and a shed; an assortment 
of fanm animals, four plastic cows, four plastic sheep, four plastic pigs 
and four plastic tapirs (whose function will be explained later). l'en 
photographs of these plastic zoo and farm animals were used in the follow-
up session. 
PROCEDURE 
l'he children received a number of tasks in the following sequence. 
Stage 1: Pretest 
Each child was withdrawn singly from the playgroup . and asked to name a 
number of plas~ic animals that were placed on the table in front of them. 
l'hese 'were a pig, sheep, cow, tapir and wildebeest. l'he purpose .of this 
section was to ascertain that the children could correctly name the farm 
animals and that they had no correct or consistent lexical entry for the 
animal to be chosen as unknown. l'his also functioned as a baseline for 
later production data. 
Stage 2: Introducing event 
One week later children were again withdrawn singly from the playgroup. 
Upon entering the testing room the children found four toy animals on the 
. ~ table.! explained that these had been left from a previous session ~nd 
that they must be removed before the game could be begun. l'he children were 
asked to pass the aniTIals one by one to E as she named them so that they 
could be put away properly. E then gave the child the necessary syntactic 
and lexical information to form a full mapping, as defined by the experi-
mental task, of the unknown referent - "Pass me the patas, not the pig, 
the sheep or the cow but the patas" •. Pat as :was the name given to the 
new animal. Children were then asked for eachvof the other farm animals 
in turn. 
Stage 3: Comprehension task 
One week later children were again withdrawn singly from the playgroup 
under the pretext of playing a new game with E. The conditions for the 
game are clearly delineated. Children are given the farm with 4 pigs, 
sheep, cows and tapirs on it and are allowed to play for a few minutes. 
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They are then informed that E is coming to buy the animals from the child 
because she has no animals on her farm. E then· "buys" each one of the 
animals from the child. The order in which each one of the four animals is 
requested from the child is randomized both between trials of four animals 
and between children. Once this sequence has been completed the materials 
are removed from the table and the child is asked whether he/she will answer 
some questions for!. The questions were designed. to assess the child's 
ability to att!ibute animate characteristics to the sense of the new term. 
Six question frames were used: 
1. Can an x run ? 
2. Can an x be painted ? 
3. Can an x drink ? 
4. Can an x break ? 
5. Can an x eat ? 
6. Can you step on an x ? 
An extra question was included. The child was asked whether the item could 
make a noise and if an affirmative response was given, the child was asked 
to give an example, ego 
.. E "Can a car make a noise 7" 
C "Yes". 
/ 
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E "What kind of noise can a car make ?" 
C "It goes B rnnn B rnnn". 
Eight individual lexical items were inserted in the 7 question frames; 
3 inanimate 6bjects,ba11,car and plate; 3 farm animals ~, sheep and 
pig; patas and a control meaningless word withy. Any child that asked what 
~ 
a withy was,was told that it was a long piece of straw. A group of children 
from a different nursery who had not had the introducing event carried out 
the same task. This was done to assess the effect of the introducing event. 
Stage 4: Longitudinal sessions 
Two weeks were allowed to elapse before this section of the experiment was 
begun. A play situation was arranged twice a week for the children in the 
nursery. On each occasion the nursery nurse brought the farm and the animals 
into the playgroup and placed them on a table. Playing with the farm and 
animals was completely voluntary. Occasionally the nursery nurse would sit 
around the table with the children and join in their games or generate 
discussion about the animals. These sessions were continued for a period 
of six weeks. During this period E had no contact 'wi th the children or the 
nurse"ry. Video recordings were made of all these sessions through a I-way 
mirror. 
The role of the nursery nurse in these situations is obviously a key 
variable. For the first four sessions the caretaker was asked not to use 
the new animal term. After this period natural use of the term by the adult 
present was encouraged so that any reference she might make to the animals 
on the farm shout"d include the tapir if appropriate • Similarly , any situation 
which involved questions about the children's activities in relation to the 
animals should also include the tapir if the situation demanded it. 
Stage 5 Follow-up session 
Two weeks after the last play session each child was tested in a series of 
production and compreh~nsion tasks. 
1-
Ten children, mean age 4;2 (range 3;3 - 4;11) from the 
student-run University nursery were used as a control group. 
Section A: Children were asked tne:f:;QllQwing question: 
"Tell me all the animals that you can remember" 
Questioning is continued until at least 5 animals are named. 
Section B: Children were presented in a random order with ten pictures 
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of toy animals: pony, anteater, tapir, cat, bear, panda, bull, tiger, 
wildebeest and a pig. The following questions were asked about each picture: 
(i) 
(H) 
(Hi) 
Section C: 
What's this picture of ? 
Have you ever seen one of these before ? 
Where did you see it ? 
The questions that were put to the children following the 
comprehension task was repeated. 
Figure 5.1 presents a flow diag~m of the experimental procedure. The 
control group were presented with Stage 3 and Stage 5(i) only. 
STAGE 5 FOLLOW-UP SESSION 
(i) Spontaneous animal names 
(ii) Productive identification 
(iii) Concept of animal 
STAGE 4 LONGITUDINAL SESSION 
STAGE 3 COMPREHENSION + CONCEPT OF ANIMAL 
STAGE 2 INTRODUCING EVENT 
STAGE 1 PRETEST 
Fig 5.1 Flow diagram of testing procedure for experiment 
-, 
, 
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RESULTS 
I should like to work through the results for each Stage of the 
experiment independently. 
Stage 1: Pretest. All children could correctly identify the farm animals. 
The two unknown animals elicited a number of responses. In the case of the 
wildebeest there were 5 "don't knows" and 11 attempts at naming. Children 
called it either a bull of a billygoat. In the case of the tapir "don't 
knows" were much more prevalent and the 6 incorrect namings were either 
pigs or cows. 
The tapir was chosen as the expe.rimental animal because for the 
majority of children it was not pre-empted by another animal term and for 
those children who did offer an alternative the animal name they chose to 
use to refer to the tapir would have a preferred 'bearer' present in the 
actual introduction event, an implicit suggestion that their original 
choice was wrong. 
Stage 2: Iritrodlicirigevent. Surprisingly, in this situation, where 
children are given all the necessary lexical, syntactic and non-linguistic 
information for "full-mappings" the children have problems. Eight of the 
children began visually to search the room "looking for the patas". One 
child even got up and after looking around the room claimed that she 
couldn't find the patas. All children passed the tapir after a single 
repetition of the informative sentence by!. 
Stage 3: Comprehension Session. Thirteen of the 16 children correctly 
chose the tapir as the referent forpatas on the first trial and continued 
to do so thereafter. Only one child, the youngest (2;11) had (considerable) 
difficulties with the task, saying that she "couldn't find the patas"~ 
This child also. had difficulties in the pretest. The other two children 
who were classed as initial failures were categorized as such because they 
. . . 
asked for reassurance that they had chosen the correct object.· It should 
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be noted that simply because the children choose the correct object as a 
patas it does not mean that the denotation of the term patas is being 
taken to be a particular animal. The word may be taken to denote a dis-
tinctive feature about the object that the children regard as salient. 
How the children represent the word 'patas' is shown more clearly by their 
answers to the questions following the comprehension session. 
Only initially correct or incorrect responses were coded for the 
present analysis. Children often gave qualifying statements to their 
initial judgements which suggested that the initial judgement should be 
altered (generally towards a correct response) but because these comments 
were spontaneous they do not occur with all judgements or with all children 
and therefore any re-analysis would be biased. 
It can be argued that the questions concerning inanimate properties 
are not related to the sense of the animal terms. It is not a matter of 
, , 
the sense of sheep that you can or can't paint it, luerely that one would 
not normally treat animals in such ways, ie. break a cow or step on a pig. 
In my experimental design I have fallen into the trap of confounding real 
world knowledge . (what we normally do not do) with semantic knowledge. 
However, I think it is important to present these data. In the first 
instance it shows that the children are not simply responding in the 
affirmative to all questions containing animal terms. Secondly, it high-
lights the difficulties in designing these sorts of questions and hence 
investigating the sense representation of a term. 
As Figure 5.2 indicates, the data show that the children treat the 
term patas as an animal term and that patas is unambiguously differentiated 
from the meaningless control word. 
Children did not respond randomly to the question frames including 
,the term withy but predominantly answered the questions with "No" responses. 
A negative response is possibly the safest strategy in this situation 
where the child has no knowledge about the attributes of the object which 
is being denoted. Until the child has some reason to believe that an 
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object has a particular attribute or functions in a particular manner (and 
if the child refuses to say 'don, 't know') negation is not a surprising 
response. 
One of the interesting aspects of the children's answers to these 
questions is their qualifying statements. For example a child might deny 
that a cow could run but then say "only at fast speeds" or on the other 
hand deny that a plate could be stepped on "because you might break it". 
There appear to be several factors at work here. Denials were 
followed to a far greater extent with qualifications and three classes of 
these can be identified. There is the child that denies that an event or 
relationship is possible because he has not seen or experienced it, or the 
child who denies an event is possible because of the consequences of that 
event and finally there is the child who denies an event is possible but 
qualifies it so as to allow some subcategory of the original event, ego "run 
quickly" or "drink, only milk". 
I have reanalysed the data for the final question because nearly all 
children gave qualifying responses here. The responses to patas are rather 
inconclusive (cLFig.'5. 3) in contrast to the responses to patas in the 
other question frames. Looking at simple binary responses less than half 
the children accept that ~'patases" make a noise but if we include the 
qualifying responses we get a rather different picture (cf. Fig. 5.4). The 
"no" responses can be subdivided into three groups; denials because the 
child has never heard the animal make the noise (6), denials because the 
child does not know (3) and bizarre responses (1). 
Control group: Figure 5.5 presents the data indicating the probability 
of successfully choosing the tapir as patas per trial in the comprehension 
sessions for both the longitudinal and control children. The difference in 
the curves is slight and analysis shows that the introducing event has no 
significant effect on the children's performance in the comprehension 
. . 
session (Fisher exact probability, p =.18). 
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denote~ tapir over the four trials (comprehension) 
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However, it seems obvious that a ceiling effect is operative here 
both for the control and experimental groups. The children are extremely 
efficient at figuring out that an unkoWnword refers to an unfamiliar 
object and therefore to the tapir. Accordingly, even the control group 
(with no prior information about 'patas') perform at a high level 
immediately - an unanticipated result. 
As Figure 5.6 illustrates, animate characteristics are attributed to 
the term patas by this group of children, but responses to withy are by 
no means as consistent as those in the experimental group. It could be 
argued that the experimental group's extra exposure to patas gives them 
an added advantage of familiarity, and hence an ability to distinguish 
between the familiar term patas and the unfamiliar withy. The lack of 
effect of the introducing event upon the children's performance suggests 
that this is a highly unlikely explanation. At present we must conclude 
that such variance is due to the random nature of these children's 
responses. 
Withy responses: As previously mentioned, a meaningless word withy was 
~ 
incorporated into the experimental design to see whether the children 
actually learned anything specific to the term patas. 
One interesting fact here is that well over half the children (9) 
responded to questions containing withy without any apparent signs of 
discomfort. Those children who were disturbed by this new word dealt with 
it in one of three ways: 
1) Four of the children simply stated that they didn't know what a 
withy was, but asked no further questions. I did not tell them but 
continued to use the word in subsequent question frames. All these 
children responded from this point onwards without hesitation. 
2) One child used what I will call the context strategy. She realised 
that I was interestednin·animals and she responded appropriately "I don't 
know all these different names of animals". This strategy becomes important 
in the longitudinal follow-up session. 
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3) Finally two children used wha.t r will ca,ll the informative 
strategy. When asked whether a withy could run they in turn asked 
whether it had legs. If it didn't have legs it couldn't run. Children 
were told in such cases that a 'withy' was a piece of straw. The responses 
to withy are interesting in their own right, for they tell us what a child 
does when he has no extrinsic'information about a word found in a particular 
linguistic context. Even here there are ways to get a meaning. 
Longitudinal results: Since the children immediately produced and 
apparently understood the term I shall give anecdotal examples from the 
video recordings to give the reader the flavour of the children's usage. 
First I should like to report my evidence for making definitive statements 
about the children's production and comprehension of the term. There was 
no signficiant difference between the mean production of the term patas 
(x = 4.2) and the mean production of the other animal term (~= 3.83), 
within sessions. Similarly, thereIs no significant difference for production 
of patas and the other animal terms between sessions·. Niether can the 
production of pat as be attributed to only a few children responding 
frequently. Fourteen of the children produced the term patas at least once. 
There is no evidence that there is anything idiosyncratic about the children's 
production of the termpatas, see Figure 5.7. 
Failure to understand the term can only be assessed if the child were 
to show evidence of misunderstanding, eg. asking for more information or 
pointing to the wrong animal when asked for a patas. No such errors 
occurred. The children appeared to have grasped the denotation of the term 
and spent a, large proportion of their time when discussing patases deciding 
what they ate, drank. etc.; that is they appeared to be constructing a store 
l I 
of knowledge relevant to patases. 
The following five. examples will allow the reader to grasp the nature 
of the children's interactions. 
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1) During the first video session one of the children was sitting 
in a corner looking through a picture book. with animal!:!. After a while 
she approached the nursery nurse asking why there was not a picture of 
a patas in the book. 
1"'/ ;) 
2) The children played many games on.:t:he farms but one favourite one 
entailed the tapir running and jumping over a fence. This was accompanied 
by frequent exclamations "Here comes the patas". "Quick make the patas jump". 
3) When a new child entered the playgroup and was playing with the 
farm one of the older children took it upon himself to inform the new child 
was the tapir was called. 
4) An interesting correction incident occurred when one of the children 
playing with the tapir made mooing noises. She was correcUrlby one of her 
peers being told "that's not a cow". 
5) The nursery nurse was asking the children what the various animals 
ate. She was told definitively by one little girl that "patases eat grass". 
The final anecdote does not come from the nursery situation but from 
one of the children's parents. I was approached by one of the parents and 
asked what a 'patas' was. He explained to me that he was driving two of 
the children home and they were discussing what they had done in the nursery. 
They said "played with pigs and patases" and recounted that the "patases 
were running and jumping". 
Stage 5: Follow-up session 
No children in the control group identified the picture of the tapir 
as a 'patas' and in the ensuing discussion about animals no child mentioned 
the name patas. These results contrast dramatically with those of the 
experimental group. 
Twelve of the 15 children producedpatas when asked to list animal 
names. The fact that 10 of these 12 children produced·patas first suggests 
that the children had been sensitized to the new term in some way. It is 
possible that they associated their first encounter of the term with the 
experimenter, though the spontaneous use of the term when the experimenter 
was absent is evidence that the term was not restricted to this initial 
association. 
Thirteen of the 15 children correctly responded with the term patas 
when shown a picture of a tapir. Eight of the 15 children said that they 
had seen the animal before. There is a problem of interpretation with 
this question in that children may well make the assumption that the 
question refers "to seen in real life". This idea is partially supported 
by the fact that three of the children who said that they had not seen the 
animal could associate it correctly with an environment. Ten of the 15 
children gave appropriate responses to where the animal is found, six 
said a farm, three said a field and one said a house. All these responses 
are appropriate considering the knowledge children have about 'patases'. 
The tapir had been seen by the children on a toy farm which had a field 
and there was a special house which the children had kept for the patases. 
The children's responses to the question frames including patas do 
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not differ significantly from the earlier presentation of these questions. 
They still clearly treat patas as a name for an animal. The interesting 
change here is the responses to the meaningless control word. Some of the 
children are beginning to attribute animal characteristics to withy. The 
demand characteristics of the task are plain to some of the children by 
this stage, since they know I am interested in animals. As one child 
reported "These are funny animals - I don't know these names". 
DISCUSSIO~ 
The perceptual and linguistic contrast in the present experimental 
paradigm allows children to form an initial referential relationship 
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between a fairly sharply circumscribed set of objects. This the children do 
almost immediately. The children's failure to overextend the term to the 
other strange animals in the picture identification task suggests that the 
denotation of the term has been limited. However the precise criterion 
that each child has settled on has not been examined. So we are unsure to 
what extent denotation has been mastered. However, not only-do children 
recognize that patas denotes a physical object satisfying some set of 
perceptual criteria but they also realize thatpatas designates an animal, 
that is the new term has been incorporated into a particular semantic 
domain. It is worth noting at this point that there was no observed 
disassociation between comprehension and production. The term was used 
and apparently understood both in the structured testing situation and in 
the free play in the nursery and with peers and other adults. 
We have, I belive, strong grounds to suggest that the child knows the 
Sense of the term and is in the process of delineating denotation. It 
seems that for all the children full mapping of this new term is well on 
the way to completion. Superficially th~sedata might appear contradictory 
to Carey's results where only one child established "full mapping" after a 
period of six months. However, I do not belfeve the results to be in con-
flict. There are two major differences between her study and the present 
one; colour vocabulary may well be more complex and the conceptual frame-
work onto which the term is be mapped may be less well established. 
The actual physical characteristics of the animal are qualitative and 
salierit as opposed to the (gradable) differences in colour. It is .inter-
esting to note that many of the playgroup interactions that focused on the 
tapir elicited comments about the object's salient perceptual features, ego 
its long nose or its clear black and white markings. No such comments were 
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noted about the other animals. Being able. to identify distinctive features 
of an object is a clear advantage in isolating one particular referent from 
a group .of possible referents. There are no defining attributes of a 
particular colour and even adults may have problems identifying a particular 
colour. Another peculiarity of the colour lexicon is the ease with which 
colour terms denoting perceptually similar groups of colours can be inter-
changed. While I might label an object as blue another adult might label 
it as green and yet another as turquoise. It would be a bizarre situation 
indeed were the same object to be labelled as ~, dog and rat by different 
adults. 
As I have already mentioned children of three and four have fairly 
firm, if often erroneous criteria for animal concepts. Suppose a child 
already knows what an animal is. When he is exposed to a new term which he 
takes to denote a type of animal, he need only add this new animal term to 
his previously established lexical/conceptual framework. Bartlett (1978) 
in a discussion on the acquisition of colour words makes a similar point: 
"we must emphasize once again that lexical development 
depends on both the store of phonological units 
available for the child to use as words and the 
conceptual system available for mapping meaning onto 
these uni ts" 
(pl04-l05, 1978) 
New words which are members of semantic classes that have not been firmly 
defined or that are themselves ill-defined are open not only to the ambi-
guity of the referential situation but also the ambiguity or possibly 
complete lack of conceptual organization of the appropriate reference 
domain. If the child does not realize that certain verbs are relational, 
he is unlikely to succeed in deriving their meaning regardless of the situ-
ation in which he encounters it. It may be that in such situations ~he 
context of the word's presentation is given undue weight (cf. Donaldson and 
McGarrigle, 1974). In these cases the ontogeny of word meanings 'is a long 
~ 
drawn out procedure with many possibilities for errors. 
These factors are only important Lf the child sees the new word, as 
referring to an animal. I tb,ink it is c1ea.:r that in this situation he 
does, although it is perfectly justifiable to argue that in this situation 
there may be no alternative. What governs the level of analysis that the 
child chooses to use? Here the initial choice of the tapir is governed 
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by the alternatives given to the child and the structure which controls the 
comprehension task. There is a farm on which there are three animals for 
which he has already firmly established lexical entries; he has previously 
received information as to the nature of the game, ie. that animals are to 
be passed between E and the child. So once explicitly and once implicitly 
the child has been told what the key items are ••• animals. So in many 
ways the level of analysis is determined by this information and the child 
appears to be sensitive to these cues. Anglin (1977) has shown that child-
ren first learn words at intermediate levels of generality, usually at the 
level at which the objects are behaviour ably equal for him (in this parti-
cular case animal).· I doubt that the task would have been as easy if the 
new word referred to the specific colour patterning of the animal and had 
been contrasted with the patterning of the other animals. 
The present experiment has not shown that linguistic information, in 
this case lexical contrast, is sufficient for the child to start the 
acquisition of a word process. Rather I have shown that lexical and per-
ceptual contrast in one particular semantic domain allows the child to be 
extremely adept at picking up certain aspects of· a word's meaning. 
If more unknown animals had been present, as in Braun-Lamesch (1973) 
or if the contrast had been purely linguistic, ego I like bananas not Ns-
aubergines, or if the new word was pre-empted,the results might have been 
very different. 
In conclusion I should like to reiterate the fact that children with 
no previous experience of an unknown lexical item will choose a previously 
unnamed stimulus as its ·referent almost innnediately. I have replicated 
this study with a different semantic domain, that of fruit terms, and the 
conclusions :remain the same. This is an extremely useful strategy for 
the early word learner and contrasts dramatically with the results of the 
story tasks (Experiments lA.and B) where the child had names for all.the 
items presented in the choice situation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A NOVEL TERM FOR A MODE OF LOCOMOTION 
The results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that children can use con-
trastive information in a restricted referential situation to grasp the 
denotation of a new term. The term can be subsequently used in comprehension 
tasks and in spontaneous and referential production. These results contrast 
dramatically with the performance levels described in the earlier studies. 
It is not my intention, at this stage, to comment on these discrepancies 
but rather I would like to expand on the data reflecting this difference. 
I shall do this by drawing on a difference in performance revealed by the 
earlier studies - the difficulty that children experienced with verbs in 
contrast to nouns. 
It was suggested that by their very nature verbs might be harder for 
the child to analyse in a single presentation. Theoretical support for 
this contention came from authors who suggested that verbal semantic fields 
had more complex meaning patterns than nom~nal ones (Miller and Johnson-
Laird, 1976:666). In a single presentation the element, an unanalysed form, 
may be described extensionally by the set of objects it relates to on that 
occasion. Subsequent encounters would allow a child to extract the criteria 
for use and to analyse the term semantically, that is to allow a semantic 
rather than a referential representation to develop. The reasons for con-
ducting the present experiment are: to increase our understanding of the 
child's acquisition of word meaning over time and to investigate whether 
the difficulties encountered with verbs in the earlier cross-sectional 
studies are still present in a situation where a child has a series of ex-
posures to draw on. 
What sort of results might we expect? The only experimental stpdy 
which traces the acquisition of a novel verb is one reported in Ervin-Tripp 
(1971) by Wick Miller. In this study a single child was taught artificial 
" words by an experimenter over a period of about a year. The experimenter 
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and a two-year old child played a game with plastic beads. The experi-
menter used the noun po to refer to beads of a particular kind and the verb 
sib to refer to actions of a particular kind. The child first used the 
noun at age 2;2 after 67 inputs; the verb was not used until 8 months later 
after 164 inputs. This experimental evidence would corroborate naturalistic 
data from Goldin-Meadow ~ (1976) suggesting that production and compre-
hension of verbs lags behind production and comprehension of nouns. 
, 
From a rather different angle Rogers (1979) has examined mothers' ways of 
specifying potential use of kitchen utensils to young children and has 
found that by far the most frequent manner of doing so was by pairing an 
action and an object rather than simply specifying action or object or 
consequence (cf. Section 1.6.1 for greater detail). Evidence from Nygren 
(1972) suggests that this sort of pairing is important for early use of a 
verb. Nygren presented 3-11 year olds with questions containing instru-
mental verbs, many of which had a semantically unusual combination of 
elements, ego can you saw cheese with a knife?; can you chop wood with 
an axe ?, or can you shave wood with an axe? Nygren found that kinder-
gar ten children in contrast to older children had the largest percentage of 
responses that indicated that usual verb/instrument pair had to be kept 
intact. The younger children had the largest percentage of "connnon" situ-
ation responses for the instrumental verbs. Nygren concludes from her data: 
"It seems that two phases of differentiation occur. 
First the differentiation of the elements of verb, 
object and instrument from the usual situation, and 
then the differentiation of the elements of meaning 
from these three elements and the decision about which 
is crucial. The decision about which is crucial is a 
long process and it seems like the strategies for 
finding crucial elements swing back and forth from 
overdifferentiation to overgeneralization" 
(1972167) 
It is worth emphasising two points about these studies. In the first 
place verbs appear to involve a longer acquisition period than nouns. Secondly 
initial understanding~of.a verb often pairs the action with a particular 
object or situation response, ego sawing wood with a saw. Interesting 
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evidence from a different perspective in support of this second contention 
comes from Clark (1980:7). She noted that: 
"To connnunicate about particular actions many children 
take up the option of coining new verbs from nouns 
where the noun in question designates one of the 
objects involved in the particular action they talked 
about, ego watching a truck pass - "it's trucking" " 
The most detailed analysis of children's acquisition of verbs comes 
from observational data collected by Bowerman (1974, 1978a & b). She dis-
cusses children's initial meanings for lexical items and how they develop 
over time, a process which she claims exhibits semantic reorganization. 
Her thesis is supported by a series of systematic errors produced by her 
children after a period of apparently correct use. It is possibly signifi-
cant that the majority of the:se errors occur in the child's use of relational 
terms, ego verbs or locative particles. From the data that Bowerman 
collected pertaining to thE~ child's errors with causative verbs, she con-
eludes: 
"In her initial usage the child is not yet in any 
sense aware of their internal structure in the way 
that she must become before she could begin to create 
novel causative verbs by analogy with existing ones" 
(1974:154) 
A similar line of argument is taken for the occurrences of errors with words 
which encode motion/manner/cause, verbs that are prefixed by ~ and substi-
tution errors, eg.behind for after. In all cases initial correct usage is 
followed by a period in which particular rule-governed errors occur, a period 
of semantic reorganization. A similar point is argued by Wa1kerdine and 
Sinha (1977). Their 
"Results suggest that children initially understand 
and use spatial relational terms as a part of the 
global, undifferentiated functional context of their 
experience" 
(1977:164) 
Initial use is in terms of normal functions in instances where the term is 
habitually applied (cf. also Hoogenraad et a1, 1978). 
It seems to me that this account which implies a gradual abstraction 
of elements of the meanings of individual words has a number of important 
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consequences. In the first place, it allows a qualitative distinction to 
be drawn between earlier and later uses of these types of terms. This 
distinction may be that the initial word meaning is a referential re1ation-
ship between word and world, whereas the latter relationship involves word-
word relationships within a semantic field in addition to the denotation of 
the term. In the second place it raises a number of questions about the 
acquisition of other types of words. Must we make more qualitative dis-
tinctions or simply quantitative ones? Errors with nomina1s tend to occur 
early on in the child's language development and are reflected in errors 
of over-and underextension. The only type of error pattern which seems 
similar to the one that Bowerman reports: is the child's difficulty in dealing 
with subordinate and superordinate nominal categories. Grieve and Hoogenraad 
give an example of a child who initially uses ~ correctly but having 
learnt the subordinate Mini no longer accepts that minis are cars. Though 
this error seems to be similar in kind it appears to be more closely assoc-
iated with classification and with the hierarchical arrangement of nominal 
categories. A more appropriate comparison would be if the following error 
occurred with the acquisition of verbs, ie. correct use of the term run for 
all types of" running; acquisition of the term·sprint and .denial 
that this is running. Bowerman's errors on the other hand are intrinsically 
related to the nature of the word, ego causatives and the situation of use, 
though situation can be a critical variable for very early acquisition of 
nomina1s (Braunwa1d, 1978; N.e1son, 1974). Situational variables do not 
appear to be as critical for acquiring the meaning of nomina1s and is 
reflected in the fact that the children appear to learn to produce and 
comprehend nouns before verbs and the early errors with nouns, such as they 
are, are very early. 
Bowerman (1978), on the other hand, suggests that acquiring th~ sense 
of non-relational terms, ie. nouns, will be a longer process. 
"This asymmetry in the distribution of errors may be 
a function of the order in which semantic integration 
occurs for different words: children may come to appreciate 
the semantic similarities among relational words earlier 
than other kinds" 
(1118;984) 
To make this sugg~stion Bowerman draws on results by Gentner (1978) which 
suggest that the components of verbs and other relational words are "both 
less redundant and less densely interrelated than those of simple nouns". 
Bowerman's suggestion is that children might be able to tease apart the 
important meaning elements of relational terms and recognize them as having 
recurrent organizational significance and that analysis will be harder in 
the case of concrete nouns. But Gentner, herself, does not arrive at the 
same conclusion: 
"First, verb acquisition is a slower process. Verbs 
enter the vocabulary later than nouns and the rate of 
vocabulary increase is lower for verbs than for nouns. 
Further, the meanings of many common verbs are not fully 
acquired until the age of 8 yearsor older" 
(Gentner, 1978:996) 
Moreover, there is evidence that the object categories a child learns 
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to label first normally differ in a large number of dimensions and that these 
dimensions are interrelated in a complex manner. Riccuiti (1965) and Nelson 
(1973a) have shown that young children can perform well with sorting tasks 
when it is members of a natural kind (ie. a complex cluster of attributes) 
that are to be grouped, but use of a single attribute as a basis for sorting 
or matching is a much later acquisition (cf. Vygotsky, 1962). Furthermore, 
evidence from the Patas study (Chapter 5) suggests that three and four-year 
old children do have an organized semantic domain at least for animal terms. 
I would suggest that this is probably true of other nominal categories', ego 
fruit, despite the dense and related nature of their components. It may 
in fact be the case that the dense and related components along with the 
possibility of a concrete referential act allows the child to build up a 
conceptual framework faster, although this framework need not be identical 
to that of the adult. 
Alternatively, one might wish to take a completely different linguistic 
stance and argue different animal terms are distinguished simply by an 
iu'dex (cf. Leech, 1974:106-108). Whichever view one advocates, it seems 
doubtful that the sense relationships of non-relational terms are acquired 
after relational ones. 
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My earlier use of verbs in Experiments lA and Band 2 exposed a 
number of methodological problems. In effect these can be summarized by 
my attempt to treat verbs as a homogeneous group of lexical items, an 
assumption which is clearly unjustifiable (cf. Lyons, 1977). The experiments 
reported in Chapter 1, although emphasizing the lack of hierarchical organ-
ization in verbal semantic fields, present the children with a selection of 
verbs, from various semantic fields, the crucial constraint in this experi-
ment being that they conformed to the prerequisites of the experimental 
design. The pictorial data, in contrast, use only stative verbs but as 
Lyons (1977:706) says 
"Most verbs, in all languages, are inherently dynamic, 
in that they normally denote either events (including 
acts) or processes (including activities) rather than 
states" 
It'was therefore decided in the present experiment to choose a single verb 
which epitomized our common understanding of the term, a verb of motion,--
"purest and most prototypical form" (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976). Verbs 
of motion are verbs: 
"denoting a process in the course of which some 
entity changes in physical location" 
(Lyons, 1977:494) 
I chose the semantic field of verbs of travel for two reasons. Firstly, 
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) have attempted to work out meaning represent-
ations for this semantic field, so I would have some theoretical notions 
for comparison. Secondly, pilot studies indicated that children have some 
sort of framework for these kinds of verbs of motion so the new word would 
not be learned in isolation. 
Having decided on what type of verb to study it was necessary to choose 
a mode of locomotion that was novel for the children and corresponded to 
an actual (and accidental) lexical gap in the child's vocabulary. ~imilarly 
it was necessary to choose 'an object that would locomote in this manner. 
Nygren's results suggested that we should be wary about introducing the 
child to a novel form·of locomotion for a known object since some other 
verb of motion may well be 'tied' to the object. Hence it was decided 
to introduce the children to a new but plausible object for locomotion. 
Bearing these factors in mind the children were introduced to a means of 
travelling that entailed going across snow called zutting. In was possible 
to contrast this new means of locomotion with motion verbs such as sailing 
(going through/across water), flying (motion through the air). The object 
which would 'zut' was called a skidoo (a form of snowmobile common in 
Canada). The term for the new object was introduced by implicit ostension. 
That is children were not explicitly told "This is a skidoo". 
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To investigate the child's semantic representation of the term, a 
series of questions was designed. An attempt was made to determine which 
semantic components could be used as specifically relating to verbs of 
travel and then to test whether the children incorporated these features in 
their notion of zut. One set of questions attempted to investigate whether 
modes of locomotion were tied to a particular object. These questions were 
. repeated at two different intervals in the experiment to see whether any 
systematic change in meaning occurred over time. 
If the children have difficulties in grasping the intended denotation 
of "the term we might expect some combination of the following results: 
i) longer acquisition time in contrast to the noun study 
ii) difficulties even in a restricted choice task 
iii) lack of production and erratic comprehension 
iv) avoidance of the term, ie. use of more general terms, ego ~, ~ 
etc. Alternatively the child might avoid the situation entirely and 
in a free choice situation fail to play with the skidoo. 
Changes in representation of meaning over time will be harder to trace, but 
markedly different response rates to the questions is one possible criterion 
for such change. Overextension/underextension of the term is another. 
The main question under investigation is whether the acquisition of a 
new action term causes difficulties which were not present in the acquis-
ition of a nominal. 
Subjects: METHOD 
Twelve children with a mean age of 3;8 (range 3;1 - 4;6) completed 
the study. All children were full-time at tenders in the Psychology 
Department playgroup. 
Materials: 
The materials consisted of four different types of vehicles: cars, 
boats, airplanes and skidoos. There were four examples of each type. The 
cars, boats and airplanes were Dinky Toys and the skidoos were constructed 
by the! using Lego. A toy garage was present for the "storage and repair" 
of the vehicles. A small doll was also used. 
Procedure: : 
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Pretest: A baseline of children's productions of the appropriate means 
of locomotion for each vehicle was established. The toy was shown to the 
child and the child was asked: "How does this move?" Unsatisfactory res-
ponses were followed with probing by!, ego .2.: "up in the sky". !: "how 
does it go in the sky ? ". S: "flying". Response s to the skidoo were 
recorded. 
Introducing event: One week after the pretest children were introduced 
individually-to the action of the skidoo. The children were asked: "Show 
me the one that can zut, not the one that can fly or the one that can sail 
or the one that you can drive, but the one that zuts". 
Comprehension session.: . A week elapsed before the children encourttered 
the toys again. The children were asked to playa game with the experi-
menter. The child was presented with a garage that stored and repaired 
transport vehicles. E passed the· child the toys identifying them as she 
did so: "These x's have to be kept in the garage until someone comes to 
collect them .. Would you put them away please". It should be noted that this 
is the first time the children encounter the term skidoo, and from this point 
the name is used naturally and children are informed that the skidoo is used 
on the snow. 
The S and the E played for a short time with the toys at which point a 
toy doll was introduced. The doll had come to collect one of the vehicles 
because he was going on holiday. The doll wanted to go either sailing, 
flying, driving or zutting. Order of request was varied randomly ~ithin 
blocks of four vehicles. Once the child had passed the correct vehicle, 
the doll would 'climb in' and enact the appropriate motion. 
On completion of the 16 requests the toys were removed and the child 
was asked a series of questions: 
Questions: The questions were designed to investigate the child's under-
standing of this new means of locomotion in contrast to known means of 
locomotion. 
Question A was designed to investigate the child's notion of travel: 
"Can you travel in a x 7" 
Question B tested the appropriateness of each specific action for a man: 
"Can a man zut 7" 
Question C looked at whether the children believed the motion could be 
accelerated: 
"Can you sail quickly 7" 
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Question D assessed children's knowledge of restrictions of modes of loco-
motion to spe"cific vehicles. A meaningless word was included in the question 
frames to see whether the children had learned anything specific to the new 
words, eg: 
"Can you sail a car 7" 
A control group of adult subjects was run to establish norms. 
Table 6.1 presents a complete set of the questions asked. 
Longitudinal session: A six week break occurred. During this break 
video-recordings were made twice weekly of the children playing with the 
vehicles and garage. Recordings were made through a one way mirror and each 
session lasted one hour. These periods provided the children's only.access 
to the toys. No contact with the experimenter occurred during this period. 
Follow-up session: A period of one week elapsed between the final 
video session and the follow-up session. The children were asked the 
Table 6.1 Questions asked concerning vehicles and mode of locomotion 
A) Can you travel ~n a car ? 
Can you travel in a cup ? 
Can you travel in a book ? 
Can you travel in a plane ? 
Can you travel in a skidoo ? 
Can you travel in a chair ? 
Can you travel in a vob ? 
Can you travel in a boat ? 
B) Can a man fly ? 
Can a man lup ? 
Can a man eat ? 
Can a man drive ? 
Can a man walk? 
Can a man zut ? 
Can a man sail ? 
Can a man drink ? 
C) Can you scream quickly ? 
Can you sail quickly ? 
Can you drive quickly ? 
Can you lup quickly ? 
Can you rest quickly ? 
Can you fly quickly ? 
Can you zut quickly ? 
Can you throw quickly ? 
D) Can you sail a boat ? 
Can you drive a skidoo ?* 
Can you sail a car ? 
Can you fly a plane ? 
Can you 1up a bicycle ? 
Can you drive a car ? 
Can you fly a boat ? 
Can you zut a skidoo ? 
Can you ride a bicycle ? 
Can you zut a plane ? 
* Altered to fly a skidoo - drive could be appropriate 
following sets of questions: 
1) If I lived a long, long way away from you tell me all the ways you 
could come and see me. 
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2) Children were shown 10 pictures of transport vehicles. As each picture 
was presented the child was asked the following questions: 
i) How does that one move ? 
ii) Have you ever seen one before ? 
iii) Where did you see it ? 
3) The questions asked in the Comprehension Session were repeated. 
4) You can sail a boat. What other things can you sail ? 
You can drive a car. Hhat other things can you drive ? 
You can zut a skidoo. What other things can you zut ? 
You can fly a plane. What other things can you fly ? 
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RESULTS 
Pretest: 
In this session only one child (J,.P.) refused to answer the questions 
as set. However, when asked to pass the object that could fly, sailor 
you could drive he responded correctly. The eleven remaining children all 
responsed with the correct mode of locomotion for the airplanes, ie. f1y/ 
flies. Three of the children specified where this action could occur, ie. 
"flies in the sky". Nine children correctly replied that a boat sailed; 
the remaining two said that "it floats on water". In response to the 
question about the car all 11 children said that you "drive" it. Eleven 
of the 12 children reported that they didn't know how the skidoo moved. 
The remaining child when asked about locomotion responsed that it was a 
bridge (L.C.). 
From these results we are justified in concluding that all these child-
ren have a lexical framework for modes of transportation and their approp-
riate means of locomotion. Only in one case does skidoo present a possible 
conflict for the ensuing linguistic contrast, in all other cases there is 
a gap in the ~exicon for both vehicle and mode of locomotion. 
Iritroducingevent: 
~ 
All 12 children chose the skidoo as the object that could 'zut'. 
Eleven of these responses occurred immediately, one child hesitating. All 
other modes of locomotion were associated with the appropriate vehicles. 
Comprehensiorisession: 
Six children passed the skidoo without hestitation when told that the 
man wanted to go zutting. Three children responsed with initial 'don't 
knows' and after some hestitation passed the skidoo. The remaining three 
children gave the following responses: 
1) "Where is it zutting ?" 
2) .. "Can't find one, where is it ?" 
3) "Do you mean the garage 7" (J.P.) 
J.P. was the only child to fail the following comprehension tasks and 
attempted to pass E the car instead. 
Their own knowledge and the limited choice of objects practically 
forced the inference that the skidoo was needed for zutting. However, 
despite this and the high rate of success with the introducing event, half 
the children have problems in identifying the intended referent. 
Questions: 
It should be noted that before responding to these questions the 
children have heard the term zut five times. The children clearly differ-
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entiate between objects which can be travelled in, ego cars, boats, airplanes 
and skidoos and objects which cannot be travelled in. The situation in 
which the children have encountered the term skidoo has allowed them in 
this situation to differentiate it from a meaningless control term(cf.Table· 6.0-
Children were also asked to define the term travel. Nine children 
attempted to define travel. Four of the children associated the term with 
a particular vehicle or action, ego "you travel in a car" or "drive". Two 
children reported that travel means "to go somewhere",. a definition that 
would be regarded as acceptable by adult standards. Two children gave 
definitions which suggested associations with particular occurrences of 
travelling, ego "you eat sandwiches - lots of food" and "put engine on". 
One child gave a response which was related to the present situation "over 
snow" - it was snowing outside. Children cannot always articulate their 
criteria for use of a term yet they can still differentiate between approp-
riate and inappropriate contexts of use. 
All children accept that a man can eat, drive, walk and drink. The 
majority of children denied· that a man can 1up, fly or zut. Why should 
children accept that a man can sail yet deny that he can fly? I think the 
answer lies in being able to associate flying with other animate objects 
other than man, ego birds. Alternatively children may be more familiar 
with the causative sail, drive than with the causative fly, ie. he flew the 
- -
plane. Adults accept that a man can f1y·if they are asked about sail and 
Table 6.2. 
Question a: Number of children accepting you can travel in an x. 
Car Boat Plane Cup Book Chair Skidoo Vob 
Adult response 
Child response 
Table 6.3. 
10 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
o 
3 
o 
3 
o 
2 
Question b: Number of children accepting that a man can x 
Fly 
4 
Lup Eat . Drive 
3 12 12 
Walk 
12 
Zut 
5 
Sail 
10 
Drink 
12 
8 3 
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drive first,otherwise they deny that a man can fly (n = 10). Children's 
responses to ~ cannot be differentiated from their responses to the mean-
ingless control, lup. 
Question c: Responses to question c suggest that as a group the children 
are not in agreement as to whether an action can be performed quickly, 
see Figure 6.1. The clear result is. that the majority of children deny 
that you can zut or 1up quickly whereas nearly all the children accept that 
you can drive ~uickly. The possible interpretations of these results will 
be discussed later. What should be noted at this point is that in contrast 
to the responses given to question a) children do not differentiate between 
the word they have been introduced to and the meaningless control. 
Question d: Responses to question d for known objects and actions are quite 
clear, ego you can sail a boat but not fly one, see Figure 6.2. A particular 
mode of locomotion is associated with a particular object. Interestingly, 
children are just as likely to say that one can zut a plane as to say that 
one can zut a skidoo. The mode of locomotion is e1ear1y ~ tied to the 
object. A possible interpretation is that children have not limited the 
extension of zut to a skidoo. It is certainly not the case that they have 
no alternative mode of locomotion for the plane. Initially, it was intended 
to use drive in the framework with skidoo, to maintain balance, however since 
drive is in fact appropriate ~ was inserted in the question frame instead. 
A point worth noting at this stage is that a third of the children respond 
in the affirmative to "can you 1up a bicycle 7". 
Longitudinal session: Allowing the children freedom of choice to play 
with the toys appears to be a satisfactory way of stimulating verbal 
exchanges. The average number of children playing with the garage at.any 
one time was 4 (range 1-7). Although the average varied between sessions, 
the' range was the same for each session. 
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The children invented a number of games to play with the toys. As one 
might expect specific reference to either the objects or the modes.of 
locomotion was not necessary, as in many situations joint reference was 
already established. Also, children can play quite happily simply mimicking 
. the noise the object normally makes. The games the children played included 
"going for petrol", "washing the vehicles", "crashing", "giving the man a 
ride", "buying vehicles" and "taking people· faraway". 
On only one occasion did a child specifically ask for the name of·the 
• skidoo. This occurred in session one and the N.N. responded with the 
correct name. 
Children always referred appropriately to the boat, car and th~ air-
plane. However, in the case of the skidoo for the first two sessions 
children referred to the object by modifying the verb in some fashion, ego 
'zutting thing', 'zutter', or 'thing that goes zutting'. This form of 
reference occurred only once after session two and this was in session 7 
where a child who had already used the word skidoo appropriately said: "He's 
going in the zutting thing". Otherwise the children used .the term .skidoo. 
Throughout the 12 sessions, children referred to the car on 57 occasions, 
. 
the plane on 52 occasions, the boat on 27 occasions and the skidoo on 24 
occasions. Although references to the skidoo and boat were less frequent 
than references to the other two objects, as Figure 6.3 illustrates, refer-
ences made to the objects varied randomly within and between sessions. 
There is no reason to conclude from these data that the children find the 
skidoo unusual. Their initial references to the 'zutter' indicated that 
they had picked up the appropriate action for the object and that the 
implicit reference to the object's name was not as successful as the initial 
lexical contrast. Although this difficulty is overcome through time and the 
natural use of the term by the N.N. 
As a supplementary way of analysing the video tapes, the frequency of 
appropriate motion terms paired with the vehicles and the frequency of alter-
n . 
native but appropriate modes of locomotion were noted. For example, an 
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inappropriate pairing would have been an utterance such as "the airplanes 
are zutting". No inappropriate pairings occurred during the video sessions. 
On the whole occurrence of verbs of locomotion (29) were considerably less 
frequent than occasions of nominal reference (160). 
The verb flying occurred 11 times and was the most common motion verb 
that the children produced. Zut ting was produced 5 times, dri ving twice 
and sailing once. Alternative action terms were produced 5 times in the 
case of cars; .~ was us ed 3 times, ~ once and ride once. Al ternati ve 
motion terms were produced 3 times for the airplane; ~, "having' a ride", 
and driving, twice in the case of the skidoo; "going away" and~. There 
is no evidence from the children's production of these verbs that they are 
treating the new verb in an unusual way or that it can be distinguished 
from known forms of locomotion. 
Children have also acquired some additional knowledge about the skidoo, 
and where you can zut, that is they associate it with snow. Examples from 
video tapes: 
1) "Snow thing" 
2) "Now it's snowing so they can zut along" 
3) "There's skis on the bottom for it to go" 
4) "The runners run on the snow best" 
5) "The skidoo is zutting in the snow" 
Follow-up session: The first section of the follow-up session required 
children to respond to the following question: "If I lived a long, long way 
away from you tell me all the ways that you could come and see me". Four 
children failed to respond. The remaining 8 children produced a number of 
responses all of which can be classed as acceptable. Car was produced 8 
times, airplane 4 times, bus 3 times, van twice and boat, transporter, 
landrover, train, tractor, donkey and horse only once each. No child men-
tioned that a skidoo might be an appropriate means of transport. 
In the picture identification section, 6 children correctly identified 
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the skidoo but only one child correctly named its mode of locomotion. No 
child overextended either the name or the action. Five children reported 
that they had seen a skidoo before. These responses included "on ice", "at 
nana's", "on the snow" and "I play with them". The reader should recall 
at this point that all these children had been exposed to the skidoo freq-
uently during the preceding 10 weeks and it is highly unlikely that they 
had evex; see'» one anywhere else. Three cases occurred where children 
labelled the picture of the skidoo as something else, sledges - 3, snow-
plough - 1. 
Responses to comprehension questions 
The questions from the comprehension session were repeated at this 
point. At no time in the follow-up session prior to this point had the 
experimenter used the term zut • 
Question a: Table 6.4 presents the numbers of children accepting that you 
can travel in an x. As in the comprehension session children clearly differ-
entiate between objects which can be travelled in and those that cannot. A 
skidoo is treated in a similar manner to objects ,which can be travelled in 
and those that cannot. A skidoo is treated in a similar manner to objects 
which can he travelled in and quite differently to the meaningless control. 
The responses follow the same pattern as those obtained in the comprehension 
session. 
" 
It is interesting in the light of responses to the first section of the 
follow-up session, where no child suggested that a skidoo was an appropriate 
form of locomotion to a distant place, that in this situation for over half 
the children change of location is part of the term's meaning. 
Children's definitionsof the term travel were once again idiosyncratic. 
Five children explicitly stated that they did not know what the word travel 
meant. The remaining children associated it with one particular aspect of 
. ,. 1 . . h II Il •• II ,\ " travell1ng, ego s eep1ng 1n t e car, eat1ng 1n the car or luggage. It 
should be noted that no child repeated the response that they had given in 
the comprehension session. It would appear that for these children a number 
Table 6.4. Numbers of children in Follow-up Session 
accepting that you can travel in an x 
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Car Boat Plane Cup Book Chair Skidoo Vob 
Adult response 10 
Child response 
10 10 
9 
( 10) 
o 
1 
(3) 
o 
o 
(3) 
o 
o 
(2) 
7 
(8) 
Note: Responses in brackets are those from the first comprehension session 
Table 6.5. Numbers of 'yes' responses given to "Can a man x 1" 
Fly~ Lup 
1 3 
(4) (3) 
Eat 
11 
(12) 
Drive 
12 
( 12) 
Walk 
12 
( 12) 
Zut Sail 
10 
( 10) 
Drink 
11 
( 12) 
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of experimental occurrences are associated with travelling and that no 
particular one appears to be consistently dominant. The association the 
children reported varied and presumably this will continue to occur until 
some stable criteria are established - a core meaning. 
Question b: 
As in the comprehension session children accepted that a man can eat, 
drive, walk and drink (see Table 6.5). The majority of children deny: 
that a man can lup or fly. Children's denial of a man's ability to fly 
was more consistent in this session than in the comprehension session. I 
would again like to suggest that children associate flying with a .certain 
group of inanimate objects and birds and they did not interpret this question 
as asking if a man can fly a plane. 
Responses to lup remained consistent between the two sessions whereas 
responses to zut showed a slight increase toward the level of sail and 
drive. However, since responses to these questions showed slight variation 
over time I believethere is insufficient evidence in this case to suggest 
any change in the child's representation of the terms. 
Question c: 
Figure'6.1 presents the data for question c. Over half the children 
claimed that you can zut, sail, rest, fly, throw and drive quickly. The 
only anomalous response from an adult perspective being "rest quickly", but 
as one child informed me "you can rest and rest and rest until you fall 
asleep". The implication is that some form of repetition is :important. \ 
.' The only respOl.""J.se which remained consistent between the sessions was 
the response to~. In all the other cases except scream the numbers of 
children accepting that the action can be performed quickly increased. 
The greatest increase occurred with zut, which only in the Follow-up 
, ~ session could clearly be differentiated from the meaningless control. though 
not from sailing or flying. I would like to suggest that the children's 
~ 
representation of zut was beginning to change. However, this suggestion is 
difficult to substantiate from these data for if we make this assumption we 
must also suggest that the children's representation of s'cream has changed. 
it is possible that in the case of scream the children were interpreting 
the. question in a different way, but that in the case of zut the word 
meant something more, that is, the children change their interpretation of 
the question in the follow-up session for scream, but their interpretation 
of the question for zut remains unchanged - it is the meaning of 'zut' 
which changes. This contention is supported by the fact that no change 
whatsoever occurred for lup. 
Question d: 
Responses to question d are presented in Figure 6.2. Particular modes 
of locomotion were associated with particular objects and children's 
responses to skidoo and zutting were nearly identical to the responses for 
known objects and modes of locomotion. If we examine Figure 6.2 we can see 
that the only substantial changes in responses (ie. more than 3) occurred 
for questions including the terms skidoo or zutting. The children's res-
ponses had become more restricted. The particular action ha~ in this set 
of alternative; become tied to the object. 
Finally, in response to. the question "a skidoo can zut; what else can 
zut ?" the following responses were obtained: six children mentioned skis 
or 'sledges which is interesting in the light of the 4 misidentifications of 
the pictures. Only one of these children had identified the skidoo as a 
sledge in the pictorial task. One child informed me that "another skidoo 
could zut, silly". 
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DISCUSSION 
In a contrastive situation with known verbs children perform in an 
identical manner to the way in which they do with nouns; that is, they hand 
over. the strange object emphasized by the lexical contrast. In the case 
of nouns, the information obtained in this exp1i~it contrast transfers 
quite easily to a request situation with implicit contrast one week later. 
This \s not the case for the verb of motion studied here. In the request 
situation half the children had initial difficulties. These difficulties 
occurred despite the fact that there was only one novel referent. Two 
interpretations of these results exist. It may be the case that in using 
a verb form the child expects'some sort of action to occur and that the 
lack of any action causes che difficulties. This interpretation is quest-
ionab1e for two reasons. Firstly, the child was asked for "the one that can 
zut" and secondly the children had no difficulties with the known verbs of 
motion - that is, they could select the one that could sail, fly or be 
driven. An alternative interpretation is that in the case of nouns chi1d-
ren are aware that the denotatum is likely to be an object which is not 
going to change in any significant degree whereas actions can be performed 
by 'any number of different types of objects - ego unlimited numbers of 
objects can~. It may take some time or the presentation of more explicit 
information for the child to make the initial association between object 
and action and only after this has occurred could we expect any degree of 
restriction of the term (cf. Nygren, 1972). For half the children in this 
study the introduction event did not give sufficient information for the 
child to restrict the term to a particular mode of locomotion by a particular 
object. One might expect that after the four subsequent requests in the 
comprehension session that a stabler mapping would have developed. Chi1d-
ren's responses to the questions after this session suggest that this is 
not so, there being no difference between the meaningless control and zut. 
This argument will only carry weight if the children realize that zutting 
" ' 
is an action. Evidence for this is only circumstantia1;in the comprehension 
session we have one child who asks "where is it zutting?" but in the 
Longitudinal session 5 different children treat the word as a verb. At 
least six. children have picked up the syntactic class of the ward. This 
type of result is supported by evidence from Brown (1957) where young 
children were successful in their use of particular syntactic classes. 
Syntactic class-membership.is only one aspect of a word's meaning. 
\~at other information has the child-acquired? A feature which the child-
ren have isolated and incorporated into their-representation of the term 
is that the object travels over snow. This is the infornlation they use 
when requested for examples of other objects that can zut, ego skis and 
sledges. The incorrect identifications of the picture of the skidoo draw 
on this information. Mistakes are objects which are aasociated with loco-
motion in/on snow, ego snowp1oughs or skis. It seems reasonable to suggest 
that this is one of the features the children regard as criteria1. 
A more detailed understanding of the children's representation of the 
terms skidoo andzut can be gained from their responses to the questions. 
From the very beginning children treat skidoo differently from a meaningless 
control and in a similar fashion to the words with which it was contrasted 
(Qu~stion a) •. Children's responses to the question entailing the feature 
(+ travel] remain constant over time. It is precisely those features 
related to the locomotion of the skidoo [+ speed] and specific action that 
do change, see Figures 6.1 and 6.2 respectively). Initially we cannot 
distinguish zut from the meaningless control, it is only after the six 
week break that responses to zut are similar to those for the other motion 
terms and different from the meaningless control. This contrasts dramati-
cally with the question responses for patas where children treat the term as 
an animal term almost immediately (cf. Chapter 5). 
The question then arises, why is there such a difficulty in bre~king 
into the conceptual framework for the verb1 Assuming that I am correct in 
arguing that a framework for verbs of locomotion exists, the difficulty 
here must be in ~aining ac~ess to that knowledge. Again I believe we must 
take into consideration the ambiguities of a referential situation with 
207 
the type of term being considered. Until the child is convinced of the 
relationship being denoted there is no reason for him to draw on his know-
ledge of other similar terms of locomotion. The difficulty is in est-
ablishing the relationship between the word and the world. Once this is 
established relationships between similar types of words can develop. Note 
that the word-world association developed over a period of six weeks when 
the child plays with the toy but does not use the term very often. Is it 
the action with the object which allows him to make this association ? 
Does the experience help him to restrict the possible alternatives? Lack 
of production of the term in the Follow-up session would go against such 
an interpretation, but let us look carefully at what the children say. Only 
one child produces the term zut, but of the remaining,' 11 children, eight 
-
produce responses that indicate that the object moves from one place to 
another and that it does do over snow. The verbs they use are ones which 
they are more familiar with, ego "go" in four cases, "goes over snow", 
"skidding", "slidin r ;", "zooming". Children have grasped the relationship 
between the objects l action and the world, but they depict this by using terms 
with which they are more familiar and which include the feature (+snowJ. 
Gentner (1978:998) predicts such a result: 
"My guess is that children often choose in production 
to extend words whose meanings they know well, rather 
than use words they are less sure of " 
The children know that a skidoo locomotes over snow, though they do not 
produce the exact term, and hence can make the association with other terms 
of locomotion. 
It might be argued that the children's difficulties in this task 
cannot be attributed to a problem with verbs per se; rather children have 
difficulties with this task because it is more demanding than either the 
patas or the chromium task - not only is the child required to learn a novel 
verb but also a novel noun and the association between the two. If this 
factor is responsible for the slower learning process there would be ?o 
reason for the children'to have difficulties in the introducing event. 
because a) the test situation is identical to that·of the previous tasks, ie. 
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there is only one unnamed/unknown item and b) the term skidoo has not been 
encountered. However, children do have initial difficulties with this 
situation and the only explanation appears to be the use of an action term. 
Secondly, if the presentation of two unknown words causes problems for 
the child, one might expect that the term that is introduced secondly and 
tangentially, ie. skidoo, would pose problems for the child. It is pre-
cisely those questions which include ,the term skido~ which contain the 
initial differences in response rates - an indication that something has 
been acquired. Children immediately pick up something about the meaning of 
skidoo. It may be the case that presenting the child with two unknown 
terms is a more complex task for the young child, but I do not feel that 
it is a satisfactory explanation of the children's initial comprehension 
difficulties, the extended mapping process and later failures to produce 
the term zut. There seems to be something more fundamental involved in 
the initial mapping procedures for the term which causes these difficulties. 
Two points are quite clear. Des.,ite minimal expCi>sure to the terms in 
the longitudinal session, it is precisely over this period of time that the 
.. 
children's semantic representation changes. The second point refers to 
responses to 'question d in the Follow-up session. Although the term zut 
is no longer overextended to any of the terms in these question frames, we can 
not simply explain this by a tying of the action to the object (skidoo). 
Children have restr.icted the mode of locomotion (over snow) not the object 
that can perform this mode qf locomotion. Hence the productions and the 
alternatives for the objects that can zut. 
Fianlly, wha.t do the resul ts of this experiment tell us about the 
development of a verb's meaning? Does the fact that the children don't form 
a restrictive bond between 'zut' and 'skidoo' contradict my initial arguments 
about the subject and object referred to being the salient features in a 
child's first encounter with a verb? I do not believe so ; the children's 
initial encounters with the verb are of a different kind. There are a number 
of differences between the present introduction to the verb and those 
presented in Chapters Two and Three. In the first place the verb here is not 
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introduced with an actor. Rather the denotation is restricted by the lexical 
contrast. The same ambiguity of action does not exist. Therefore the need 
to focus on the subject and object occurring with the action is eliminated. 
What the lexical contrast does, in theory, then is to eliminate Nygren's 
first stage of the differentiation process by contrasting the novel mode of 
locomotion with other particular modes of locomotion. The second, though I 
believe less important factor, is that the subject/actor involved is novel 
as well. So whereas previously the children were familiar with the subject 
and object, in this case the children have jits.t encountered the term skidoo 
and may be less certain of it as a subject per se. What I am arguing then 
is that the presence of lexical contrast restricts the denotation of the 
novel verb in a manner that did not occur in the early verb experiments 
and so these results do not contradict my earlier ideas. Indeed, they are 
supported by the fact that even with lexical contrast the mapping is a more 
prolonged one. 
210 
CHAPTER 7 
A NOVEL SHAPE OR PATTERN OR COLOUR TERM? 
Carey's study and my own two, developed along similar lines, have 
attempted to look for a particular gap in a specific semantic domain. These 
studies present the child with sufficient information to determine the 
referent intended by the experimenter and proceed to assess performance 
in a series of well-defined contexts. 
Apart from the denotation intended by the experimenter what alter-
natives did the child have? The opportunity for the children to make wrong 
guesses is sharply circumscribed in these studies. If we assume that any 
guess will be consistent with the information given, Carey's testing pro-
cedure forces the inference that chromium denotes a range of colours 
including olive green, and my procedures force the inference that patas 
denotes a range of animals including tapirs, and that zut denotes a mode 
of locomotion including that of skidoc& This argument, of course, assumes 
that the child can infer the equivalent ostensive definition: for all x, x 
is a 'patas' if and only if x is similar to this. Three-year old children 
can make these inferences, though the time involved varies both within 
and between word classes. 
In the patas and the chromium tasks the initial linguistic contrast 
was supported by a single supporting perceptual contrast, ie. colour or 
type of animal. In the zut task the linguistic contrast did not have a 
corresponding perceptual contrast in the introduction event. That is, 
while the reference was to modes of locomotion the perceptual contrast was 
between objects that could perform these modes of locomotion. By the time 
the comprehension questions were asked the children had seen the toys in 
simulated action. Ilowever, the point is that in each situation there was 
only one critical attribute that differed, be it kind of object or colour. 
By contrast, it seems evident to me that there must frequently be cases 
where there is a doubt "about which attribute is being referred to as well 
as which value (range of values),because of the referential situation and 
the child's limited vocabulary. As we have seen both Rogers (1975, 1978, 
1979) and Bridges (1979) have evidence which indicates that mothers of 
young children are aware of this and sometimes structure the information 
which accompanies the encounter with the new term so as to restrict the 
range of possible denotations. 
The present experiment was desigred to trace the acquisition of a 
single term where the range of possible denotations spanned three distinct 
attributes: shape, colour and pattern. 
Building blocks were used as the experimental stimuli. The test 
stimulus was a hexagonal block with an unusual pattern on it (tangerine 
stripes on a silver/grey background). Would the child take the new term 
to denote the shape*, the pattern or the constituent colours? Two groups 
of children were given different introducing events to see whether it was 
possible to affect their guesses by means of different lexical contrasts. 
A series of questions was designed in an attempt to assess their know-
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ledge of shape and colour terms and of how the new word entered the lexical/ 
conceptual framework. 
Before embarking on the actual experiment, t would like to comment on 
two major criticisms regarding the experimental stimuli. In the first 
instance it might be argued that for some reason one of the attributes 
might have some kind of potency or saliency for the child and therefore 
there might be a tendency to assume .that the potent or salient attribute 
was what was meant by the unknown term, without any account being taken of 
the particular lexical contrast drawn. The general consensus from the 
literature is that nursery school children tend to p~efer colour, there 
Reing a shift to form preference around the age of four and a half to six 
*To save space and spare the reader the following conventions will be used: 
Hexagonal: hexagonal shapes 
Multigonal: a range of shapes including hexagons but excluding circles and 
squares 
Tigrine: 
Stripes: 
Pattern: 
orange and silver striped patterns 
striped patterns, any colours 
a range cf patterns including stripes, ego polka dots, 
zig-zags etc. 
(Suchman and Trabasso, 1966). Preferences do appear to depend on the 
type and complexity of the stimulus. A prediction from this conclusion 
might be that children should find it easier to learn an unknown colour 
term, but there is no guidance about the relative salience of pattern. 
Moreoever, such findings tell us little about the salience of particular 
colours and shapes. However, if the introducing event has any effect 
these perceptual criteria might be overruled.. The second possible critic-
ism is of the use of pattern as a stimulus. Contrasting pattern with 
known colour is clearly unusual. However, there is good reason for this 
choice. It was found in a pilot study that when children encounter colours 
for which they have no name, they overextend known colour terms to include 
this new instance. This did not occur with unknown shapes or patterns and 
since I was looking for a gap in the lexicon, I chose pattern for the main 
experiment. I have, however, included a supplementary control study where 
an unknown colour is contrasted with known colours. This study is reported 
after the results of the main study have been presented. 
21.2 
2:1.3 
METHOD 
Subjects: 
Sixteen children, mean age 4;0 (range 3;0 to 4;11) participated in 
the study. The sample consisted of the full-time at tenders at the Stirling 
University nursery. Fourteen children completed the study, six in the 
shape contrast group and eight in the pattern contrast group. 
Materials: 
The materials consisted of a selection of wooden blocks painted 
specifically for the experiment, one toy puppet and a number of toys as 
filler items described in the following section. 
Procedure 
Stage 1: Pretest: Prior to any exposure to the new word, a baseline 
level of performance was established. Children we~e individually brought 
into a test room in which a number of different objects were present on 
the table. The objects included a toy cupboard, a cup, a plate, a card-
board banana, a car, an airplane, a boat, a skidoo and a semicircular 
block. All these items were filler items for the present experiment. The 
.. 
key stimuli were a green square block, a red circular block and a hexagonal 
block with tangerine stripes on a silver-grey background. The child was 
asked a number of questions about each item. The key question for the 
blocks were: 
1) What's this? 
2) l-lhat dees it look like ? 
3) Do you know what kind of shape it is ? 
4) Do you know what colour/colours it is ? 
5) Is there anything else you can tell me about it ? 
All these questions were used at least once for the filler items. Questions: 
1 - 5 were used for all test items. The toy cupboard was always thQ first 
item presented to the child. The remaining items were presented in a 
random order. The aim of this pretest was to establish the extent of the 
.. . 
children's productive vocabulary for shape, colour and pattern terms. 
Stage 2: Introducing event. Before any testing had begun, the 
children had been divided into two groups. 
received the following instructions: 
Group A, the shape group, 
"You see those blocks over there? Could you please bring me the 
gombe one, not the square one or the round one, but the gombe one". 
Children from this group are designated by an (SC) after their first 
name. Group B, the pattern group, received the following instruction: 
"You see those blocks over there? Could you please bring me the 
gombe one, not the green one or red one, but the gombe one". 
Children from this group are designated by a (PC) after their first name. 
After the gombe block had been surrendered, the other two blocks were re-
quested using the attribute mentioned in the original question. The 
children then proceeded to do a task unrelated to the present experiment. 
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Stage 3: Comprehension 1: Coincident attributes: One week later 
children's comprehension of the term gombe was examined. Each child was 
withdrawn from the playgroup on the pretext of meeting a new puppet (Buzby) 
and playing a game with him. Buzby had a set of blocks (3 striped hex-
agons, 2 green squares, 1 red square, 2 red circles and one green circle), 
with which the children could play and construct anything they liked. 
The child was allowed to play with Buzby and the blocks for approximately 
five minutes, at which point Buzby objected strongly that he had not had 
a chance to build anything. The child was first asked what Buzby should 
build and then asked if he/she could assist the puppet by passing him 
the blocks he requested. 
For children in group A, the blocks were requested by using shape 
terms and gombe, e.g. "I want a square block". Children in group B were 
asked for blocks by using colour terms and gombe, e.g. "I want a red block". 
The tasks were continued until all the blocks had been used in the construct-
ion. Each of the three blocks was asked for three times, the order of these 
9 requests being random within blocks of three. The child was then allowed 
more time to play with,the blocks and, if they wished,to ask Buzby to pass 
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the. blocks. All connnents were recorded. 
At this point the child has heard the new word four times with both 
unusual shape and unusual pattern present in the same object. There are 
no opportunities for the child to extend 'gombe' beyond its known range 
unless the children assume that its range is so wide as to include colours/ 
shapes already pre-empted by existing lexical items. 
Stage 4: Comprehsion 2: Separated attributes. One week later the 
children were again taken out to play with Buzby. This time, in addition 
to the blocks present in stage three, Buzby had a green hexagon~ a red 
hexagon and a square and round block with the unusual pattern on' ,them. The 
two variables shape and pattern have been separated. The game was played ." 
as in stage three. Once the game had been completed the child was asked 
to hold Buzby while! put the blocks away. The blocks were removed from 
view and after a short break the child was asked a series of questions. 
A control group of eight children was'" presented with four blocks 
(a square striped block, a red circle, a red hexagon, and a square green 
block). The children were requested to "Pass the gombe block". This 
allowed a comparison with the experimental group in case a preference for 
one or other of the unnamed attributes existed. 
The Questions: 
The questions were exploratory in nature. They were asked in an 
attempt to discover the child's understanding of shape and colour terms. 
Some of the questions were unusual. However, it is not simply the child's 
"yes" and "no " answers which are critical here but the manner in which he 
justifies his responses. An adult control group+answered the questions 
as well. 
Included in each question frame was the new lexical item and a mean-
ingless control word. The purpose of this section of the task was to see 
if the new word comes to "mean" anything. How was it conceptualized ? 
Was it simply a soun~/object association? Was it differentiated from an 
unknown sound pattern ? 
~ 
Six psychology postgraduate students served as the adult 
control for these questions. 
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The question frames can be divided into 2 subcategories: implicit 
(and unusual) questions about shape and colour and explicit questions 
about shape and colour. 
Implicit Questions: 
Cl: 1. Can you paint a car red? 
2. " square ? 
3. " nerk ? (meaningless control) 
4. " green ? 
5. " gombe ? 
6. " round ? 
C2 : 1. If you went to a shop do you think you could get an x shirt ? 
(1 - 6 in a randomized order). This question was made more relevant 
to the child's knowledge if necessary, ego does daddy have an x shirt? 
Sl: 1. If I gave you a piece of paper could you cut it into an x ? 
(1' - 6 in a randomized order) 
S2: 1. Can you draw an x ? (1 - 6 in a randomized order). 
Explicit Questions: 
1. Is x a shape? If a negative response is given he is asked what 
he thinks it is. 
2. Is x a colour? If a negative response is given he is asked what 
he thinks it is. 
Stage 5: Longitudinal recording: A minimum of one week was allowed 
to elapse before bhe blocks were introduced into the playgroup. 
Buzby became an important feature in the playgroup and I decided to 
use this situation to introduce the blocks into the playgroup. The child-
ren had frequently made "things" for Buzby and sang him songs so Buzby was 
going to give his blocks to the children in repayment. This would allow a 
smooth and natural ifitroduction of the blocks into the playgroup. The 
nursery nurse (N.N.) could then (working in conjunction with myself) 
1> 
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decide on appropriate times to bring the blocks out. 
Extra blocks were added to the original group. These included novel 
shapes - triangles, parallelograms and oblong blocks, two new colours -
brown and purple, different colours of stripe patterns - purple and yellow 
and the two original colours in the stripe pattern separated and painted 
uniformly on square, round and hexagonal blocks. 
The N.N. was asked not to use the new word. If she was asked any 
questions she was to ask for clarification. She was not to give the child-
ren any new information. The sessions were video-recorded through a one-
way mirror. 
Stage 6: Follow-up session. Five weeks elapsed before the start of 
this session. This section consisted of three standardized and one free-
ranging tests. The first task was one of perceptual classification. The 
child was presented with a card on which there were three shapes of three 
different colours or patterns. The child was required to pick out the one 
that was different. No reference is made by E to the varying attributes. 
A total of 13 such stimuli were presented to the child. The purpose of 
this task was to examine the children's conceptual organization of the 
attributes •.. Would shape children (group a) regard shape as the defining 
criteria for judging difference? Would colour children (group B) regard 
colour as the defining criteria for judging difference? Would children 
who in the separated attributes comprehension task required both attributes 
to be present to identify the block as 'gombe' perform differently? The 
second task involved a reversal of the "game" procedure which occurred in 
the comprehension tasks; that is, children had to ask Buzby for the blocks 
so that they could build. Buzby on this occasion was obstreperous and 
always asked for clarification. The point of this modification was to see 
whether the children would produce the word gombe and if so, what w~uld be 
the intended referents. The task also made it possible to record the 
verbal criteria that the children used to identify the blocks. 
The third task included specific use of the term gombe by the E. The 
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context i.n which this occurre.d w-a.s one of clearing away blocks. The child 
was required to pass all the blocks, one by one, so that they could be put 
away. Shape terms, colour terms and gombe were used to request the blocks. 
The requests for the gombe blocks terminated when the child said there 
were "no more gombe blocks". The blocks were requested in such a manner 
that there-was always a selection of blocks left after the final request 
for the gombe block. Both the production and the comprehension tasks 
presented the child with opportunities to extend the term to other shapes, 
other colours and other combination of colours (patterns). 
Finally there was an attempt to get the children to verbally define 
gombe. This interaction between child and E was purely exploratory and 
adapted to the needs of each child. 
Figure 7.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the experimental pro-
cedur~ and is supplemented by photographs of blocks presented through the 
various stages (cf. Figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5). 
'GOMBE' =. 
Stage 6 
Stage 5 
4 Comprehension 2 
Follow-up Session 
1) Production 
2) Comprehension 
3) Definition of term 
i 
Break & observation 
5 weeks 
+Questions+ 2 
,. 
3 I Comprehension 1 Comprehension 1 
2 Introducing Event Pattern n = 8 
Introducing Event 
Shape n = 6 
Stage 1 = 
Figure 7.1: Experimenta1Procedure 
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Figure 7.2 Experimental stimuli for introducing event 
Figure 7 . 3 Experimental stimuli for Stage 3 - coincident attributes 
22 1 
Figure 7.4 Experimental stimuli for Stage 4 - separated attributes 
Figure 7.5 Experimental stimuli for Follow-up session 
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RESULTS 
The results are analysed in two ways. Initially I shall deal with 
the two groups' responses through the various stages of the experiment and 
in relation to the control group results. The second results section 
examines the children's individual mapping strategies. 
Throughout the Results section as asterisk is ~laced beside any child 
who is exhibiting or who has exhibited an unusual response. There is an 
accompanying number indicating the stage at which the first idiosyncratic 
response was given. These responses are cases from which we might predict 
that the child will develop an idiosyncratic denotation of the term. 
Criteria for being "at risk" are subdivided into two categories: direct 
and indirect criteria. These are presented in Table 7.1. 
Section 1 - Group responses 
Stage 1: Pretest. Only responses pertinent to the present experiment 
will be reported. These include responses made to the colours and shapes 
that were chosen as experimental values and the test stimulus, the striped 
hexagon. 
All b . . ()*1 h d ut one ch11d, LOU1se PC ,produced t e colour names re and 
, 
green and the shape names round and square. The hexagon elicited the 
following comments with respect to shape (see Table 7.2); five children 
explicitly stated that they did not know what shape it was, three children 
produced a combination of square and round, one child called it a triangle, 
one child described it as a "stool", one child described it as a "star" 
and one child simply stated that "it was a shape". All of these are in-
appropriate ways of referring to the hexagon. Though they serve the 
communicative purpose in this context, they are not restricted to that 
particular stimulus as are other shape terms. 
Table 7.3 presents the responses given to colour and patterning of 
the test stimulus and, as the table shows, fewer children attempted to 
respond. This is possibly due to the fact that the object was not of a 
simple solid colour. Four of the children used a combination of colours, 
Table 7.1 
Direct 
criteria 
Indirect 
criteria 
Table 7.2 
Don't knows 
5 
Table 7.3 
Criteria for being "at risk" 
1. evidence of underextension or overextension of the term 
in a comprehension session 
2. altering criteria for the denotation of the term ego 
from a pattern to shape 
3. confusion or refusal to complete the task 
1. production of a term which would qualify as a synonym 
for E's intended denotation (ID) of gombe, ego striped 
in the case of the pattern group, since this may pre-empt 
gombe's ID 
2. evidence that the semantic domain in question is not 
clearly differentiated in the child's mind, ego confusion 
in comprehension of colour and/or shape terms, since this 
entails lack of structure into which the ID may fit. 
Children's descriptions of the shape of the test stimulus 
Combination Inappropriate 
3 4 
Children's descript~ons of the colour(s) of the test stimulus 
-
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Combination Combination Solid colour Note patterning (correct colours) (incorrect colours) 
3 2 1 2 
"grey and orange", "grey and blue" and "brown and blue". One child 
labelled it "sort of browny, orangy, grey". Finally one child simply 
produced grey. Only two children commented on the pattern saying "long 
lines on it". No child produced the word striped though it would be most 
surprising if this word was not present in at least some of the children's 
lexicons. 
I shall first work through the comprehension data for the shape group 
followed by the pattern group. 
Shape Group 
Stage 2: Introducing event: The possible denotations of gombe are 
restricted in all cases because the children appropriately produce the 
names of the other attributes. The only object in view with any unknown 
attributes is the test stimulus. All the shape group immediately passed 
the intended referent when requested. 
Stage 3: Coincident attributes: All the children immediately chose 
the correct block and proceeded successfully with the task. 
Stage 4: Separated attributes: All these children used hexagonality 
as their criterion for choosing the gombe block. In this situation the 
arternative variables pattern and colour, which were correlated, were 
redundant. 
Pattern GrouE 
Stage 2: Introducing event: In this group there is one child 
(Louise*l) for whom the denotation of gombe is not restricted, since she 
does not know the other appropriate colour terms. She failed this stage 
completely by failing to pass any block. A second child, Anna*2, also had 
difficulties. She pointed to each block in turn and then receiving no 
feedback, simply a repeated question, passed the correct block. All the 
other chlldren succeeded. 
Stage 3: Coincident attributes: Both children *1 and *2 hesitated 
at this stage but when the request was repeated passed the correct block. 
" 
All the other children chose the correct block immediately and proceeded 
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successfully with the task. 
Stage 4: Separated attributes: Only two children: *2*4 failed to 
use the pattern as their criterion for choosing the gombe block. Inter-
estingly, these children both produced the word striped at this stage. 
Another child, Michae1*4, replied that there were "no more gombes" when 
there were two striped blocks left. In contrast to the other children he 
did pass the blocks when the request was repeated. 
Regarding the sample as a whole, 11 of the 14 children chose the 
original stimulus on the first trial in stage 4 and nine of the children 
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chose the other copy of the original stimulus on the second trial. It was 
only when these:safe options had been exhausted that the children were 
forced to show the extent of his/her mapping of the term. 
Saliency control group (Stage 4 only) 
~ 
A control group of eight children responsed to the request "pass me 
the gombe block". Thei+, responses are presented in Table 7.4. Asking the 
children a second time for a gombe block resulted in confusion and a 
number of random responses, ego green circle, red square and the re~ 
hexagon. These results indicate the importance of the implicit and ex-
plicit contrasts for the experimental group and they also show that the 
results obtained cannot be explained in terms of prior saliency. 
Responses to the questions: 
-To ensure that the questions were internally valid, they were put to 
a group of adult subjects, n = 6. If my intuitions were correct we would 
expect responses for Sl and S2 always to be "yes" for shape terms and "no" 
for colour terms. The opposite response pattern would be expected for Cl 
and C2. Table 7.5 presents the responses obtained from the adult sample. 
The results from the adult sample support the original predictions, apart 
from one anomalous response to S2. It seems likely that the interpretation 
of this question depends on the prior assumptions made by the ~, that is 
you can draw a red if you have a red pencil. Henceforth the expected 
.. 
answers will be taken to be those exhibited by the sample of adults. 
~ 
The control group consisted of eight children drawn from a 
focal nursery school, mean age 4;3 (range 3;11 - 4;4). 
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Table 7.4 Choices of blocks by the Saliency control group 
Red hexagon Striped square Red square Green circle 
3 4 1 0 
Table 7.5 Adult "Yes" responses to the questions concerning colour and shape 
Cl C2 Sl 52 
C Red 6 0 6 0 1 
L 
0 
U Green 6 6 0 1 
R 
S 
H 
Square 0 0 6 6 
A 
p Round 0 0 6 6 E 
n = 6 
Table 7.6 Experimental group "yes" responses to colour and shape questions 
Cl C2 Sl S2 
C Red 12 13 5 7 
£ 
0 14 U Green 11 5 7 R 
S Square 3 2 13 9 H 
A 
P Round 4 2 13 14 
E 
n = 14 
As we might expect, there is variation in the children's responses, 
not only intersubject variation, as occurs with the adult samples, but 
intrasubject variation between similar items. Apart from responses to 52, 
children's response patterns are similar to t~ of the adult sample as 
can be seen in Table 7.6. 
The data from the two experimental groups are tabulated separately 
in Table 7.7a. The two groups' responses do not differ significantly. As 
can be seen from Table 7.7b there are no apparent within or between group 
differences in response to gombe and nerk,; • 
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These data suggest that the children had not learnt anything about 
'gombe'. However, since responses to these questions are likely to under-
esdmate their knowledge the data werereanalysed. The new analysis involved 
a re-interpretation of the initial responses in the light of follow-up 
comments (RI responses). These results are presented in Table 7.8 a & b. 
Initial responses were altered where a child provided evidence that 
either the action was possible, but he could not perform it or if some 
extra condition was met the response would be appropriate. If one or other 
of these conditions was met the response was altered without regard to its 
correctness. This was done so as to maintain consistency within the 
analysis. If the two types of responses were contradictory, the follow-up 
response was used. No change was made if the justification was either 
pragmatically or logically irrelevant to the initial response. Examples 
of pragmatic and logical ireelevance follow: 
Pragmatic irrelevance - E "Can you paint a car red?" 
5 "No" 
E "Why not ?" 
5 "I don't want to" 
Logical irrelevance E "Could you have a square shirt ?" 
5 "No" 
E "Why not ?" 
" 5 "Cause you can't buy one in the ,shops" 
Table 7. 7a "Yes" responses to questions by Group A and B 
228 
Pattern Group n=8 . Shape Group n=6 
Cl C2 Sl S2. Cl C2 .Sl S2 
, 
C Red 7 7 2 5 5 6 3 2 0 
L 
0 
6 u Green 8 2 4 6 5 3 3 R 
S Square 3 2 7 6 0 0 6 6 H 
A 
P 
Round E 2 2 7 8 .0 0 6. .4 
Table 7. 7b "Yes" responses to gombe and nerk 
Pattern Group n=8 Shape Group n=6 
Cl . C2 '. Sl S2 Cl C2 Sl S2 
Gombe .' 2 2 3 2 0 0 2 4 / 
Nerk 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 
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Pattern Groupn=8 ~ Shape group n=6 
Cl C2 Sl S2 Cl C2 Sl S2 
C Red 8 8 2 3 5 6 o· 1 £ 
0 
U Green 8 8 2 3 6 5 1 0 
R 
S Square 3 2 7 8 0 0 6 6 H 
A 
P 
E Round 3 2 8 8 0 0 6 6 
Table 7. 8b RI analysis of "yes" responses to gombe and nerk 
Pattern Group n=8 Shape Group n=6 
, Cl C2 Sl S2 Cl C2 Sl S2 
Gombe 5 3 4 5 0 0 6 6 
Nerk 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 
A random selection of RI responses is ' presented in Table 7.9. 
Many of the children were treating the questions concretely rather 
than abstractly, so that often a child would deny the possibility of per-
forming a particular action because of his own ability or a lack of tools. 
It was the subsequent connnents that made it possible to conclude that the 
child knew what was possible and what was not. As such the RI data make 
the children's competence appear much closer to that of the adult with 
respect to colour and shape terms. 
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The RI responses also allow a better evaluation of children's under-
standing of 'gombe' and 'nerk'. The shape group treat gombe as a shape 
term and clearly differentiate it from the meaningless control term nerk. 
In contrast, although the pattern group responds differently to nerk and 
gombe, gombe is treated neither as a colour term nor as a shape term. This 
may well reflect the odd nature of the question if 'gombe' is viewed as 
a pattern, but equally this may indicate that different children are treating 
gombe in different ways and as we shall see it is within the pattern group 
that a variety of different mappings OCCUIR 
Tables 7.10 and 7.11 present the results of the explicit or hypernym 
q~estion~. These questions are not dealt with competently by the children. 
Some children accept". round and square as colours, others regard red and 
green as shapes. Five out of six shape children accep~ gorobe as a shape 
term but this result is uninterpretable since four out of the same six 
children also say that it is a colour term. The results to these questions 
appear random and are certainly uninformative about the children's represent-
ation of the new term. In fact what the questions appear to show is that 
many of the children have not grasped the hypernym relation for these terms. 
However, this conclusion is questionable since children responded correctly 
to questions concerning colour and shape in the pretest. 
Stage 5: Longitudinal recording: During this five week break six 
video sessions of on.~ hour in length were recorded. During these recording 
sessions there were always groups of children playing with the blocks. 
Table 7.9 Examples of follow-up responses to questions 
El: Can you cut a piece of paper into a round? 
No but my daddy can do it 
E2: Can you paint a car gombe ? 
No cause it would look funny 
E3: Could you have a red shirt 
No I don't like red 
Have you seen a red shirt ? 
Yes 
E4: Could you have' .a nerk shirt ? 
Yes, but you can't make any 
E5: Can you draw a red? 
Yes, but you would have to colour it in 
E6: Can you draw a green? 
Yes, if you coloured it in 
E7: Can you cut a piece of paper into a gombe ? 
That would be difficult I can only cut into 
a round 
E8: Can you draw a square ? 
That's too difficult for me 
E9: Can you draw a gombe ? 
That's too difficult for me 
Original RI 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
2311 
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Table 7.10. 'Yes' responses to question "Is x a shape?" 
~ Group Red green round square gombe nerk 
Shape 2 2 6 6 5 1 n = 6 
Pattern 2 3 6 6 3 1 n = 8 
Table 7.11. 'Yes' responses to question "Is x a colour?" 
~ ~ed green round square gombe nerk 
Shape 4 4 4 4 4 0 n = 6 
Pattern 7 5 3 2 4 4 n = 8 
," 
Attempts were frequently made by the children to gain control of as many 
blocks as possible. Combe was never produced in any recording session. 
Nor did any situation arise where the children appeared to be searching 
for the term but could not retrieve it from memory. Since the N.N. was 
ignorant of the new term it was impossible for her to produce it. Child: 
ren's references to the bricks on the whole were very generaL" They did 
not, in general, resort to other colour or shape terms either. Children 
used shape terms only four times (square once and round three times) in 
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the six recorded sessions. All four times the terms were used in requests. 
Colour terms were used only once, when a child noticed "red and green -
just like my trousers". 
Children tended to play by themselves with the blocks. Each child 
was involved in building sometihing, ego lighthouse, fire engine, spaceship, 
banana, train, chimney, window and animal. All these we,re constructed 
in session two. Discussions with peers and the N.N. revolved around these 
constructions. These sessions therefore inform us neither negatively 
(because children rarely used the other shape and colour terms they knew) 
nor positively (because children never produced"gombe) about the children's 
acquisition.or representation of the new term. 
Stage 6: Follow-up session: The initial task in this session 
required the child to make 13 oddity judgements for a series of sets of 
three shapes, each set being presented individually. Only one set is 
relevant for our present purposes. This set contained a striped hexagon, 
a striped circle and red hexagon. ~.Jould the shape group use shape as 
their criterion for similarity? Conversely would the pattern group use 
pattern as their criterion for similarity? The results are presented in 
Table 7.12. This difference is non-significant (Fisher Exact Probability). 
~atever the children have learnt about the denotation of gombe, it does 
not affect their judgements of similarity in this task. 
In the comprehension session the two groups differed dramatically. 
These results are presented in Table 7.13. As the table indicates all 
the six shape children took gombe to denote HEXAGONS and no other shape 
Table 7.12 
Group 
Children's oddity judgements 
Pattern 
Shape 
Shape 
2 
4 
Pattern 
6 
2 
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known or unknown present. That is, requests for a "gombe block" produced 
responses until all the hexagons were eliminated from the array. In 
contrast, of the eight children in the pattern group, two children took 
gombe to denote TIGRINE, one child took gombe to denote STRIPED, two child-
ren *4*4 reversed their criterion and took gombe to nenote HEXAGONS, two 
response patterns *2 suggested that the term could be applied to objects 
which were either hexagonal or striped or both and finally one child*l 
performed randomly. The development of these responses are dealt with in 
greater detail in the following section. The classification of being at 
risk identifed four of the five children producing unpredicted response 
patterns in stage 6. No child categorized as being at risk followed the 
expected mapping process. 
Production: 
A summary of these results is presented here. They will be dealt 
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with in greater detail in the following section. Productions were not 
frequent. This may well reflect the problems enountered in stage 5. 
Children do not regard it as necessary to include specific attributes when 
requesting a block. The context allows a number of non-linguistic devices 
ta be used appropriately, ego pointing and grabbing. It was the puppet's 
ability to feign ignorance of the intended referent which forced the 
productions which occurred. Table 7.14 presents the productions which 
occurred in this session in relation to the child's final comprehension of 
the new term. Once again these will be discussed in greater detail in 
relation to the individual child. 
Throughout the experimental stages nine children produced the term. 
In the early testing sessions children did produce the term spontaneously. 
However, actual production of the term tells us nothing about the child's 
understanding of it. This fact becomes clear when it is realized that 
the one child who had no criterion for denotation actually produced the 
term twice. It is the wider linguistic and non-linguistic contexts in 
which the word occurs that allow us to make inferences about the child's 
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Table 7.13 Comprehens~on result~ in the Follow-up session 
Criteria for Shape group Pattern group denotation 
Hexagonality 6 2 
Tigrine - 2 
Pattern - 1 
Either/Or - 2 
None - 1 
Table 7.14 Relation of Comprehension to Production - Stage 6 
Subject Production of gombe for Comprehension 
Andrew (PC) 1. tigrine on half moon shape 
2. grey hexagon 
3. original stimulus only as tigrine 
4. tigrine on square 
-
Becky (PC) 1. tigrine on half hexagon only as a 
2. original stimulus hexagonal shape 
Johnathon (SC) 1. hexagon only as a hexagonal shape 
Grahame (PC) 1. original stimulus 
only as a 
2. original stimulus hexagonal shape 
Matthew (SC) 1. hexagon 
only as a 
2. hexagon hexagonal shape 
Anna (PC) 1. tigrine on square either hexagon or 
tigrine or both\ 
.. 
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understanding. One example will make my point. Rosalind - a shape child -
uses the term in conjunction with the colour and the pattern associated 
with the required block: "red gombe", "red round", "striped gombe", 
suggesting that gombe is being treated as a shape term, since is has the 
same distribution as shape terms like circle and square. 
238 
MAPpr~G S'l'RA'l'EGIES 
The use of the term strategy in the following discussion is not meant 
to imply that the child is explicitly aware of these processes. In fact 
the evidence runs counter to such a hypothesis, less than half the children 
(6/14) articulate criteria which are consistent with the criteria they use 
to make their responses. The use of the term strategy here indicates that 
there are certain regularities in the child's decision-making. In the 
present section I will deal with the children's individual response patterns. 
To aid the reader Table 7.15 contains a list of the children's names in 
each condition. 
The first pattern of responses to be described will be those of the 
shape group. Since all the shape children followed a common path, 
their data are combined. 
Shape group - common strategy 
In Stage 1 none of these children had any problems in producing the 
required colour and shape terms, though some of the children clearly had 
larger colour vocabularies than others. No problems were encountered in 
choosing the intended referent in either Stage 2 or 3. In Stage 4 all 
children chose the blocks as if they had made" the inferenc~ that gombe 
denotes HEXAGONAL SHAPES. However, at this stage it is not possible to 
distinguish between the inference that gombe denotes HEXAGONS or that gombe 
denotes MULTIGONAL SHAPES. By Stage 6 it becomes apparent that not only 
had the children made the inference that gombe denotes SHAPE but that it 
denotes a particular shape, HEXAGONS. 
, 
The groups responses to the questions 1n Stage 4 were reasonably homo-
geneous especially if we examine the RI responses, see Table 7.8 a & b. 
Children clearly treat gombe as a shape term and their responses to gombe are 
inconsistent with their responses to a meaningless control. 
Four children from this group produce the term. Ruth produces the term 
'correctly' in Stag~s 3 and 4. In both cases there can be no doubt concerning 
her intended referent because she points as well. Both these productions 
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Table 7.15 The names of the children in each experimental group 
Shape Group Pattern Group 
Ruth Andrew 
Rosalind Becky 
Zol:! Rachel 
Jonathan Michael 
Matthew Graham 
Hazel Anna 
Lucy 
Louise 
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are requests for a "gornbe block". Rosalind uses the term in conjUQction 
with the colour and the pattern associated with the required block (see 
previous page). The following utterance - a response to one of the quest-
ions - is also good evidence that Rosalind is treating gombe as a shape 
term. "First you cut it into a square, or a round or a gombe. Then you 
colour it in". Jonathan and Matthew both produce the term in Stage 6 
when requesting blocks. Their productions are consistent with the manner 
in which they comprehend the term, since they were requesting plain-
coloured hexagons. 
The pattern of the children's responses deviates only when we con-
sider their responses to the final question in the experiment - "What do 
you think gombe is?" Three children give definitions consistent with 
their earlier responses and illustrating an ability to respond object-
ively. 
Rosalind - "Shape, but not colour" 
Ruth 
- "Shape" 
Zog 
- "Shape, has lots of sideways ". 
Hazel denied that it was either shape or colour. Jonathan said it was a 
.. 
btick and that it had both shape and colour and Matthew refused to respond. 
It is within the pattern group that variation in mapping strategies 
occurs and these are presented diagrammatically in Figure 7.6. In principle 
at least, the experimental design allows for at least three distinct 
patterns of response corresponding to the following three hypotheses: 
Hl: the inference that gombe denotes TIGRINE. That is a specific pattern. 
HZ: the inference that gombe denotes STRIPED - The constituent colours 
being irrelevant. 
H3: the inference that gombe denotes a range of one of the constituent 
colours or the original stimulus. 
No child produced a pattern of responses consistent with H3. Perhaps 
the children already knew terms which could be appropriately applied to 
... . 
the colours presented •. This might then block the inference "that gombe 
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denotes a particular colour (cf. discussion of pre-emptmninChapter 3). 
This explanation is partially supported by the fact that the children did 
name the colours, albeit usually wrongly. This evidence for pre-emption 
will be considered in more detail when the results of the colour control 
group are discussed. On the other hand we cannot yet dismiss the possib-
ility that the pattern was simply more salient than either of the cons tit-
uent colours. 
The specific pattern strategy HI: 
Two children produced response pattern consistent with HI. Andrew 
and Becky both passed through Stages 1, 2 and 3 in the same fashion as the 
children in the shape group. However, in Stage 4 their responses are 
clearly different from these children. Both Andrew and Becky chose the 
original stimulus on the first request for a "gombe block" but on the 
second and third request, both children passed striped blocks of a differ-
ent shape. 
In response to the questions in Stage 4 (except S2) Andrew's treatment 
of shape and colour terms was equivalent to that of the adults. Andrew's 
responses to gombe were the same as his responses to colour terms and 
-
therefore differed from his responses to shape terms as well as the meaning-
less control. Becky's question responses were uninterpretable because of 
her response bias to say "yes" to all questions and her refusal to justify 
her responses, eg.: 
E "Can you cut a piece of paper into a nerk 1" 
B "Yes" 
E "How would you do that 1" 
B "Don't know'! 
Of these two children then, only Andrew's responses indicated knowledge of 
sense. 
In Stage 6 both children produced the term. Although Becky's prod-
uction was not inco~sistent with her comprehension data it is not very in-
formative since both uses were references to the original stimulus as a 
"gombe block". In contrast one of Andrew's four productions was incon-
sistent with both his prior and subseqqent comprehension (see Table 7.14). 
He referred to a plain coloured hexagon as a "gombe brick". 
Both children chose only blocks with the original striped pattern in 
the Stage 6 comprehension session and reported that there were no more 
"gombes left" when there were in fact only plain coloured hexagons and 
blocks with differently coloured stripes left, that is, there were no 
tigrine blocks left. 
Becky refused to define gombe but Andrew produced the following 
responses: 
E "~Vhat do you think gombe is ?" 
A "Don't know" 
E "Can't you guess ?" 
A "Gombe 
- with stripes" 
E "Is it a colour ?" 
A "Yes" 
E "Is it a shape ?" 
A "Yes" 
E "Is it a pattern ?" 
A "Yes'~ 
Despite the fact that Andrew both produces and comprehends the term, he 
cannot offer a satisfactory definition'. Two points should be mentioned 
about Andrew's results. Andrew produces the word striped in Stage 6 yet 
this does not preclude his comprehendinggombe as 'striped'. It is, of 
course possible to argue that for Andrew 'gombe' is not synonymous with 
'striped' because for himgombe denotes TIGRlNE. However, as we shall see 
this is not a satisfactory explanation. 
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The second point. relates to the asymmetry between Andrew's production 
and co~prehension in Stage 6. Andrew's comprehension data are unambiguous: 
.. gombe denotes TIGRlNE, yet his production data suggest that goIilbe denotes 
either TIGRlNE or HEXAGONS. There seems to be no simple explanation of 
such a result. 
The generalized pattern strategy R2: 
One child, Rachel, followed the pattern predicted by H2. Rachel's 
responses in Stages 1, 2 and 3 were identical to those of the shape group 
and the specific pattern group. Her responses in Stage 4 were identical 
to those of the specific pattern children. At this stage she responded on 
trial 1 by passing a striped square. Responses to the questions about 
shape and colour were identical to the adult pattern. However, responses 
to gombe could not be differentiated from ~hose given to the meaningless 
control word since responses to both were negative throughout. 
In Stage 6 Rachel made no productions of gombe. She did, inter-
estingly, produce "stripey". Again we have evidence that existence of the 
word stripe in the child's productive vocabulary does not preclude the 
comprehension of gombe as 'striped'. Here there is no justification for 
arguing that gombe denotesTIGRINE; for ih the comprehension section all 
striped objects were passed, regardless of colour, in response to gombe. 
She re~orted that there were "no more gombes left" when there were no 
striped blocks left - though there were plain-coloured hexagons. 
Rachel's definition for gombe is as follows: 
E' "Do you know what gombe is 7" 
R "No" 
E "What do you think gombe could be 7" 
R "Don't know" 
E "Could gombe be a shape 7" 
R "No" 
E "Could it be a colour 7" 
R "No" 
E "Could it be a pattern 7" 
R "Yes'~ 
It should be noted that the possibility of overextending the term to other 
patterns (eg. polka dots) was not present in this study. We cannot there-
fore distinguish between two possible meanings thatgombe may have had for 
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Rachel: 'striped' or 'patterned'. 1-f Rachel views gombe as denoting 
PATTERNED it is not possible to argue that stripey pre-emptsgombe. 
However, her comprehension of the term pattern suggests that if this is an 
alternative, pattern might pre-empt gombe. 
The strategies I have described so far are hardly anomalous. I have 
described shape children who treat gombe as a particular shape and pattern 
children who treat gombe as a particular pattern. However, there were four 
children who produced anomalous response patterns. Two of these were com-
plete reversals of the anticipated strategy, that pattern children who 
treated gombe as a shape term. 
The reversed denotation strategy: 
The children who produced this sequence of responses passed through 
Stage 1, 2 and 3 in an identical manner to the pattern children previously 
discussed, but both were noted as being "at risk" in Stage 4. Michael so 
wassocBssified because of his initial denial of the presence of gombe blocks 
when there were still two striped blocks (not hexagons) left. Buzby's 
insistence that he wanted "a gombe block" resulted in Michael passing the 
remaining striped blocks but no others. Despite this interaction Michael 
proceeded to map gombe on to hexagonal shape. in Stage 6. On the other hand, 
Graham's refusal at Stage 4 was absolute. On the first two trials he passed 
the original stimuli. At this point there were no hexagons left, only 
circles and squares, two of which were striped. Graham said there were "no 
gombes left~ only stripey ones". From these responses we cannot tell 
whether Graham has mapped gombe on to hexagon, multigon or whether both 
shape and pattern are necessary, the critical test block being no longer 
present. 
Graham's initial question responses show a confused pattern. Approp-
riate responses were given for Sl and S2 but random responses were 'given for 
the other questions and in response togombe. Michael responds approp-
.. 
riately for CI, Sl and S2for both colour and shape terms, but gave no 
indication that he could distinguish between 'gombe' and the meaningless 
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control. We can draw no conclusions about the children's semantic represent-
ation of the new term. 
Graham's production of gombe in the follow-up session was restricted 
to the original stimulus. Although Michael did not produce gombe he did 
appropriately produce the word striped. Both children responsed in compre-
hension as if gombe denoted HEXAGON. Michael's definition makes this 
explicit: 
E "Wha t 's gombe ? " 
M "Shape, silly". 
Graham refused to define the term. 
Despite the initial ~xica1 contrast and for Michael the forced choice 
of striped blocks in Stage 4, both children comprehended gombe as denoting 
HEXAGONAL. Why did these reversals occur? The most satisfactory exp1an-
ation and the one I have been advocating throughout the thesis, would be 
that because both children have the word striped in their vocabularies, 
there-is no gap to be filled but there is a lexical gap for 'hexagon'. 
The tendency to assume that a new word denotes a new attribute may be very 
strong. However, we must be wary of being too narrow in our interpretation 
for, as we have seen in the case of Rachel , having the word striped in the 
lexicon does not necessarily preclude taking gombe to denote STRIPED. 
The either/or or both strategy 
The strategy to be described now has a direct analogy in the field of 
concept attainment: the inclusive disjunctive, that is for an instance to 
be defined as 'gombe' it must eigher be hexagonal, tigrine or both. Two 
children's Stage 6 results suggest that this strategy was operative. Anna's 
*2 ... 1 ln1t1a uncertainties became apparent in Stage 2 when she pointed to 
each block in turn in response to the request for a "gombe block". _ A . 
request by the experimentel: resulted in Anna passing the correct block. 
A similar instance occurred in Stage 3 when Anna asked for reassurance: 
the request was simply repeated. It was in Stage 4 that a completely 
individual response pattern occurred. As do the majority of- children Anna 
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passes the test stimuli for the initial two trials. On trial three she 
selects a green hexagon, suggesting that shape is her criterion for choice. 
However, on the fourth trial when no hexagon is available she chooses a 
striped round block. Anna's choices indicate that no single attribute 
suffices to define gombe. Her production at this stage suggests that gombe 
denoted SHAPE: "red gombe", "striped gombe". It also showed that striped 
is in her vocabulary. 
Anna responded appropriately to CI, C2 and S2.for shape and colour 
terms. Responses to gombe and the meaningless control word varied randomly 
and between question types. So although Anna responded to colour and shape 
terms as if she has a conceptual framework, gombe has not been incorporated 
into these semantic fields. 
Requests for the "gombe block" in Stage 6 produced three different 
types of response: the original stimulus, plain-coloured hexagons and 
tigrine blocks. Her penultimate comment was "only got round gombes left". 
Her use of gombe is different from that of Stage 4 where she used gombe in 
conjunction with red and striped. Anna's productions of the term gombe were 
.. 
therefore consistent with her comprehension of the term. That is, gombe 
could denote either HEXAGONAL or TIGRINE. However, her final comment when 
pushed for more gombe blocks was to pass a tigrine square saying "gombe 
cause it's got stripes on it". If we had not had access to Anna's previous 
performance it would be tempting to conclude that Anna had grasped the 
intended denotation of gombe despite the fact that the term was pre-empted in 
her vocabulary. Her response to the final question adds little clarification: 
E "Anna, what is a gombe 1" 
A "A brick, a gombe brick" 
E "Is it a shape· ?" 
A "No" 
E "Is it a colour 1" 
A "Yes ". 
Anna's criterion for the denotation of gombe seems to be simply resemblance 
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to the original referent (ostendent). It appears that she was in the 
process of mapping out the denotation ofgombe by testing various hypotheses 
based on the first presented instance. On several occasions she looked for 
feedback from the experimenter to see if she was correct - a good practice 
in normal discourse. The initial linguistic contrast was not effective, 
either because colour was contrasted with pattern or because the term 
striped already existed in Anna's lexicon. 
In contrast Lucy, who produced similar Stage 6 data to Anna, followed 
the expected sequence of responses for a specific pattern child until Stage 
6. Lucy producedgombe in Stage 4 in the same way as she was using other 
colour terms "big red" "big gombe". However, Anna's results suggset that 
we should be wary of a simple interpretation based on production. When 
asked what she though gombe was, Lucy said: 
L "Don't know" 
E "Is it a colour 7" 
L "Yes" 
E "Is it a shape " 
L "No'~ 
N9learning: 
Despite the fact that Louise produced the term twice, it was not 
possible to identify her intended referent. She failed to show any learning 
whatsoever. Louise was the only child who failed the pretest for colour 
and shape terms and this fact may well explain her results. 
It might be argued that the variety of strategies evidenced in the 
pattern group is specifically due to the fact that the striped pattern is 
riot a novel colour - as the aexical contrast suggests. To control for this 
possibility a study contrasting colour with colour was run. 
COLOUR CONTROL GROUP 
This experiment was designed to answer the question raised at the end 
. of the preceding· section: viz did the diverse, anomalous strategies of the 
pattern group arise because the lexical contrast invited a search for a 
new colour which could not be found,:? Accordingly a lexical contrast 
between gombe and known colour terms was employed as an introducing event 
(as formerly), but the ostendent differed from the other objects in shape 
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and colour only. That is, all blocks were self-coloured, without patterning 
of any sort. The colour chosen for the ostendent was selected so as to 
minimize the possibility of pre-emption of other known colour terms. 
METHOD 
Subjects: 
Seven children completed the experiment. All children were full-time 
attenders of the University nursery group. The children ha.d a mean age of 
3;3 (range 2;8 to 4;0). These children were not in attendance at the 
nursery when the main study was carried out. 
Procedure: 
The procedure was identical to that of the main experimental group 
apart from the alterations in the design implemented in the following stages. 
Stage 1 -Pretest: The pretest was designed to assess the children's 
productive colour vocabulary. The children were. introduced to a monster 
who had one eye that changed in colour. The children's task was to 
identify the colour of that eye. The experimenter controlled the change 
in eye colour and randomly presented 14 different colours; brown, red, 
pink, green, yellow, navy blue, purple, orange, black, white, grey, rust 
and two shades of blue/green. The two shades of blue/green are labelled 
silver fern and green slate on Berger paint colour charts. 
Stage 2 - Introducing event: In the introducing event gombe was con-
t~asted with red and green. The ostendent colour was silver fern. It 
was the colour labelled least consistently in Stage 1. Children were asked 
to: "Pass me the gombe brick, not the red one or the green one but the 
gombe one". The ostendent was a hexagon, the other objects being a c~rcle 
and a square block as formerly. 
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Stage 5 -Longitudinal gap: The gap between stages 4 and 6 was reduced 
to three weeks. Play sessions and hence video-recordings were omitted. 
Stage 6 -Follow~up session: This section consisted of two sub-
sections - a production and a comprehension section, as in the main study. 
The choice of objects was extended to include dark blue, slate green and 
silver fern squares, circles, triangles, hexagons, parallelograms amd 
oblong blocks. 
RESULTS 
Stage 1 - Pretest: The numbers of correctly identified colours ranged 
from 3 to 11. Six of the seven children labelled at least seven colours 
correctly. Only four times did children acknowledge that they did not 
know the names of colours. The colours concerned were rust, silver fern 
and green slate. The tendency for children to label all colours with 
colour terms regardless of their appropriateness supports my argument for 
choosing pattern in the experimental study. There are no clear gaps in 
251 
the colour lexicon. Rather children do not acknowledge the pnsence of a 
gap. Two colours had been included in the pretest as potential test 
stimuli, slate green and silver fern. Silver fern was chosen as the test 
stimulus because it received the greatest variety of colour terms including 
blue, brown, grey and green. I did not want a colour which a11 children 
consistently named in the same way. My assumptions are, of course, a) 
inter-child inconsistency is the best indicator of intra-child inconsist-
ency and b) intra-child inconsistency of naming means that colours so 
named are not pre-empted by the known terms used to name them. 
Stage 2 - Introducing event: Only one child failed this task, Julia. She 
refused to respond. Julia was the only child to exhibit an extremely 
restricted colour lexicon, identifying only 3 colours correctly in Stage 
1. The children's mapping strategies are presented diagrammatically in 
Figure 7.7. 
Stage 3 ~ Coincident attributes: Again only Julia had any problems at 
this stage. This appears to be directly related to her unstable colour 
lexicon. At this stage only one child, Niall, produced the term. He refers 
to the Qriginal stimulus as "gombe block". 
Stage 4 -Separated attributes: Only two children, Nia11 and Myrianthe, 
responded as if gombe denoted the unknown colour, SILVER FERN. Tom res-
ponded as if either property, colour or shape, constituted an identification 
of a gombe block, and finally, four chiMren (David, Lesley, Julia and 
Rebecca) completely reverted from the expected· pattern responding as if 
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gome denoted HEXAGONAL. Rebecca's reSponse when asked for "a.nother 
gombe" was "none left only blue ones". There is a direct comparison here 
with Graham's results (reversed denotation strategy) in the main experiment 
"none left only stripey ones". The difference here is that Rebecca has 
extended the term blue to include SILVER FERN. This was the same label 
she used in the pretest and since it appears Silver Fern is pre-empted, she 
has deduced thatgombe denotes the unknown shape- the only other unnamed 
salient attribute. 
Questions: Of the six children who could have responded to the questions 
three simply replied "yes" to every question and only two of the six were 
prepared to offer any justifications. 
Niall distinguished between shape and colour terms and reponded to 
gombe as if it denoted COLOUR. This is consistent with his comprehension 
data. Again, here, there is evidence that simple "yes"/"no" responses 
underestimate the child's competence. There are not sufficient data to 
warrant any further analysis. 
Stage 6 - Follow-up: In the final session only Niall took gombe to denote 
SILVER FERN. Five children tookgombe to denote HEXAGONAL and Julia took 
gombe to denote the original stimulus. The simplest interpretation of 
these results is that colour terms are more easily extended than shape 
terms; this leaves a gap in the shape vocabulary but not in the colour 
one and therefore children take gombe to denote SHAPE in this situation. 
Apart from the fact that children do learn new colour terms, albeit with 
difficulty (Bartlett, 1978; Campbell and Bowe, 1979; Carey,1978a; Rice, 
1978 cited in Carey, 1978b) and that they do learn synonyms and super-
ordinates and subordinates, such an explanation fails to take into account 
two factors present in the control experiment. Firstly, children's denot-
ation changed. from Stage 4 to 6 and secondly, there were occasional' 
asymmetries between production and comprehension. 
Two of the children who responsed as if' gombe denoted HEXAGON in Stage 6 
had responded quite differently in Stage 4. Myrianthe was the onlY' ohild to 
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admit she had no term for 'silver fern' and in Stage 4 gombe to denote 
SILVER FERN - a mapping we might predict. i~y does she change her criterion 
in Stage 6 and respond as if gombe denotes HEXAGONAL? One possible 
explanation is that some semantic reorganization took place between Stages 
4 and 6 -.possibly in her colour lexicon. 
Tom's performance in Stage 4 could best be described as an either/or 
both property strategy. By Stage 6 he has restricted the denotation to 
hexagonal. ¥fuy? Certainly his Stage 4 strategy allowed for flexibility 
in the mapping process but what made him focus on shape and a particular shape 
at that ? 
In contrast, Julia performed in Stage 4 as if gombe denoted HEXAGONAL. 
By Stage 6 she had restricted the denotation to the original stimulus. The 
reasons for such a restriction are somewhat obscure. Her willingness to 
label all colours with other colour. terms may account for-eliminating 
colour as criteria but why restrictgombe to shape and colour? There 
seems no obstacle for mapping gombe on to shape or even unnamed shapes. 
Alternatively, why can't gombe be just another one of these randomly-
assigned colour terms ? 
It might be argued that the options in the two test situations are so 
different that no consolidation of meaning occurs - rather diff~rent 
situations entail different choices. However, I fail to see how offering 
a different choice can explain Julia's and Tom's restriction of criteria 
or for that matter Myrianthe's focus on one particular attribute - shape. 
Surely present theory would predict either no change or extension with a 
greater variety of responses. 
Interestingly, I have evidence of semantic reorganization in the one 
child, Niall, who took gOltibe to denote SILVER FERN. The evidence comes 
from Niall's father who reported that at home Niall was labelling BLUE as 
gombe. It would appear that although the initial lexical contrast had 
made it clear to Niall that colour was being denoted he had not restricted 
the range of denotata~ 
The second point I would like to mention is the one case of striking 
asymmetry between comprehension and production. Gombe denotes REXAGON 
for David both in Stage 4 and Stage 6. Much to my surprise, when asked 
the colour of a particular block~ at the end of the testing in Stage 6, 
he replied ."gombe". The colour was Silver Fern, but I was expecting blue 
or some similar alternative. One possibility is that David has come to 
realize that he has no appropriate name for 'Silver Fern' and therefore 
uses the only name that has been associated with that colour - odd colour, 
odd name. This hypothesis is weak: since David performs as if gombe 
denotes HEXAGONAL - it is not an odd name. 
Since five of the seven subjects take gombe to denote HEXAGONAL, 
despite the initial lexical contrast, my doubts about the potential for 
pre-emption by the colour lexicon appear to be substantiated. 
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DISCUSSION 
At the end of ten weeks only one child had failed to learn something 
about 'gombe'. All the other children had formed some representation of 
the term. It is not possible to say how many, if any, had acquired a 
"full mapping" for we have no conception of what new contexts might alter 
these responses or what refinement will occur spontaneously(note the 
changes which occur between Stage 4 and Stage 6 when the child does not 
hear or produce the term). In any case, "full mapping" is a relative term. 
In this situation it can only mean the experimente~s intended denotation 
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and sense. Normally the child's interpretation of lexical items is con-
trasted with an agreed consensus. The question is not which children reach 
the experimenter's criterion for "full mapping", but rather what do these 
individual and group strategies tell us about the child as a word learner. 
Chapter 8 will contain a synthesis of all the mini-longitudinal studies 
and will consider whether they shed any light on the questions posed in 
Chapter 4. At present I should briefly like to mention the issues which 
are raised by the present experiment. 
Rather~than giving clear support to my ideas about pre-emption as an 
inhibitory factor in acquiring the meaning of a new word, the present 
experiment makes it clear that some qualifications are needed. The exist-
ence of a lexical gap when a child first meets a new word, assuming that 
the child can pick out the intended denotatum, allows a quick and direct 
mapping.to take place. Certainly pre-emption places added strain on the 
process but it does not preclude the acquisition of the new lexical itemn 
as having the same or a similar denotation to the previously known~xeme. 
Of course, this result should have been expected since children do learn 
synonyms. To my knowledge no work has been done in this area and it seems 
a fruitful field of investigation. At what age and for what word classes 
is pre~emption important ? 
The second issu~ that this experiment sheds light on is the importance 
of lexical contrast. As I stated in the Introduction to this Chapter, in 
257 
the previous studies of this nature th~ range of possible properties 
being refe~red to was highly constrained. The question then is, is lexical· 
contrast still infor~tive to the child when a number of properties are 
available for reference? As the experiment has shown, lexical contrast 
can playa decisive role in the child's ensuing; representation of a new 
lexical item (cf. shape group), but this contrast is less effective when 
the term is pre-empted (cf. colour control) or when the contrast is not 
accurate (cf. pattern group), and an alternative denotation is available. 
Children's solutions, when pre-emption and lexical contrast conflict, may 
depend on a number of factors including their ability to accept synonymity, 
the relative importance placed on linguistic information, the degree of 
ambiguity within the frame of reference, the salience of the attribute and 
other similar variables. 
Thirdly, this experiment allows us to trace the development of denot-
ation over time. Since the childrens' access to the new word is controlled 
by the experimenter, we can conclude with certainty that changes in either 
denotation or. sense relations are due to internal reorganization, since 
there is no further exposure to the new term. Children appear to test out 
tbeir own mini-hypotheses as to the term's denotation (cf. Anna, either/or 
or both strategy). By restricting the child's exposure to the first 
referent and subsequent instances we are also able to examine the proposals 
of Bowerman (1977) and Anglin (1977) that the first referent is often the 
prototype for future extensions of the term. The children who exemplify 
the either/or or both strategy are possibly uncertain as to the intended 
property but use the first referent, that is the striped hexagon, as their 
basis for use of the term. 
Fourthly, within this experimental paradigm it is possible to identify 
children who are "at risk" of developing unexpected mappings. What this 
means is that we are able to identify some of the important variables in 
the word learning process. These include pre-emption, the existence of an 
immature semantic framework, and uncertainty concerning the intended 
referent. 
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The fifth point is a methodological one but bears upon our under-
standing of the child's semantic competence~ As I have stated, knowing the 
meaning of a word entails knowing both its denotation and its sense. In 
an attempt to investigate the child's semantic representation of the new 
lexical item I discovered what appeared to be, in many cases, a series of 
unstructured semantic fields. That is, children responaed inappropriately 
to the questions about colour and shape. Some of the problem may rest in 
the structure of the questions. But the children never responded to 
questions about shape with colour terms and vice versa. This suggests 
that a conclusion about unstructured semantic fields for colour and shape 
terms is unwarranted. Possibly I should have presented children with 
blocks consisting of one gombe attribute and asked about colour, shape and 
pattern, but this method places demands on the child's productive abilities. 
The point is that we must be very sure that the task we design tests the 
competence we wish to investigate. 
The sixth point is also methodological and is an attempt to explain 
why there were no productions in Stage 5. The explanation may lie, not in 
the complexity of the term, but rather in the nature of the verbal inter-
changes. I assumed that children would use the only possible distinguishing 
criteria, either shape or colour, to request the blocks. This was not the 
case. The following are examples of what actually occurred: "I want a 
-
big brick· like that one", "I need two of them", "I want some bricks", "I 
want one of those", "Do you want the brick 7" (holding it up), ''\fuere have 
my bricks gone 7" or "I've got lots of bricks". The level of use which I 
assumed would operate was wrong. Children were functioning quite success-
fully without resorting to shape or colour terms. 
The final point pertains to a possible built-in bias in the experi-
mental design. Children used the bricks for building, and this very 
activity may predispose a child to consider shape as the more salient 
attribute. It is not possible to test this hypothesis directly. I am not 
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sure what sort of stimuli would be used in such an experiment. However, 
two points suggest that this predisposition might not be a critical 
variable. In the first place the only difference between the shape group 
and the pattern group was the lexical contrast, yet the two groups differ 
dramatically in their mapping strategies. So while building may engender 
a predisposition to focus on shape, it is not sufficient to eradicate the 
effect of linguistic contrast. Also the saliency control group showed no 
bias to select hexagons. Secondly, during the video sessions the pre-
dominant response was to build, but children also grouped blocks according 
to their colours and patterns, another suggestion that shape might not have 
been the only variable that the children focussed on. If the experiment. 
made the children focus on anything it was the fact that they were dealing 
with bricks, not necessarily bricks of a particular cblour or shape. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE MAPPING PROCESS 
This chapter falls into three parts. In the first section I will 
bring together the overall results from the mini-longitudinal studies so 
as to present a synthesis for the reader and to provide further ground for 
the ensuing discussion. In the second section I will discuss the data 
accumulated in these studies, in relation to the theoretical issues dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 (4.2). In the final section of this chapter I will 
speculate as to the possible progression in the acquisition of ~ew terms 
by preschool-age children. 
8.1 Themini~longitudinalstudies as a whole 
Carey's innovative experimental method has made it possible to trace 
preschoolers acquisition of unfamiliar words. New word classes and a 
number of other potentially important variables have been investigated by 
the introduction of a series of experimental modifications. Figure 8.1 is 
an attempt to view the experiments as a whole in relation to the variables 
involved and their relation to the final mapping of the new terms. From 
th~ figure it is possible to pick out those variables which can be regarded 
as carrying greater weight in the, subsequent acquisition process •. Undoubt-
edly these variables will interact in a number of complex ways, but at 
present the manner in which this interaction occurs can only be speculated 
upon. 
Lexical contrast which specifies the intended semantic field without 
ambiguity is a decisive factor in the ensuing mapping process, providing a 
gap exists in the relevant area of the lexicon. If no gap exists the 
children either focus on an unnamed variable which is present or produce 
alternative strategies as in Carey's original work. The lexical contrast 
need not be supported by an analogous perceptual contrast, though the 
presence of an appropriate perceptual contrast does seem to accelerate the 
ensuing mapping process. This result should not, in fact, be surprising 
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since Harris (1975) has shown that 1inguisti.c infqrmation in the form of 
"a mib is a bird" allows children to make inferences regarding the attri-
butes of\mib' and to distinguish it from other members of the class. 
The presence of a semantic framework into which the new word can 
enter appears to be more important for a sense representation of a term 
than for its denotationa1 repre~entation. The semantic frame is set up by 
the initial linguistic contrast. A semantic framework shows that the 
children know that relations exist between words, and therefore its exist-
ence potentially allows the new term to enter into these word-word relation-
ships. As such the existence of a semantic frame may in fact be a 
necessary prerequisite for the development of sense relationships. So, for 
example, in the case of the pattern contrast group, although various denot-
ationa1 boundaries are constructed, the term does not enter into any 
coherent semantic framework. This may well be because the initial contrast 
is ambiguous. This is not the point, however. The point is that various 
denotations develop but there is not evidence of any sense relations. In 
a similar vein, in the 'patas' case, where a semantic framework exists,we 
are sure of the sense of the term for the children and can only infer the 
denotation of the term from the choices the children make from a limited 
selection of animals. It is, therefore, logically and empirically possible 
for sense and denotationa1 mappings to exist independently. The sense of 
the term restricts denotation, and equally, knowledge of denotation miy 
allow a sense representation to develop. When both of these representations 
are complete, the child may be said to have achieved full mapping of a term. 
The existence of a gap in the relevant area of the lexicon accelerates 
the mapping process as we have seen in the case of pat as , zut and the gombe 
shape contrast group. Although the absence of such a gap in the lexicon is 
likely to prevent the intended mapping, it does not necessarily do so. In 
support of the importance of the lexical gap theory we have data from five 
o~t of the six children in the colour control. These chi1dre~who have an 
alternative label for silver fern, treat the new word as a shape term 
2 6 ~ 
despite the initial linguistic contrast. Even the single child who does 
take gombe to denote COLOURalters his own denotational boundaries and 
starts to label blue as gombe, an indication that for this child'two words 
cannot denote the same entity. It is the existence of the word striped 
in the lexicons of Rachel and Andrew (pattern group - pattern strategy) 
which forces us to revise the lexical gap hypothesis. It may be that the 
difficulties children appear to have in associating pre-empted objects or 
attributes with new names underlies a second stage in the process of 
tackling word meanings. There may be an initial stage where the child has 
broad/general rules for identifying the referent of a particular word, for 
example, contextual ones. This process is not necessarily affected by 
previous "name" knowledge. Possibly because the child has either too few 
stable denotata for words or becaus.e he has not grasped the conceptual 
nature of language, so that it is not incongruous for one object to be 
labelled by two different terms. There may then be a second stage where 
the child's conceptual and linguistic knowledge has increased and he uses 
263 
a number of labour saving devices (rules) to cope with the ensuing problems. 
Elements such as contrastive information, limiting features, ego no name 
for x but names for all others, conceptual information, textual information 
etc. all come into play. All these rules can potentially work against the 
child, ego in the acquisition of synonyms, possible superordinate and sub-
ordinate relationships and in understanding text/context asymmetry. 
Finally, there must be a stage of integration where subordinates are seen 
as members of the superordinate class, where the· possibility of synonymy 
exists and where problems encountered with homophones (cf. Campbell and 
Bowe, 1978) are eradicated. The rigid rules which were originally designed 
to rescue the child from the amorphism of the earlier period become 
flexible. It may be that Andrew and Rachel, who are in fact the oldest 
children in the study, have reached the equivalent of stage 3, whereas the 
children who reverse"their denotation forgombe because of the presence of 
the word striped in their vocabularies, are only at stage 2. Such a 
suggestion would be refuted if it were shown that the same child is 
affected by pre-emption for some words yet treats others synonymously. 
This work has yet to be done. However the fact the young bilingual child-
ren will sometimes only label objects by words in one language denying 
the appropriateness of the word in their other language would support the 
stage theory proposed here (Fantini cited in Clark, 1980). 
Carey (1978a, 1978b)identifies two phases in the acquisition process; 
a fast mapping and a more extended slow mapping. The present studies 
support Carey's description of the slow mapping period - a long period of 
semantic and lexical reorganization - however her description of the fast 
mapping process requires some qualification. To Carey, the fast mapping 
is only a 
" Small fraction of the total information that will 
constitute a full learning of a .word" 
(1978:18) 
The first point is a simple qualification of Carey's initial conclusion. 
In some cases the fast mappings may provide the children with sufficient 
information to gain a considerably more detailed understanding of the term 
than Carey would have us believe (cf. patas study). The second qualifi-
cation is more important. Implicit in Carey's definition is the fact that 
information acquired in the fast mapping process is relevant to the 
meaning of the new word. Certainly this is the case in her own study, but 
when the child has more options as to the attribute being referred to 
there is a greater potential for errors, and children make them. There-
fore fast mappings need not necessarily provide the children with inform-. 
ation which is relevant to the meaning of the new word but rather on some 
occasions the fast mappings may lengthen the word learning process 
because the child has made an initially incorrect guess. Fast mappings 
are structured by the linguistic and non-linguistic context in which the 
child encounters the word and by the nature of the episode; the more un-
structured are the alternatives that are available to the child the more 
likely he is to make an error. It would seem then that the information 
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provided by children's mothers, which restricts the possible meaning of 
the new term, are extremely valuable guidelines for the child. 
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8.2 Theoretical implications of the mini-longitudinal studies 
The data accumulated in the preceding studies serve as a clarifi-
cation and expansion on some of the ideas and theories presented in 
Chapter 4, Section'2. In particular, the data present us with evidence 
from the preschool child with respect to the formation and subsequent 
representation of semantic categories. 
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Two main explanations of the development of denotation have been 
proposed; the functional core hypothesis and the semantic feature hypo-
thesis (cf. discussion 4.2.1). The data from the patas study do not 
contribute directly to the evaluation of these explanations. From the 
children's discourse it was possible to extract features that they regarded 
as salient in an association with the new animal. Children talked about 
the animal's long nose, it's habitat and the actions they, could carry out 
with the toy animal. Now while long nose and habitat may be regarded as 
perceptual features and might well have been a possible basis for over-
extension, no child used these features though it is true that the 
possibilities of doing so were limited. Equally, children focussed on the 
actions which they could engage in with the toy. Again no overextensions 
on~this basis were produced, but once more the possibilities for doing so 
were limited. Neither of these features appeared to be the basis for the 
children's representation of the term. Children treated the term, as an 
animal term and attributedtothis new word '. animate characteristics. 
The object as a whole rather than any independent feature was the basis 
for categorization. 
In contrast, in the zut experiment children did overextend their use 
of the new verb to include actions carried out by other vehicles in 
similar situations. It is questionable whether this should be termed an 
overextension at all •. 'Zutting' is a manner of locomotion in the same way 
that flying, driving and sailing are. Although there may be one partic-
ular vehicle that is predominantly associated with each of these actions 
this does not preclude statements such as "the car flew through the air". 
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It is arguable therefore that other objects zut as well. If we do regard 
these as overextensions then they are overextensions on the basis of 
action. There is no doubt that the overall basis for categorization here 
is the type of action but what alternatives are there? The lexical 
contrast provides the basis for the eventual mapping and children treat 
the term as an action term. What perceptual features could have been used ? 
As far as I can determine no real alternatives are available apart from 
locomotion over snow. This is in fact the crux of one of the points made 
against the perceptual feature hypothesis earlier and that is that some-
thing other than perceptual similarity is, involved when we consider words 
which denote non-object/relational categories. The key relationship for 
the children in this situation is that the action; a mode of locomotion, 
takes place across snow. However, such a result in no way forces the 
conclusion that all categories are action based. 
It is thegombe experiment which provides us with the most insightful 
, 
data vis ~ vis denotational development and the basis for categorization. 
A function/action based categorization process would presumably involve 
the possibility of building with the blocks and we would therefore expect 
overextensions to blocks of an unnamed shape that could be used for 
building in a similar manner to the hexagons. No such overextensions 
occurred. Some of the children do use a perceptual feature as their basis 
for categorization, either pattern or shape. Children may focus on this 
property either because of the preceding lexical contrast or because an 
alternative property is pre-empted (cf. colour con~rol). Not all of the 
children's lexical categorizations are based on a single simple feature. 
Children also develop,denotations which are best described as associative 
complexes (cf. Vygostsky, 1962). A red hexagon and a striped square share 
nothing in common with each other; they do each share one feature with a 
central instance, the striped hexagon referred to asgombe. In the colour 
control there is one child (Thomas) who uses this system as his basis for 
categorization in stage 4, but by stage 6 is only focussing on a single 
perceptual feature. So not only is it possible for different children to 
have different bases of categorization and for. the same child to have 
different bases of categorization for different words, it is also possible 
for the same child to change his basis of categorization. Now it can be 
argued that the strategies produced by calling something a "gombe block" 
and intending to denote colour are different from pointing to the moon and 
saying "moon". They are only different if the child knows that in one case 
a property is being denoted and that in the other case an object is being 
denoted. I suggested that in the cases of children who produce associative 
complexes this distinction has not been made. It seems that in both 
situations the child uses the original referent as a basis for discovering 
the denotation of the term. Lexical contrast when it is successful 
restricts the denotation. 
Since the mini-longitudinal studies attempted to elicit production as 
well as assess comprehension, they provide us with data to evaluate the 
present theories concerning the relationship between comprehension and 
production. In thepatas study both comprehension and production occurred 
at approximately the same time. Children showed evidence of comprehension 
from the first test session and spontaneous production occurred in the 
subsequent session. The children's productions were always consistent 
with their comprehension. 
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In contrast, in the case of the novel verb, children did not produce 
the term but rather produced verbs with which they were more familiar, ego 
'go' and then qualified the action stating that it was associated with snow. 
It would seem that children choose to use words with which they are more 
familiar. Arguably these terms are semantically less complex as well. It 
would have been impossible in the patas study for the children to produce 
terms which were semantically less complex and still establish reference. 
I believe that this is further evidence that concrete objects are best 
viewed in a hierarc~ic .framework whereas verbs and other relational terms 
are best viewed in terms of semantic complexity of the inclusion type. 
Looked at in this light [80] is included in the meaning of 'zut', ie. go 
over snow, whereas 'patas' is viewed as a hyponym' of animal. Children's 
productions of more general verbs may therefore be seen as indicating that 
children's attempts at production are not in conflict with the manner in 
which they comprehend the term. 
The majority of children in the gombe experiment produced the term in 
a manner that was consistent with their comprehension, although in some 
cases the production was restricted to the original stimulus. One child, 
Louise, produced the term but showed no evidence in the final analysis of 
acquiring any information whatsoever about either its sense or its denot-
ation. It was as if Louise knew the context in which the word occurred, 
playing with blocks, but had no other principles governing the appropriate-
ness of its use. Louise then presents evidence of a complete reversal of 
the expected pattern, that is she produces before she comprehends. 
Apart from one instance of production before comprehension, the data 
here are not inexplicable in terms of the more common views of these two 
processes (Clark & Clark, 1977; Clark et a1, 1974 ; Gentner, 1978; 
Hutten1ocher, 1974). There are data from two children in the gombe study 
which ape difficult to reconcile with any of the prevalent production/com-
prehension theories, except possibly that of Campbell and Bowe (1979). 
Andrew (cf. Table 7.15) is a pattern child who comprehends 'gombe' as a 
specific pattern yet produces the term not only for the specific pattern 
but also when the only defining attribute is shape. While David (colour 
control) takes .gombe to denote SHAPE from stage 4 onwards, it is only in 
the discussion after the main experiment that David produces the term and 
this is when he is responding to questions concerning colour. Why do these 
children respond in this manner? Must we conclude that the production and 
comprehension ranges are not inherently related? In effect I think this 
statement is too extreme, since in the majority of cases production and 
comprehension proceed ill synchrony. The problems arise when the children 
encounter some difficulty in the mapping process either when the domain 
under investigation is ill-defined (colour vocabulary) of when one source 
of information, ego lexical contrast, conflicts with the child's knowledge, 
ego the term is pre-empted (David), or when the initial encounter empha-
sizes one property yet there is still an equally salient possible unnamed 
alternative available (Andrew) or finally when the amount of information 
presented to the child overwhelms him so that he is unable to establish 
any consistent mappings (Campbell & Bowe's systematically varyingdenot-
ation task). The relationship between comprehension and production is not 
always systematic: it will depend to a greater or lesser extent on the 
conditions in which the child encounters the term, his own semantic com-
petence and the extent to~ch alternative appropriate labels are present 
in his vocabulary. This is very different. from saying that the two pro-
cesses are inherently not related. 
I have already dealt with the importance of having a pre-established 
semantic framework for acquiring the sense of a new term. At this point I 
should like to bring the reader's attention to an interesting incongruity 
concerning children's understanding of sense relationships. It is precisely 
those sense-based relations which are seen as primary to the linguist 
which are difficult to evaluate in the child. Synonymy appears to be'a late 
acquired relationship; children'S responses to hyponym questions are often 
obscure (cf. Carey, 1978; and the data presented in Chapter 7). The re-
lations of converseness and antonymy have not been examined here. Yet it 
is clear in many of the cases that children do have organized semantic 
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frameworks; the problem appears to be in their ability to state the relation-
ship explicitly. It is, therefore, necessary for the investigator to 
attempt to overcome these difficulties by inventing tasks which assess the 
child's semantic competence without explicitly testing the child' s ~eta-
linguistic awareness. 
, 
In fact the childrens ability to use linguistic 
contrast to limit denotation illustrates.that children are alive to the re-
1ationships which ex1st·betweenwords and can use such relationships to 
their own advantage. 
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8.3 Acquiring the meaning of a new word 
, 
In this section I intend to speculate on the preschoolers process of 
acquiring the meaning of a new word. Needless to say, this speculation 
is based on the data collected in this thesis. 
Provided that reference is established the child will use the first 
referent as the basis for his subsequent attempts at mapping the meaning 
of the new word. If the child does not identify the referent when relational 
terms are involved he will pay attention to the words which accompany the 
new term and any other contextual information which is regarded as salient 
until a consistent mapping can be established. 
If the child is introduced to the new term in contrast with a set of 
related linguistic terms,and if there is a distinct gap in his lexicon, 
then the child can use the information given to infer a denotation of this 
new term which matches the linguistic information. In the same manner, 
providing that the semantic framework is stable the child will develop 
relationships between words as well. 
If, however, no such gap exists the child may resort to a number of 
possible strategies: 
(1) He may focus on an unfamiliar property (if present) not emphasized by 
the linguistic contrast; 
(2) He may treat the word as a synonym of a known appropriate word, but 
see discussion 8.1 ; 
(3) Criteria for use of the term may fluctuate, but the basis for ex-
tensions will be one or other property of the original ostendent. 
Strategies one and two are possibilities wh~n the domain is structured 
and no piece is missing. Three,on the other hand, is more likely when no 
structure exists or when the child is unsure of which semantic domain is 
relevant. Clearly, if the child is sure of the original ostendent but 
unsure of the criteria for application of the term, testing by over-
extension to exemplars with varying degrees of similarity is one way of 
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defining the limits of application. Responses of types one and two 
elimiate possible denotata rather abruptly, whereas responses of type 
three allow for a gradual development. 
Children have great difficulty stating what they know about a partic-
u1ar lexical item. In fact it is not unjustifiable to say that they are 
often not aware of this knowledge - it is tacit. Not only are children 
not aware of what they know about a word's meaning, but frequently the 
child's tacit understanding of the term, as viewed in spontaneous prod-
uction and comprehension, does not necessarily reflect what they say about 
the term. So, for example, Andrew (pattern group, specific pattern 
strategy) behaves as if gombe denotes TIGRI~6 0' and clearly distinguishes- bet-, 
ween shape and colour terms,but cannot explicitly distinguish between 
shape, pattern or colour with reference to 'gombe'. On the other hand, 
Anna never responds as if gombe denotes CO LOUR, does respond as if gombe 
can denoteSHAp'E, yet on occasion denies it is a shape and says it is a 
colour. There appears to be a disjunction between the children's two 
representations of the term. Campbell (1979) makes a distinction between 
what he calls phenic and cryptic representations: 
"what is evident to the subject is 
phenic, what is hidden, cryptic" 
(1979:420>-
This distinction may well be helpful in understanding the present apparent 
disjunction. If we view the child's production and comprehension of the 
term as processes employing cryptic representation, which occur without 
the child making inferences about its meaning, asking the child to make a 
conscious rational decision about its meaning may well involve a phenic 
representation which is not yet available for use. 
"There is an inner domain rphenic7 of the organism, 
the contents of which are-constantly changing and 
available to awareness and whose dynamic is rational; 
there is an outer domain /cryptic7, the contents of 
which change only slowly, are not ~vai1able to aware-
ness, and whose dynamic is causal" 
(1979:420) 
The fact that children's representations of.the new lexical items change 
slowly over time when no information is encountered is another indication 
that we may in fact be dealing with a cryptic process when we are exam-
ining the acquisition of new words. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
if we attempt to examine something which is initially only cryptically 
represented by means that tap phenic representations , we will find 
explaining the acquisition of word meanings a difficult if not impossible 
task. 
CHAPTER 9 
WHAT NOW? 
Chapter Eight ended on an optimistic note; it was possible to specu-
late, based on empirical evidence, about the process of acquiring a new 
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word. This Chapter will outline some of the questions which remain un-
answered and comment upon the methodological difficulties of studies con-
cerned with semantic acquisition. In conclusion, I will return to the three-
fold distinction between sense, reference and denotation and suggest a 
manner in which theAe three elements of word meaning might be related. 
Whitehead (1932) distinguishes three stages in the development of 
learning-the stages of romance, precision and generalization. Whitehead 
suggests that the scientific questions asked at each stage are different 
types of questions. The stages do not necessarily reflect different 
empirical methods. Rather it is the manner in which the questions are asked 
and the data interpreted which is critical. Not only did my own thought 
processes parallel Whitehead's stages throughout the formulation and execution 
of this thesis but also ~~itehead's model seems a useful framework for 
envisaging future research in the area. 
Whitehead's first stage is the embryo of future work. He calls it the 
stage of romance, though wonder would seem an equally appropriate term for 
the stage. At this point investigations are not dominated by systematic 
procedures, rather it is a stage where the possible importance of bare facts 
are realized and the potential for unexplored relationships speculated upon. 
In essence this is where I began with the data which suggested a difference 
in children's performance with nouns and verbs. Similarly, the idea that 
the distinction between sense, reference and denotation might prove import-
ant was a speculation based on a distinction recently introduced int~ ling-
uistics. I was searching for the possible role of these variables and 
looking for a framework into which they could be assimilated. It was only 
through moving to Whi fehead' s second stage, the stage of precis ion, that 
questions could be clearly formulated and empirically tested. The stage of 
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precision is one where specific hypotheses are tested (cf. Chapter 3), 
and facts are analysed bit by bit. The whole process forms a coherent 
approach. The approach manifested itself in the form of the mini-longitudinl 
studies. Whitehead's final stage, that of generalization, is self-exp1an-
atory. Bryan Dockre11 (1980) has discussed this stage in relation to 
educational research. He suggests that the final stage is where 
"We ensure that the relationships examined at the 
stage of precision are generally valid" 
095l?-20) 
As far as my research is concerned this stage has yet to Le realized. 
Whitehead makes the point that these stages are not to be treated as dis-
crete entities. Rather they are integrally related. Not only is it necessary 
to speculate before we can be precise and to be precise before we can gener-
a1ize, but equally as we proceed we generate more facts which require specu-
lation and precise investigation. The cycle is unending. This thesis is 
no exception. 
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It is only with hindsight that I can look back and state definitively 
that this thesis has investigated the acquisition of word meaning from two 
sides of a three-sided coin. In the first part of the thesis I examined 
the child's ability to infer meaning from a single presentation of a term 
and I tested this knowledge at once. So the new word was encountered at 
time tl and testing took place at time tl. In the second part of the thesis 
I followed the mapping process over a period of time (tl, t2 ••• tj) and 
testing occurred at several points along this time scale. In the longi -
tudinal sequence each encounter with the new word after tl was always con-
sistent with the meaning/denotation which was most plausibly attached to the 
term at tl. Thus in this situation the difficulties which arose for the 
children occurred when they failed to guess the most plausible meaning. 
There was really no viable alternative consistent with either the linguistic 
or non-linguistic context. So no viable alternative referent exists in any 
of the studies and despite the fact that alternative denotations do exist 
(eg. black and white animals in the patas study) these are circumscribed 
by the lexical contrast, and the subsequent linguistic and non-linguistic 
contexts are always consistent with the initially dominant denotation. Hov -
ever it is probably equally common for a child to encounter an unknown term at 
tl which suggests one dominant meaning and to encounter the word again at 
t2 when a different meaning is predominant. The child must assimilate -the 
information from both encounters with the term to work out the correct 
denotation and sense. If the child was not required at tl to give a precise 
indication of the term's meaning he could hold specific. criteria, with 
respect to meaning, in abeyance until he encountered further instances. At 
any rate the child has no way of knowing whether his initial guess is correct 
until he meets the term again. Hew much meaning should the child invest in 
the new term ? 
Joos (1972) introduces a principle of semantic discovery which he calls 
Semantic . AXiom~~mb~ One .•. Joos' maxim pertains to situations ·where 
"Wnrds are apprehended as mysterious in their environment \\ 
(1972:257) 
The central test of Joos' theory is that when a ,yord in unknown the least 
meaning is the best meaning: 
"The word should be defined in such a manner as to 
make it contribute least to the total message 
derivable from the passage where it is at home" 
Joos also suggests that the process of deriving a complete meaning occurs 
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without the individual being aware of the process and that the final under-
standing manifests itself apparently spontaneously. Now Joos originally 
postulated this maxim to account for situations involved in translating, 
but it would appear that this principle of empirical discovery in semantics 
may have relevance for the child. How would it work ? 
Let us imagine that the child encounters the following sentence: 
"The children are playing with the Iud". Now if the child is required to 
or naturally makes a precise guess as to the meaning of lud, he might well 
say 'ball'. However he will find himself in considerable difficulties if 
l\e later encounters the sentence "Daddy is taking the Iud for a walk". 
The initial specific guess 'ball' is inconsistent with this second encounter. 
If on the other hand the children follow Joos' maxim,all that is required 
is a very general guess, viz. 'something children play with', and on the 
second encounter this initial, guess would need to be coordinated with the 
second context, viz. 'something that is taken for walks'. This process of 
-
coordination according to Joos would go on without the subject being aware 
of it; this idea of lack of awareness fits in well with the processes of 
semantic reorganisation that we have witnessed spontaneously occurring in 
the child. The precise meaning of a term would therefore be acquired 
through a process of semantic reorganization and with further experience 
with the word - a dual process and one which might be hampered if the child 
were required to make a precise guess as to the meaning of the terN, as 
happened in Experiments 1 and 2. The process of semantic reorganization 
would be cryptic (cf."Campbell, 1979) and by interrupting it, as I did, it 
would appear that I was attempting to investigate it as if it were a phenic 
process. 
Joos' principle of maximum redundancy makes sense, but this does not 
necessarily mean that it is put into practice. We are most definitely at 
Whitehead's stage of romance. Tacit processes do appear to underlre the 
acquisition of word meanings. That children initially endow a novel 
lexical item with the least amount of meaning, given the intial context, 
would need to be empirically investigated. 
How might this be done? Two groups of children would need to be 
tested with a text containing an unknown word in at least two different 
contexts, each context suggesting superficially conflicting meanings. One 
group of children would be assessed on their comprehension immediately, 
278 
the second group some time later. Do the children who have time for 
semantic reorganization to occur perform in a superior manner ? Does 
requiring a precise definition at tl impair later operation of the semantic 
process? Ideally one would wish to design a means of assessing semantic 
representation at time tl without requiring the child to make a precise 
definition and then subsequently test representation at time t2 after the 
child had encountered the new term in a different context. This testing 
of semantic representations at various time intervals is very similar to 
the'mini-longitudinal studies but the goals would be different. We would 
be looking a) for assimilation of meaning over a variety of conflicting 
conditions and b) for initial vague criteria to define the term. The 
difficulties with getting children to define words at all might complicate 
gathering the latter type of information. On the other hand it might be 
worth designing an experiment similar to the sentence task in Chapter Two, 
but this time with the object of assessing the children's definitions from 
a perspective of amount of detailed information extracted from the ling-
uistic context. 
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9.3 Precision 
In many respects this thesis has raised more questions that require 
systematic investigation than it h~ provided answers to specific questions. 
At least now we are on firmer ground to investigate the word-learning 
process. I do not believe this necessarily detracts from the content of 
the thesis, for it is only through generating frameworks that we can ask 
specific questions in relation to those frameworks. There are, at least, 
three topics which require more detailed information. 
The differences which appear to exist between different word classes 
with respect to both acquisition processes and final semantic represent-
ations need to be clarified. I have shown that with stati€ pictures child-
ren have greater difficulty identifying the referent of a verb than that 
of a noun. It is not clear whether this difficulty is special to verbs 
or is inherent in all relational words. I have suggested that the problem 
lies in isolating the key components of the relation and therefore this 
difficulty should generalize to all relational words, including relational 
nouns. There is evidence in the literature that relational terms are in 
fact the terms which are acquired later on in the word-learning process 
(cf~ Piaget on 'brother', 'tomorrow' etc). It would be possible to test 
this assertion by contrasting the rate of acquisition of relational nouns 
with non-relational nouns, as well as studying other relational words. 
If the difficulty does rest in the 'relation', it should be possible 
to characterize to a greater degree than I have been able to, exactly what 
elements are crucial for meaning to the child - is it the global nature of 
the initial context or do specific contextual elements play a role? In 
the pictorial study it was established that children opt for the original 
context picture, lacking the relevant action, when they encounter an 
unknown/unnamed action. Can we be more precise about the criterial elements 
for meaning and canwe show, as Nygren (1972) suggests, that these 
variables change with age? I believe so. A similar paradigm to that of 
Chapter Three could be used to investigate the phenomenon. For example, a 
child could be presented with a picture illustrating a girl skipping by a 
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tree and told: "the girl is NS-skipping by the tree". The test pictures 
could then be constructed in such a way as to vary only one key item (cf. 
Table 9.1). 
Of course, these experiments are still open to the objection that the 
nature of the prototypical verb is not being accurately depicted. That is, 
the novel action is being depicted statically rather than actively. A 
different type of experimental paradigm could overcome this difficulty as 
follows: Children could playa game with a puppet, the puppet demonstrates 
a variety of actions to the child, some known and some unknown. To test 
comprehension the child is required to act out the action and to test 
production he is required to identify the action being performed by the 
puppet. By manipulating the choice of objects available in response con-
ditions it is possible to assess the importance of the original objects in 
the child's representation of the novel verb. So, for example, the child 
is introduced to a verb denoting uncorking and the action demonstrated on 
a bottle of wine with an easily removable cork. The choice of objects for 
response inclu4es, 'say, a bottle of wine without a cork, a storage jar with 
a large stopper and a bowl with a wooden spoon in it. Now to demonstrate 
uncorking the child must choose the storage jar but if the representation 
of the new verb is tied to the original objects he will choose the wine 
bottle. 
The evidence from the mini longitudinal studies suggests that children 
do take longer to map out the deno~ions of novel verbs in contrast to 
simple nouns, but we need more information as to why these difficulties 
arise. Description is only one phase in scientific endeavour; it must be 
accompanied by explanation. I have suggested that part of the reason that 
the semantic process is extended is due to the semantic complexity of 
verbs and the fact that it is easier to use a more general verb without loss 
of adequate communication. How accurate is this assumption? In essence 
we need objective criteria of semantic complexity. Talking in terms of 
.. . 
numbers of features avoids:the issue and is misleading when we consider 
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Table 9.1 A hypothetical example for an experiment controlling 
contextual elements in initial presentations of novel verbs 
Test picture Rl R2 R3 R4 
Girl GirI Boy Boy Girl 
Rope Rope Rope 
Action Action Novel Action 
Tree Tree Tree 
· . 
semantic domains like colour. Once reference is established what factors 
influence the child's subsequent mapping of a verb? A systemaUcinvesti-
gation of a number of different types of verb is what is required. 
282 
The second issue, which is the subject of a thesis in itself, is 
pre-emption. In Section 8.1 I suggested that there might be a developmental 
trend in the manner in which pre-emption affects the child's increasing 
vocabulary. This hypothesis seems to be a sensible one. Such an investi-
gation would necessarily entail both an element of longitudinal and cross-
sectional data collection. Factors such as the intended level of speci-
ficity and the degree to which the new term was pre-empted would have to 
be carefully controlled. A useful back-up source of information could be 
obtained from bilingual children. 
Finally, a more detailed understanding of the nature of fast mappings 
is required. It should be possibly to classify the type of information 
children use in fast mappings, the nature of which may vary between word 
classes. For example, if I am correct in my analysis of relational terms, 
certain contextual elements may be more salient in the fast mapping for 
these terms than they are for object terms. For object terms the degree 
of similarity to the prototypical exemplar of that category may feature 
strongly in the fast mapping. In a similar vein it should be possible to 
specify the relative importance of syntactic, lexical and conceptual 
elements in the fast mapping. Finally, one would wish to investigate the 
differences between the fast and the slow mappings. Are they qualitatively 
different processes based on different types of information? To what extent 
is the fast mapping context dependent - that is based on the external objects 
and events and shared knowledge - and the slow mapping semantically 
dependent, that is, based on the child's pre-existing semantic structure? 
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9.3 Methodology 
Throughout the thesis I have commented upon those methodological 
inadequacies which I felt may have distorted my results. There are several 
methodological problems which are inherent in this area of investigation 
and as such are worthy of note in their own right. 
A possible lack of connection between the processes of comprehension 
and production has been postulated. Such a prediction implies that unless 
we wish to constrain our theorizing to one process both must be assessed. 
There is no doubt though that studies involving comprehension are easier 
to design and that even when we design experiments geared to eliciting 
production there is no guarantee of getting the data we want (cf. Chapter 
6). Moreoever, once we do design an experiment which succeeds in eliciting 
production we must be sure that the equivalent knowledge is being tested 
in the comprehension task - that, for example, the child does not have any 
alternative non-linguistic strategies available to cope with the compre-
hension task. 
The second problem is one that is harder to .isolate - that is the 
subject's attitude to the experimental situation. Children's conceptions 
of the task may change over time. A prime example of this occurs in the 
patas study where by the time the child reaches the follow-up session he 
is aware that I am interested in animal names and thus treats unknown words 
as names of animals. A more fundamental difficulty here iS,where the 
child's whole approach to the problem changes, so that there may be situ-
ations which are initially testing a phenic process, but where tluwgh 
repeated exposures to a particular mode of testing, the child's responses 
become automatic. 
Analogously we must be careful of the types of example we choose to 
assess the child's compete.~ce. Do the experimental stimuli generate 
ad hoc procedures, basic procedures or standby procedures used for regular 
exceptions? Certainly if we wish to make generalizations with respect to 
the actual word-learning process we must be quite sure we are not dealing 
with ad hoc procedures. More specifically there is a danger that when we 
know the type of data we are looking for that we actually design experi-
ments which artificially produce the expected results. Suppose I design 
a task to see whether strategy A exists and therefore specifically include 
a condition where this strategy may manifest itself. If my controls are 
not adequate, the strategy may well appear because there is no alternative 
mode of responding. 
The two following problems are particularly relevant to the present 
set of experiments. Nonsense words are extremely useful tools but they 
should not be used without caution. I think it is significant that the 
studies reported here would not pass the ethical committees in American 
universities (Bowerman, personal communication 1979). At present such 
restrictions seem to overrate our understanding and our capacity to inter-
fere with semantic acquisition, but the more refined our understanding of 
the word-learning process becomes, the more likelyare we to tamper with 
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the child's vocabulary successfully. At any rate, parents can rightly 
object to psychologists teaching their children "nonsense". Ideally one 
would want to investigate the acquisition of real words. Such studies are 
confounded by innumerable extraneous variables. Perhaps the most prominent 
are our inability to establish that a given word does not exist in the 
child's lexicon and to prevent interference from incidental variables. 
There is always the possibility with nonsense words, however, that the 
child is aware that the word is treated in some odd way, despite precautions 
to avoid this - even if it is only the manner in which the child is intro-
duced to the word. 
Despite a rather optimistic introduction to the concept of the mini-
longitudinal study - the missing link - there are definite problems and 
limitations with this method. The number of words of interest that can be 
lexically and perceptually contrasted is limited. Simple dichotomous 
contrasts such as those that exist in the block task are rare. The child 
must have alternative denotations available to him to make the task ex-
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ternally valid, yet if the experiment allows the development of too many 
different denotations it is difficult for the investigator to keep track 
of all the alternative mapping strategies and this leads to a lack of 
internal validity in the experiment. As we have seen, even wLth the 
semantic domains investigated here it is difficult to devise a means of 
assessing the sense of the term. This problem is bound to be exacerbated 
if we wish to investigate anything other than simple nominal fields. 
Finally, we must be aware that the context in which the new word is intro-
duced may affect subsequent mappings, yet the new term must be introduced 
in relation to something. These are all issues which must be taken into 
consideration when designing such studies. 
In summary there are a number of methodological difficulties in the 
area not all of which can be overcome by careful manipulation of variables. 
Perhaps the most frustrating problem for the experimenter occurs when an 
experiment has been well thought out and well designed, but fails to yield 
any response from'children. Too frequently we fail to look at the task 
from the child's perspective. 
Finally, all experiments contain an element of experimenter bias, 
-
even if it is only the orientation from which the problem is tackled. By 
defining meaning as involving sense, reference and denotation my orientation 
was stated at the beginning. 
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9.4. Sense, Reference and Denotation Revisited 
In the introduction to this thesis I drew a three-fold distinction 
between sense, reference and denotation. It is now time to review, 
the usefulness of this distinction and to speculate about the relations 
which might hold between these three components of meaning. 
One of the main reasons for introducing the sense, reference and de-
notational (SRD) distinction was to clarify our understanding of the notion 
of meaning and hence to provide a framework for assessing the child's com-
petence. Was it successful? Perhaps the best way of assessing the 
success of introducing such a distinction is to contrast the possible con-
clusions which may be made when no such distinction is made and those con-
clusions which can be formed when such a distinction is implemented. With 
respect to the noun-verb dichotomy if we fail to implement the SRD dis-
tinction we can only conclude that children have greater difficulty grasping 
the meanings of verbs than they do with nouns. We have no basis for pin-
pointing the difficulty with any particular componant of the word-learning 
process for no a priori distinction between components existed. We would 
find ourselves in the same situation we were in in Chapter Two - verbs 
. 
appear to be difficult for some reason. In contrast, by including the SRD 
distinction we can begin to investigate which component of meaning causes 
the difficulty in the word-learning process. So far we can state that est-
ablishing reference for relational verbs is difficult. 
If we fail to draw the SRD distinction the concepts of full-meaning 
and par~ial meaning can only be subjectively assessed. Carey's (1978a) 
discussion of what ful'l meaning entails is made in comparison to some adult 
norm rather than to any objective criterion. There is no possibility of 
a full meaning which is not equivalent to an adult meaning. Similarly, her 
concept of partial meaning refers to "some amount' of information which is 
not equal to full meaning (adult meaning). In contrast we can state what 
we mean by full meaninfl ($RD) and, by corollary, what components of meaning 
are present in a partiai representation of a term - either sen'se, reference 
or denotation. Talking only in terms of full or partial meanings we 
might have been tempted to say that in the patas study children have 
grasped the full meaning of the term, whereas it is more accurate to say 
that the children know the sense of the term but the precise denotation 
remains to be empirically established. Using the full- or partial-meaning 
approach with respect to the gombe study, either we would wish to say that 
most children know the meaning of the new term since they chose the correct 
objects when asked for the gombe block or we would say that nearly all 
children have only a partial meaning since they did not treat the new term 
in the same manner as they treated other shape or colour terms. 'Meaning' 
is not simply 'full' or 'partial', rather it is either 'full' or one of 
various types of partial meaning. 
In conclusion, I suggest that the SRD distinction clarifies our con-
ception of the word-learning process, adds precision with respect to the 
variables involved in the mapping process and allows us to define meaning 
in such as way as to be able to make predictions about the processes in-
volved in acquiring the meaning of an unfamiliar word. 
One problem which must now be investigated is the manner in which the 
various aspects of word-meaning are related. I would s~ggest that it is 
not the case that onee two elements of meaning are known that the third 
can be deduced. Rather, knowing either sense, reference or denotation or 
some combination of the three, helps in discovering the third. Consider 
Carey's chromium task. Determining the reference of chromium means infer-
ring that the tray intended is not the blue one, determining the sense of 
chromium means realizing that the trays differ saliently only in colour 
and knowing the denotation of chromium means knowing the denotation of 
other similar colour terms, ego brown, green etc. Knowing that chromium 
is "not the blue one" and "a colour" does not necessarily force the 
inference that chromium denotes OLIVE GREEN. Similarly knowing that 
zutting is "not flying, driving or sailing" does not necessarily mean that 
it is a mode of locomotion, though there is a good chance that such an 
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inference will be made. Knowing one or other component of meaning re-
stricts the range of possibilities but does not determine the correct one. 
Sense and denotation are two separate aspects in the word-learning 
process; this is true for both child and adult alike. They involve two 
different semantic pro.cesses: establishing a relationship between words 
and establishing the relationship between word and world. For the adult, 
reference is an arbitrary relationship - an object can be referred to in 
any number of ways. If, however, pre-emption is a problem for the child 
then reference cannot be viewed as an arbitrary activity, rather it is 
intrinsically linked to denotation. The child does not, initially, 
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realize that reference is an arbitrary act but sees it as related to the 
range of objects to which the term is applied. From the child's perspect-' 
ive an object can only have one name and therefore cannot be referred to 
by any other set of arbitrary names. 
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APPENDIX IA 
MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENTSIAAND IB 
Sentences 
A) Nouns 
1. a) ,Jenny saw a GED on the pond. 
b) I play with my rubber GED in 
the bath. 
c) All GEDs make quack quack noises. 
2. a) There are ZUMs in the park. 
b) Daddy bought a Christmas ZUM. 
c) All Zums have branches. 
3. a) I climbed up on the JOD. 
Intended 
denotation 
duck 
tree 
Bed 
b) My JOD is big and soft and springy. 
c) Everynight I go to my JOD. 
4. a) Paul threw the LEV. ball 
b) There are lots of games you can 
play with a LEV. 
c) Most LEVs are round and bounce. 
B) Verbs 
1. a) I BIVed an ice cream cone. eat 
b) When I am full I don't want to 
BIV anymore. 
c) The teacher told us to BIV all 
our dinner. 
2. a) BIPping hard makes you tired. work 
b) Everybody must EIP when th~grow up • 
.. 
c) Daddy BIPs in an office. 
,q ; 
Choice 
duck, horse, cup, 
chair 
tree, cat, cat, boy 
bed, bath, fish, 
man 
ball, plate, 
chicken, horse 
man, table, ball 
butter 
bird, man, plate, 
bath 
3. a) Mummy JUKed at the dog 
b) I can JUKvery loudly. 
c) The teacher JUKed at us when we 
were naughty. 
yell/shout duck, boy, car, 
tree 
A ii 
4. a) Bad dreams are TISsing 
b) It is not nice to TIS people 
Frightening baby, knife, bed, 
table 
c) Mary started to cry when she was 
TISsed, by the noise 
Stories 
a) Nouns 
1. On Christmas day some good little boys get KOGs. John was very 
excited when he saw his Christmas presents. The first one he opened had 
a big red KOG in it. John started to play right away. He pushed his big 
KOG along the floor. 
Intended denotation: truck/car Choice: truck, plate, baby, duck 
2. ,Paul was walking along one day when he saw a LUP run across the road. 
Soon he heard a lot of barking. There was a dog chasing the LUP. The LUP 
ran up a tree.· 
Intended denotation: cat Choice: cat, fish, car, plate -
3. Ben was learning to read. For .his birthday his mother gave him a 
MOG. Ben opened his MOG, and began to look at the pictures. He put it 
down to drink some chocolate but by accident he spilt the chocolate all 
over his new MOG. 
Intended denotation: book Choice: book, car, boy, dog· 
4 •.. Jane was going shopping with her mother. All of a sudden they heard 
a siren. "There must~be a RIZ somewhere" said her mother. Just then Jane 
saw the RIZ engine going along the road. "Let's go see" said Jane. "No" 
said her mother. "RIZs are dangerous. They burn people". 
Intended denotation: fire Choice: fire, bird/boy,ball 
B) Verbs 
1. One day Billy and his friend were walking in the woods. They saw a 
horse ~ping across the field. He was LEPping very fast. Billy turned 
to his friend and said "Let's see how fast we can LEP". So off they went. 
Intended denotation: run Choice: women, duck, car, table 
2. Mary woke up early on Saturday morning. She heard the birds FIMming 
in the trees. She was very excited because today was the day of the school 
concert. She was going to FIM all by herself. She decided to practice, 
but when she trted to FIM she couldn't. Mary had lost her voice. 
Intended denotation: sing Choice: women,dog, plate, chair 
3. Helen was playing with her dolls. One of her dolls was very special 
it could PID. Helen decided to make her doll PIDso she spanked it. As 
Helen was spanking her doll she hit her hand on the table and then she 
started to PID. 
Intended denotation: cry Choice: bird, boy, car, book 
4. Last summer I learnt to PIV. It is great fun to PIV in the sea. 
Sometimes when I go PlYing I swallow water. 
Intended denotation: swim Choice: cup,chair, cat, fish. 
1 
! 
I VERBAL RESPONSE CHOICE RESPONSE 
SENTENCES STORIES SENTENCES STORIES 
. 1 2 3 4 I 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
NOUNS (,8.1% 62.5% 43.8% 59.4% 50% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 83.3% 757- 41.9% 58.3% 62.5% 56.3% 31.3% 37.5% 
VERBS 3.1% 15.6% 65.6% 58.3% 58.3% 8.3% ~8.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 50% 58.3% 28.1% 53.1% 43.8% 59.4% 
---- ----------- --- ---- -- - - - ---~- ----
--.------ -- --------- -- ---
APPENDIX IB PERCENTAGE CORRECT FOR EACH ITEM IN EXPERIENT 1 
tJj 
APPENDIX rr 
INFORMATIVE SENTENCES 
. 
Nouns _. Known 
1. The children are playing with the ~. 
2. The cat is climbing the !!:!!.. 
The indians are dancing aroWlg the fire. 
-
4. The cowboy is riding a horae. 
Nouns - Unknown 
1. The indian 18 paddling the canoe'. 
2. The girl i8 playing the violin. 
,. The cowboy i8 throwing the boomer!!ys. 
4. 'the dog ia "tag c~ed 1>7 a monster. 
Verba - Known 
1. 'the girl ia pushir;g the pram on the path. 
2. 'the girl i8 aittina at the table. 
,. The boy ia rollip.Jt the ball on the box. 
4. The boy ia runnina to the. house. 
Verba - Unknown 
1. The dinosaUr ia attackina the rabbit. 
2. The horse is tangled in the rope. 
,. The donkey ia refusing to go with the boy. 
4. The fish are contained in the box. 
